Opening the Third Century of American Federalism:
Issues and Prospects
Daniel J. Elazar
Ambiguous But Promising
At the beginning of its third century, the condition of American federalism
is best characterized as ambiguous but promising. This, in itself,
represents a great advance for noncentralized government over the situation
which had prevailed between 1965 and 1980, during which the trend was
rather unambiguously centralizing.
In an earlier Annals article, this writer set out the shifting patterns
of American intergovernmental relations in the twentieth century.1 In the intervening
twenty-five years, federal intervention in state and local affairs reached
its apogee and then began to collapse of its own weight, assisted by the
electoral triumph of Ronald Reagan in this dual federalist, states rights
ideology.
The various "New Federalisms" that preceded the Reagan administration
at most sought to replace noncentralization, that is to say, the
constitutional diffusion of power among federal and state, or federal,
state, and local centers in such a way that the relationships among them
are those of true partnership, with decentralization, that is to say, a
federal center deciding what the states and localities should or should not
be doing, even as it relied upon the latter to carry out most federal
programs.2 The most striking aspect of American federalism in the 1980's
is the existence of very strong contradictory trends within the federal
system. On one hand, in the Garcia and South Carolina decisions, the
United States Supreme Court has compounded all its previous errors with
regard to the proper consitutional relationship between the federal
government and the states.3 The court has stood the constitution on its
head to give the Congress of the United States the last word in determining
the federal-state relationship in matters deemed to be within the preview
of the federal government under the Commerce Clause of the federal
constitution. In doing so, it threw over 200 years of constitutional
understanding and nearly that many years of precedent. The Court has done
exactly what the Constitution pledged not to do, that is to say, make one
of the parties to any intergovernmental controversies the arbiter of the
results.
If the states and localities, through their political influence in
Congress, have been able to hold the line on a number of the issues
directly confronted in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, they have lost the
battle with regard to Congressional mandates, whereby the Congress, in
court-justified actions, orders the states to do this and that without any
pretense of winning them over through federal aid or making those orders
contingent upon accepting federal grants.4 This is "prefectorial
federalism". A decade ago, prefectorial federalism seemed to be emanating
from the executive branch of the federal government. In the intervening
years, the executive branch headed by President Reagan, has turned out to
be generally a friend of federalism while Congress, increasingly detached
as it is from state and local ties, has turned out to be a danger , seemed
only to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The transformation of American politics from a state and local
party-based system to a free-for-all among individuals supported by various
national economic, cultural, social, and political interests through
political action committees (PACS) has meant that fewer members of Congress
have had experience in state and local government. Increasingly candidates
for Congress are new to the political arena, and depend on projecting their
personalities to raise enough funds from PACS and individuals to cover
today's outrageous campaign cost. Hence they come to Washington without
state and local political roots. They settle their families within the
Beltway year round, and, while they continue to work their districts, they
do so as visitors more than as residents. Thus they have no strong personal
commitments to state and local interests, much less to the constitutional
rights of the states.5
The States Reassert Themselves as Polities
Nevertheless, within this deteriorating constitutional and political
framework the states have become stronger and more vigorous than ever, have
reasserted themselves as polities, and have become the principal source of
governmental innovation in the United States as well as the principal
custodians of most domestic programs. In this extraordinary turnaround
they have been helped by the catastrophes that have befallen previous
presidents and the positive efforts of the Reagan Administration to have
the federal government turn over certain functions to the states, free
certain revenue sources to accompany them, and reduce federal regulatory
interventions into state affairs and the processes of state governance.6
Fifteen years ago, the crisis of the Nixon Administration -- Watergate,
the Arab oil embargo, the national truckers strike and the collapse of
South Vietnam -- paralyzed the federal government. The states,
particularly the governors, acted to fill the vacuum in the true spirit of
federalism and in a manner that should have demonstrated once and for all
the virtues of federalism as providing useful redundancy and fail-safe
mechanisms, so that when one part of the political system can not function,
other parts can take over. The states organized the distribution of
limited oil and gas resources, governors settled the truckers strike, and
state agencies came to the fore in the settlement of southeast Asian
refugees. State officials discovered that they had powers of their own
derived from the very existence of their states as states and did not need
to wait for federal initiatives or permission, that the states were indeed
polities. Moreover, they enjoyed exercising those powers and did so well.
By 1975, as the United States was about to enter a new political
generation, the second of the post-modern epoch, the states were off and
running. The states' innovative role continued to expand through the late
1970s, in part because of the relative paralysis of the Carter
Administration (which was sympathetic to fostering a greater state role in
the federal system and whose relations with the states were generally good
and constructive).
At the same time, in the years following the Warren Court, the formerly
unambiguously activist U.S. Supreme Court entered into a period of rather
diffuse retrenchment. Many state supreme courts began to pick up the slack
through the development of a new, vibrant state constitutional law,
building state constitutional foundations for public policy in everything
from individual rights to relations between religion, state and society, to
the fair distribution of public services. The constitutional legitimacy of
these grounds was increasingly recognized by liberals and conservatives
alike on the U.S. Supreme Court, each for their own reasons. State
constitutional law became a field of academic and legal interest beyond the
courts, a sure sign of its new importance.7
In the mid-1970's the federal high court began to look more favorably
upon state actions in a number of fields previously subjected to preemptive
decisions by their predecessors. For a while until Garcia, it even seemed
as if the 10th Amendment would be reinvigorated through decisions such as
Usery. Even today the Court's decisions on federalism are distinctly mixed,
with state prerogatives being preserved at least half of the time.
The Reagan Balance Sheet
President Reagan, from the very first moment of his election, began to
reshape American attitudes toward the federal government and the states in
particular. The President annunciated a very traditional dual federalist
view of the American system, but by annunciating it forcefully, he forced
even committed centralists to respond in federalist terms and to justify
their extraordinary reliance on federal intervention in those terms. With
his flare for communication, President Reagan brought federalism into the
headlines in a way excelled by any president in this century.
By its decisive actions in so many fields, the Reagan Administration
demonstrated that it was still possible to take hold of the reins of
government and begin to reverse seemingly irreversible trends -- including
the at least seventy year-long thrust toward greater government permeation
of society. Yet fulfillment of Presidents Reagan's promise to strengthen
the states within that system and thereby strengthen the system as a whole
has not been an easy task. There are several reasons why this is so:
1. Even when there was general agreement in principle, there was great
disagreement around the country and even in the Administration as to what
should be turned over to the states. The Reagan administration was no more
immune to this problem than any other. Indeed, its people suggested new
federal interventions almost frequently as they suggested federal
withdrawls. 2. The states were not necessarily willing to accept added
responsibilities as solely theirs, if the costs -- fiscal or political --
were high. 3. There was a tendency in the administration to rely on
simple notions of striving to separate federal and state functions as a
basis for making policy rather than gaining an understanding of the
possibilities of strengthening the states by restoring classic patterns of
intergovernmental cooperation. Much of the problem relates to a
misunderstanding of the principles of federalism and how they informed the
American political system in better days.
While the Reagan Administration failed to secure the adoption of the
most visible portions of its New Federalism program, by shifting federal
government priorities, reorganizing existing grant programs, and reducing
federal domestic expenditures as a proportion of the total federal budget,
it did succeed in introducing new attitudes among state and local officials
and their constituents. The latter learned that it was no longer possible
to turn to Washington for solutions to most of their problems and therefore
it was necessary to rely upon their own efforts. All this was accompanied
by a shift in the orientation of the federal departments and regulatory
agencies in favor of loosening or reducing federal regulation of state and
local activities and oversight of intergovernmental programs.8
On the other hand, the Reagan Administration did not succeed in
restoring anything approximating dual federalism, even in the limited areas
in which it made proposals. Quite to the contrary, the general sense that
cooperative federalism was the only kind of federalism possible was much
strengthened from both directions -- that is to say, among those who would
have hoped for more federal activity and those who hoped for less.
Moreover, whenever an issue came forward in which an increased federal
role was perceived by the Administration to be beneficial to its interests,
it acted in what has by now become the usual way of opting for the
expansion of federal powers. Three examples of this will suffice: the
federal act allowing double bottom trucks on most federally-aided highways
thereby preempting and superceding state standards; the enactment of a
requirement that states raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one or
lose a percentage of their federal highway funds, and federal preemption of
state laws prohibiting multi-state banks, thereby initiating a process of
nationalization of the banking system. Still, all told, the Reagan
Administration pointed the United States in a new direction. In doing so,
it galvanized and focused the shift that began to be evident even earlier.
A New Direction
The twentieth century was a time in which objective conditions fostered
centralization. Whether the states and localities acted responsibly or not
in meeting the century's challenges, they found the federal government
stepping in. Especially during the first post-war generation there was an
environmental basis for the centralization that occurred. The nation's
economic system became increasingly centralized as locally owned firms were
purchased by national (and multi-national) corporations. The civil rights
revolution led to substantial federal intervention in the legal and
educational systems. Even organized religion underwent centralization as
the various denominations developed strong "national offices" with
extensive bureaucracies. The country's communications system, which so
influences the public, led the pack toward an almost exclusive focus on
Washington as the single center of political power.9
There are many signs that objective conditions in the twenty-first
century will require different responses. Conditions of size and scale
will reduce the utility of the federal government as a problem solver and
increase that of the states. The idea that new models of intergovernmental,
interorganizational, and public/private activity are needed has attracted
increasing attention across the entire political spectrum, from Robert
Reich's America's Next Frontier to John Naisbit's Megatrends, from
conservative advocates of old-fashioned states rights to environmentalists
interested in the greening of America.10 Even ten years earlier, similar
ideas, whatever their intellectual value, ran against the realities of
American civil society.
By the late 1980's, concrete changes in the thrust toward
centralization were evident. While the trend towards further integration
of the national economy has not abated--witness the movement to nationwide
interstate banking--America's new economic concerns focus on industrial
redevelopment and improving foreign markets. Both are spheres in which the
states have played and are likely to continue to play a prominent role
overlapping into international relations, consitutionally a federal
preserve.11
The federal role in the educational system in everything but civil
rights matters began to decline in the mid-1970's. During the Reagan
Administration, federal intervention in civil rights matters also
diminished, first in the actions of the executive branch and most recently
in Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, recent criticism of the results of
the American educational system has led to greater state involvement in
funding and setting minimum educational requirements and achievement
standards. What seems to be emerging is a combination of an increased
variety of educational options locally, both public and private, often on a
non-territorial basis: coupled with state standard setting to establish
certain basic requirements for all who pass through the schools.12
Noncentralization has come back even more strongly to the religious
sphere. The transfer of power to the national offices of the mainstream
denominations stopped by the early 1970's as church members voted with
their feet against the policies of those bodies. Since then, the national
offices have retreated and the great national seminaries had lost much of
their influence.13 The revival of fundamentalism, which tends to be highly
localistic or, failing that, based upon individual evangelists with their
own regional or national followings, has increased noncentralization in the
religious sphere. As fundamentalists became involved in politics, they
brought some of that noncentralization with them. Even when they seek
national solutions, by and large their national political activity has been
devoted to repealing federal policies which interfered with what earlier
had been considered issues in the domain of the states such as abortion and
school prayer.
Communications is the sphere in which there has been the least amount
of change. Political news, especially in the electronic media, still seems
to be heavily national in orientation, flowing from Washington and
concentration on the White House. In this respect, the media, following
the line of least resistance, have lagged behind the overall trends in
American society. In doing so, they have lost the confidence of the
American people.14 Cable television offers the promise of more public
affairs programs that do not originate in Washington or New York even if as
yet that promise has not been fulfilled.
What is characteristic of this new noncentralization is that it does
not represent a retreat from nationalization to an older style territorial
democracy but a movement to a new stage which combines territorially based
and non-territorially based actors in a multi-dimensional matrix.
Technological change has made much of the old centralization obsolete or is
rapidly doing so but the new technology is certainly not restoring the
simpler territorial democracy of a more rural age. American civil society
is becoming more multi-dimensional than ever before, having to accommodate
people who have embraced different lifestyles rubbing shoulders with one
another in an urbanized environment as well as different stages of economic
growth, educational aspiration, religious commitment, and social group
expression.15
If the system has become too complex to simply turn things back to the
states, it has also become too complex to simply rely upon the federal
government. There are too many forces in a country of over 240 million
people spread over three and a half million square miles. States,
localities, and sections offer points of identification and expression
which have a real vitality in their own right and offered real
opportunities to deal with a multi-dimensional society.16
Changes in the patterns of urban settlement will continue to reinforce
that trend. At the beginning of the century, urbanization had encouraged
centralization; at mid-century, metropolitization helped shift government
in the direction of decentralization. Now the spread of low density urban
settlement in the countryside is restoring the impulse for
non-centralization.17 Finally, the closer intergration of an international
community whose members increasingly will rely on federal principles in
their own organization, will increase the international role of the states,
including a closer relationship with their counterparts in other federal
systems. Today over 70 percent of the world's population lives under
federal arrangements of one kind or another, from the United States of
America to the European Community. The 160 plus politically sovereign
states are interacting with the 300 plus federal states in ways that are
diminishing the differences between them.18
New Dimensions and First Principles
In order to cope with these new dimensions, it is necessary to go back to
first principles -- not for formulas but to reexamine them and to discover
how they can help us deal with the new environment which the American
federal system must serve.
First and foremost, we must recall that the nation and each of the
fifty states is a polity in its own right, in the fullest sense. While the
federal and state governments may serve the others in some administrative
capacity by mutual agreement, neither is designed to be the administrative
arm of the others per se.19 Together they form a governmental matrix
established by the American people, not a power pyramid with the federal
government on top, the states in the middle, local governments on the
bottom and -- by implication -- the pyramid as a whole resting on the backs
of the people. The general government (that nineteenth-century term has
great merit for its precision and the clarity it brings to the subject)
sets the framework for the matrix as a whole by defining and delineating
the largest arena. The states, whose boundaries are constitutionally fixed,
provide the basic decision-making arenas within the matrix.20 Both together
provide the constitutional basis for the diffusion of powers necessary to
prevent hierarchical domination, given the human penchant for
hierarchies.21
Since the beginning of the Republic, the elements in the matrix have
worked together to develop common policies and programs, with most
important actors involved in most important details of most steps in
problem definition, planning, programming, budgeting, implementation, and
evaluation of most policies of mutual interest to them through the
political process.22Empirically, students of federalism pointed this out
two decades ago and more, through detailed case studies of federalism, the
party political process, and the role of Congress, particularly in the
quadrangle linking states (and/or local) administrators, their federal
counterparts, their congressional representatives, and their common
professional associations or interest groups. Congressional-administrative
pre-clearance of proposed legislation and administrative regulations is a
regular feature of American government and has been since 1790. Plans for
programs are developed, more often than not, in consultation with spokesmen
for the interested parties.23 Unfortunately, the inroads of the new
hierarchies into the manner in which all this is done has put the
traditional system in jeopardy.24
The problem for federalism, then, is not that the federal and state
governments must cooperate in the governance of the country, but that, in
the 1960's, the federal government, under the guise of "cooperative
federalism" changed its role from being supportive--from playing a
"backstopping" role -- to being coercive and even preemptive basis.
Recognizing the interlocking character of the federal system, a proper
theory of federalism suggests that the federal government should only deal
with: (1) The application of the framing principles of the United States
Constitution; (2) extraterritorial issues (e.g. foreign affairs, defense); (3)
boundary questions between the constituent entities of the federal system; (4)
backstopping the states and their localities in matter of national concern. It
need not, indeed should not, deal with any of these on an exclusive or
preemptive basis. It is clear that this coercive federalism has failed.
Coercion of the states and localities not only leads to a strong negative
reaction on the part of the principals involved and the public in general, but
it is tied closely with the failure of managerialism -- the ideology of those
who sought to replace traditional federalism with a power pyramid approach.
Refocusing on the States
There was a time when the American public -- reformers and conservatives,
interested parties of all kinds -- looked to their states as the arenas in
which to fight great battles and do great things. Indeed, that was the
case even though American society was in many respects a national society
from the first and certainly became more intertwined nationwide in the wake
of the Industrial Revolution. Now that is happening again. The New Deal
quite properly represented a recognition that the states could not "go it
alone," at least not after the U.S. Supreme Court had so limited their
powers that reform was stymied unless Congress acted. But to carry the
principles of the New Deal to absurd extremes, to assume that because the
states can go it alone in some things, they cannot go it alone in any, or
that they cannot lead in those things that are done cooperatively, is
simply to misread American reality and American aspirations.
On the other hand, because powers really are diffused -- usually in a
rather untidy way throughout the matrix, it is very difficult to decide to
transfer power from Washington. Other presidents discovered that in order
to decentralize, they must first centralize.25 Today, in an age of
hierarchy-assumers, a president can be a successful centralizer to a great
degree but there is no guarantee that an administration strong enough to
overcome the non-centralization inherent in the system will so willingly
part with hard-won powers. For those who believe in the utility and
virtues of federalism, the substitution of decentralization for
non-centralization is not an advance. The Reagan Administration grasped the
idea apparently lost in the previous generation that while, under normal
circumstances the elements in the matrix do work together to develop common
policies and programs, the secret of a successful federal system lies
precisely in the right of the elements not to act under certain conditions.
Federalism and The Curses of Bigness
Through bitter experience, it has been discovered that, in very large
bureaucracies, coordination is well-nigh impossible "at the top" since the
people on the top can barely control and are frequently at the mercy of
their own organizations. Moreover, in a system of interlocking arenas
(which is what exists in the United States despite all the talk about
"levels"), there is no real "top" to do the coordinating. Similarly,
students of public administration have begun to note the failure of
managerial techniques widely touted as means to come to grips with
contemporary governmental problems. Certainly, the idea that they would
automatically result in efficiency and economy has long since gone by the
boards. We now know how bureaucracies create their own inefficiencies and
diseconomies. Beyond that, there has been a discovery that the new
management techniques (PPBS and zero-based budgeting are prime examples)
often are inappropriate to the political arena with its lack of precise,
agreed-upon goals and its basic purposes of conciliating the irreconcilable
and managing conflict.
On a different but closely related plane, Americans are beginning to
sense the failure of consumerism - the redefinition of people primarily as
consumers and their institutions primarily as vehicles for the satisfaction
of consumer wants. At the very least, the redefinition of government as a
service delivery mechanism and citizens as consumers leads to an
unmanageable acceleration of public demands.26 It also leads to the
evaluation of all institutions by a set of standards that, being human
institutions, they are bound to fail. Not the least of its problems is the
abandonment of the principle that people have responsibilities as well as
rights, obligations to each other if not to the polity in the abstract,
which, when neglected, imperil democracy by undermining its very
foundations.
Simultaneously, the actions of the U.S. Supreme Court and, to some
extent, the Congress offer vigorous testimony to the dangers which the
states and the federal system face, demonstrating once again the need for
strong constitutional protections for federalism even where there is the
best will in the world on the part of those actively engaged in the
political arena to be good federalists. The founding fathers understood
this need, which is why they wrote such protections into the Constitution.
The possibilities of an increased role for the states are better for
yet another reason. Until the mid-1970's, states rights were inevitably
associated with arguments on behalf of slavery or racial segregation and
discrimination against non-whites. However erroneous such arguments my have
been in principle, in practice states's rights were used effectively as a
shield for slavery and discrimination. That problem has been overcome as a
constitutional issue. It is clear to one and all that the federal
constitution and for that matter the vast majority of state constitutions
are color-blind. This is the constitutionally correct position in a civil
society dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal and
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." For the first
time in American history, believers in federalism can argue that protecting
the rights of the states is important for the sake of liberty and is not
entangled with slavery and discrimination. Hence, as the United States
moves into the third century of American federalism, within the limits of a
reality that will never conform as closely to our models as we would like
and which might not pass certain aesthetic tests, there is a serious
opportunity to strengthen the basic noncentralization of the American system
in new ways.
Notes
1. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Shaping of Intergovernmental Relations in the
Twentieth Century" The Annals, Vol. 359 (May 1965), pp.10-22.
2. Cf. Jeffrey L. Mayer, ed., Dialogues on Decentralization, a special
issue of Publius, Vol.6, No.4 (1976) and Robert D. Hawkins, ed.,
Federalism and Government Reorganization, a special issue of Publius,
Vol. 8, No.2
3. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
_____ U.S. _____ (1985) and Baker v. South Carolina
_____ U.S. (1988 ).
See, the ACIR Reports on Garcia: Reflections on Garcia and its
Implications for Federalism (February 1986); Federalism and the
Constituton: A Symposium on Garcia (July 1987).
4. See, ACIR on Congressional Mandates:
U.S. ACIR, The Constitutional Integrity of the Federal System: Questions of
Balance (1988).
_____, State Regulation of Banks in an Era of Deregulation (September
1988).
On mandating, itself, see:
Catherine Lovell, "Mandating: Operationalizing Domination" in Publius
, Vol. 11 , No.2 (Spring 1981) pp.59-78.
5. For a popular description of how this works, see Hedrich Smith, The
Power Game (New York: Random House , 1988).
6. Robert B. Hawkins, ed., American Federalism: A New Partnership for
the Republic (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies,
1982).
7. John Kincaid, ed., "State Constitutions in the Federal System,: in
The Annals (March 1988) pp. 12-22.
G. Alan Tarr, "Religion Under State Conditions," in The Annals (March
1988) pp. 65-75.
Robert Williams, "Involving State Legislative and Executive Power in
the Founding Decade," in The Annals (March 1988) pp. 43-53.
8. For assessments of Reagan's new Federalism, see Richard Nathan and Fred C.
Doolittle, Reagan and the States (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press,1987).
Reviewed by Daniel J. Elazar in Political Science Quarterly, Vol.104 ,
No.1 (Spring 1989).
Stephen L. Schechter, ed., The State of American Federalism 1980,
a special issue of Publius, Vol. 11, Nos. 3-4 (1981); 1981, Vol. 12, No.3
(1982); 1982 Vol.13, No. 3 (1983); and 1983 Vol. 14, No. 3 (1984); 1986
Vol. 17 No. 3 (1987); 1987 Vol. 18, No. 3 (1988).
_____,Assessing
the new Federalism, a special issue of Publius Vol.16, No.1 (Winter1986).
Richard Williamson, Federalism: Reagan's Efforts to Decentralize Government
(Lanham, Md., University Press of America and Center for the Study of
Federalism, forthcoming).
9. I develop this argument in Daniel J. Elazar "Cursed by Bigness: Toward a
Post -Technocratic Federalism" in The Federal Polity, Publius, Vol. 3, o.2
NO.2 (1973) rePubliushed by Transaction Books as Daniel J. Elazar, ed.,
The Federal Polity. (special issue of Publius in book form,1973)
10. Robert Reich, The Next American Frontier (New York: Penguin Books,
1983) and John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming
Our Lives, 6th ed. (New York: Warner Books, 1983).
11. Cf. John Kincaid, Political Culture, Public Policy and the American
States (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982).
_____, "The American Governors in International Affairs " in
Publius Vol.5, No.3 (Summer 1975).
12. On federalism and education, see:
Susan H. Fuhrman," Education Policy: A New Context for Governance "
in Publius, Vol.17, No.3 (Summer 1987).
13. Peter Takayama, "Administrative Structures and Political Processes in
Protestant Denominations" in Publius, Vol.4, No.2 (Spring 1974).
14. From Public Opinion, see:
John Immerwahr and John Doble, " Public Attitudes toward Freedom of
the Press " in Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.46, 1982, pp.177-194.
15. On culture,see:
Aaron Wildavsky ,ed., American Federalism in Perspective
(Boston; Little, Brown, 1967).
_____, American Governmental Institutions; A Reader in the
Political Process (Chicago: Rand McNally,1968).
_____, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminister
Press,1964).
Terry Clark and Joseph Ben David, eds.,Culture and its Creators:
Essays in Honor of Edward Shils (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press,1977).
Terry Clark, Comparitive Community Politics (New York: J. Wiley,
1974).
16. Cf. Neal Peirce's series on the United States in our time (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1976).
17. Cf. John Herbers, The New American Heartland (New York: Times Books,
1986).
18. See Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1986).
19. See Daniel J. Elazar, "The Rebirth of Federalism: The Future Role of
the States as Polities in the Federal System," Commonsense, Vol. 4,
No.1 (1981)
20. See Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States,
3rd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), Chapter 1.
21. See Martin Diamond, "On the Relationship of Federalism and
Decentralization," in Cooperation and Conflict: Readings in American
Federalism, Daniel J. Elazar, et. al., eds. (Itasca, IL.: F.E.
Peacock Publiushers, 1969).
22. Daniel J. Elazar, The American Partnership (Chicago: Rand-McNally,
1966, reprinted by Transaction Books, 1984).
23. Publius, the Journal of Federalism, has documented examples of
virtually every aspect of these phenomenon.
24. See Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Federalism and Prefectoral Administration,
Publius, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1981).
25. Cf. Mortin Gordzins, The American System (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1966) Chapter 12.
26. See, for example, Norton E. Long, "The Three Citizenships" in Serving
the Public in a Metropolitan Society, a special issue of Publius
Vol.6, No. 2 (1972), pp. 13-32.
