The Balance of Political Power
and Israel's Political Future
Daniel J. Elazar
The Likud as Israel's Centrist Party
It is important to emphasize that what most non-Israelis think of
as Israel's political right, namely the Likud, has become in
reality Israel's political center. It is still common in certain
circles in Israel and abroad to describe the Likud as the
political right. In fact, in the last eleven years the Likud has
moved well into the political center.1
This has always been true in domestic matters with regard to the
welfare state where the Herut position was opposed to Histadrut
control of key health and welfare institutions because it wished
to replace Labor movement control with nationalization, not
privatization. It is true with regard to the economy where there
are few, if any, differences between the Labor and Likud
mainstreams with regard to privatization or, more accurately, the
appropriate public-private mixture to stimulate Israel's economic
growth, again excepting only the Likud's interest in weakening
the Histadrut, in contrast to Labor's interest in bringing about
the adaptation of that Labor movement institution to new
realities. One of the reasons why the 1984 national unity
government lasted was because on these issues there is so little
difference between the two major parties, a factor which
contributes to the strength of the 1988 unity coalition as well.
The "Real" Political Right -- How Right Is It?
There is a political right in Israel consisting of three parties
represented in the Knesset -- HaTehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet --
plus Meir Kahana's Kach party which was excluded from the ballot
in 1988 for being racist under the terms of Israeli law.2 That
political right has seven seats in the Knesset and is united by a
view of the Israel-Palestinian struggle as an uncompromising one
in which the Palestinians will never truly recognize Israel's
right to exist and cannot be trusted with more than local
political power west of the Jordan River, if that. This view
flows in part from the three parties' strong commitment to the
retention of all of Eretz Israel west of the Jordan under Israeli
rule by right as the ancient homeland of the Jewish people. They
view the Six-Day War as the culmination of the Zionist enterprise
with the liberation of the remaining territory west of the river
and its opening to Jewish settlement and control.
In social and economic matters which usually define right and
left in other countries -- in other words, on most domestic
policy issues -- these parties are social democrats or new free
enterprise progressives. Most of the leaders and supporters of
these three parties had their political beginnings in the Labor
camp or the National Religious Party when it was a religious
version of the Labor party, so they share most of the social
welfare goals of the Labor camp, as modified by the experiences
of the last 30 years. In fact, they may even be greater
supporters of the welfare state than much of the Israeli
mainstream today because they believe in the communitarian
character of the Jewish state. In other words, their
"right-wing" character is confined to the twin issues of Israel's
relationship to its land and to the Palestinians.3
The Two Major Parties and the Peace Process
It is in connection with the future of the territories and the
Palestinians that the two parties most differ. Even so, for the
past several years both have moved in the same overall direction,
toward recognition of the need to accommodate the Palestinian
Arabs in some realistic way, and, since the PLO initiative, may
have begun to converge in the center. As Labor has moved to a
position more willing to accept territorial compromise, Likud has
also softened its stance in the direction of finding some
satisfactory political role and status for the Palestinians.
Shamir's plan for elections in the territories as a first step
toward a political settlement is a sign of how far he has moved
from his original rejection of the Camp David Agreement a decade
ago to his reliance on it to start peace negotiations now.
Shamir's proposal calls for the election of a Palestinian council
that would be responsible for the internal government of the
Palestinians in the territories under an autonomy plan and, more
important, would also be the Palestinian negotiating team for
talks leading to a permanent solution.4 It seems that the plan
Shamir has in mind will divide the territories into ten
single-member districts. Shamir has indicated that while only
Palestinians resident in the territories will be acceptable as
candidates, Israel will not question whether or not they have PLO
connections. In fact, the single-member district system rather
assures that those elected will be connected with the PLO, which
is preferable from the Israeli as well as the PLO standpoint to a
system which would allow the far more extremist Muslim
fundamentalists, who totally reject Israel's right to exist and
represent something over one-third of the total population in the
territories, to be represented in the negotiating process. This
step, which carries very great risks for Israel, has become the
rallying point for all who want to realistically pursue a peace
settlement, further strengthening Shamir's position at the center
of Israeli politics.
As we have seen, this continues to be true despite the action of
the Likud central committee (the party's principal governing
body) on July 5, 1989, where Shamir and his supporters felt it
necessary to compromise with those opposed to the peace
initiative in order to preserve party unity and continue the
peace process.5 That is another reason why the Likud can be
described as Israel's centrist party today.
Most of the former Liberals in the Likud favor some form of
Israeli-Palestinian power-sharing, a position which, once unknown
in Herut, has gained strength even in that party, albeit
remaining a minority position. Prime Minister Shamir has
combined very hard-line statements with suggestions that he, too,
has moved toward some kind of power-sharing arrangement. The
opposition to his right on this issue, primarily voiced by Ariel
Sharon, David Levy, and Yitzhak Modai, is more a matter of
internal party politics than deep conviction on the part of at
least two of those figures who have on other occasions shown
different faces to the public.
People "in the know" in Israel are firmly convinced that if
Sharon were prime minister, anything could happen including
significant territorial compromise if he thought it appropriate,
while Levy and Modai have traditionally been more moderates than
a hawks. These is even more apparent among Likud voters who,
since most are less ideologically bound than their party's
leadership, are willing to be more realistic about the changes
that have taken place among the Palestinian public. The
leadership is well aware of this and will undoubtedly have to
take it into consideration as they move the country further into
the current peace process.
Shamir Outmaneuvers His Rivals
In the meantime it is well to recall that Yitzhak Shamir has
outmaneuvered all of his foes within his own party and outside to
consolidate his position in a way that few would have expected.
He has now survived two Knesset elections as party leader, two
internal struggles within his own party, and two bouts at
coalition formation, each time emerging with a new success.
Whereas prior to the 1984 election, his position in his own party
was severely threatened, today he has the overwhelming majority
of the party behind him and faces no serious opposition, even
from two skilled and potentially powerful opponents like Sharon
and Levy.
The Labor party, Shamir's chief rival, is widely perceived to be
a "loser," an image that party head Shimon Peres has personally
acquired. Four years ago Peres was upstaging Shamir at every
turn. Today he is struggling for his own political life and has
to bear the burdens of finance minister at a time of economic
crisis, high unemployment, and the incipient collapse of several
major Israeli industrial firms.
Shamir is clearly dominant on the Israeli and world political
scenes. At the beginning of the present government, Peres tried
to present himself as a competitor as he had in the previous
government, but has been unable to carry out any significant
measures in that direction. Shamir's principle supporter and
colleague, Moshe Arens, sits in the Foreign Ministry, so that the
prime minister and foreign minister speak with a single voice.
Peres' principal rival in the Labor party, Yitzhak Rabin, is
minister of defense, so that Labor must bear at least equal
responsibility with Likud over the conduct of the war against the
intifada, while Rabin pursues policies that are quite congruent
with those of Shamir. Up and down the line, Labor's share in the
coalition government is a maximum of burden with a minimum of
potential benefit.
Labor's recent threats to leave the government in the wake of the
Likud's reemphasis of its hard-line position actually
demonstrated the party's weakness. No doubt a majority in the
party would have liked to go into opposition, but all signs
pointed to the likelihood of a disaster for Labor if they did.
Without elections, Shamir would have to form an anti-peace
government and the peace initiative would have fallen. Elections
would have led to a further Labor decline. Leaving the
government would have necessitated replacing Shimon Peres as
party leader but no leading substitute satisfactory to those
seeking change is available and Peres would have fought to return
to his post.
Shamir's new power is visible in every way. Take the World Jewry
Solidarity Conference held in March 1989. Shamir and his close
associate, Ehud Olmert, who was the Likud co-chairman of the
Conference, managed to overcome what were initially strong
objections from many diaspora Jews as well as from the Labor
party, to score a major symbolic victory. The Labor party was
coopted and Mordechai Gur, one of the new Labor ministers and who
sees himself as a strong contender for party leadership, used his
role as co-chairman to persuade skeptical diaspora Jewish leaders
that the Conference was not to back the Likud but to back Israel,
thereby strengthening his own contacts with the diaspora but
bringing Shamir the successful event that he wanted. Olmert, by
the same token, no doubt under Shamir's direction, clearly
defined the Conference as one of support for the present Israeli
coalition government as a whole, something that is very
acceptable to Jews the world over. Thus the Conference took
place amid predictions of dissension and when it concluded on the
positive note that it took, everyone was more than pleased and
Shamir was handed another victory.
Less than a month later, he achieved a similar victory in
Washington by bringing a plan that promised sufficient progress
in the short term, foreclosed nothing in the long term (despite
his rhetorical disclaimers), and was clearly the best that the
United States government or anyone else could get. Since then,
the world has supported the Shamir plan with greater or
less enthusiasm. Within Israel, as Shamir has been attacked on
his right, his plan has served as a magnet for most of the center
and even the moderate left.
Personally, Shamir no doubt agrees with the strictures adopted in
the Likud compromise resolution, namely that whatever peace
negotiations are pursued, East Jerusalemites should not be
allowed to vote in the elections, Jewish settlement in the
territories should continue, no foreign sovereignty should be
allowed west of the Jordan, and there should be no negotiations
with the PLO. On the other hand, he insists that those
strictures represent only his party's stance and do not determine
the meaning of the plan adopted by the government as a whole.
Moreover, he claims that his party's endorsement of the
government plan is more important than the strictures they
attached.
All told, Shamir has shown his mettle in his strongest resources
-- patience, solidity, and gentlemanly behavior -- to secure his
position and advance his policies in the face of more outspoken
and frenetic rivals. The real question today, then, is where he
stands on the immediate issues of land and the Palestinians as
well as such critical domestic issues as constitutional and
electoral reform.
Shamir's Peace Position
With regard to peace, land, and the Palestinians, Shamir began
his new term with a number of leaks suggesting that under the
rubric of "confederation" he was prepared for what might be
described as a joint Israel-Jordanian rule over the administered
territories through which an autonomous Palestinian entity would
be linked to Jordan for civil and political purposes, while
Israel would retain principal control of the territory involved.
This solution would still be an interim one but it could develop
into a more formal confederation in the future. Subsequently he
seemed to retreat from that position with a series of very harsh
statements, at first delivered within Herut forums but broadcast
publicly and then delivered in other forums as well.6
Which is the real Shamir? It is hard to say but it is at least
plausible that he is prepared for the first option.
Nevertheless, as he saw Israeli and diaspora Jewish "doves"
rushing to embrace the PLO and to grant the Palestinians an
independent state when even Yasser Arafat was talking about a
"confederation" along the lines of the Benelux arrangement (not
exactly a true confederation but that is certainly an interesting
opening position for the PLO), he may have felt that it was
necessary to reaffirm and reemphasize that the people in power in
Israel are not about to give away the store. Whatever certain
vocal Israelis and other Jews might be saying at a round of
conferences in Belgium, New York, and Switzerland about a
two-state solution, Shamir made it clear that the decision would
be made in the government center in Jerusalem where he and his
supporters rule the roost. At the same time Shamir has continued
to hint that he is prepared to be forthcoming and conciliatory on
his terms.
What remains is something of an enigma but with room for
intelligent negotiation and maneuver, remembering that neither
Shamir nor his government will be a party to any formal surrender
of territory west of the Jordan River in the sense of giving it
up completely. In the long run the possibility seems to be there
for a federal solution, probably labelled "confederation," even
if it is unconventional and does not follow the strict definition
of a confederation, but it will have to be a position that
constitutionally preserves a legitimate Israeli presence in those
territories. It may be that this will be the great test for the
United States peace-making effort, whether Americans can draw
upon their own experience and that of others to devise such a
federal solution.
In an atmosphere of uncertainly over what can or should be done
to achieve peace with the Palestinian Arabs, the Israeli
population remains almost equally divided between those who think
there is a possibility of conceding territory for peace and are
willing to do so, and those who think there is no such
possibility and that therefore a hard line is necessary. In
fact, Israeli public opinion is more sophisticated than this
summary would suggest. It is just that Israel continues to be
faced with Hobson's choices, a situation exacerbated by Shimon
Peres' misplaying of the Jordanian option which he had so
patiently built in his two years as prime minister and Yitzhak
Shamir's refusal or inability to present himself to his public as
more than a stand-patter, even when in private he has made
significant proposals for breaking the deadlock. The tragedy of
these two intelligent and patriotic men who have done so much for
their country in other situations has very sad public
consequences. Most immediately, it seems to be contributing to a
perpetuation of the deadlock.
The Prognosis for Constitutional and Electoral Reform
In the wake of the ugly and embarrassing coalition negotiations
of November 1988, Shamir also seemed for a while to have resolved
to press for far-reaching constitutional and electoral reform.
Understanding that electoral reform alone, whether in the form of
raising the minimum threshold needed to obtain seats in the
Knesset under the present proportional representation system or
moving to some form of district elections or some combination of
both, will not solve the problem of minor parties being decisive
in determining which of the two major parties will form a
government, the prime minister apparently opted for the direct
election of the head of government as a chief executive.
Last December, several private draft bills calling for the direct
election of the head of government were introduced by Likud
members of the Knesset.7 This lead to the appointment of the
Interministerial Committee on Electoral Reform, a coalition
committee consisting of leading Likud and Labor ministers and
Knesset members to work out a plan combining constitutional and
electoral reform agreeable to both parties and capable of being
enacted early in the life of the present Knesset. In May, that
committee reported a compromise electoral reform proposal that
satisfied the political needs of the major parties but was
problematic as a reform likely to build public confidence. At
the same time, it backed away from any recommendation of direct
election of the head of government. The Likud had second
thoughts after Peres made a public statement that such a change
would work in Labor's favor.
Needless to say, as time passes, ugly memories of the coalition
negotiations fade, and the stability of the present government
decreases, the major parties become less interested in an
electoral reform that would bring them into conflict with the
small parties whom they might need for coalition purposes. Thus
Israel is presently in a race between the feeling of necessity to
make constitutional changes and the relaxation of that feeling
coming from the daily experience of the present government. The
smaller parties, left, right and center, remain opposed to any
changes that would weaken them. Even the large parties agree
that no change should be introduced that would force a strictly
two-party system and thereby deny such permanent minorities as
the religious bloc and the Arabs the chance to elect their own
representatives to the Knesset, even if it is desirable not to
leave either of those two groups in a position of being able to
determine which major party will form the government.
By July of 1989 the interministerial committee had come to
realize the impracticalities of certain aspects of its reform
proposal and began to consider revisions in it. Two months later
the government experienced another mini-crisis and the big
parties scrambled for the support of the small parties once
again. Indeed, Agudat Israel seemed to take advantage of the
situation, threatened to leave the coalition unless among other
things they would be guaranteed that there would be no further
action on electoral reform. In the end Shamir conceeded to them
on this issue.
At this writing it seems that electoral reform is once again in
suspended animation. At the same time the idea of direction
election of the head of government is growing in popularity.
While no action is expected in the immediate future, it is likely
to be the first step in any constitutional reform that is
undertaken. In truth, it is the only step that would enhance
governmental stability, which is one of the purposes of
constitutional reform in Israel, while at the same time not
denying permanent minorities representation in the Knesset, as
step which would be seen as contrary to Israeli conceptions of
democracy.
The Continued Rise of the Likud as a Centrist Party
Any doubt over the Likud's position as Israel's leading party
should have been dispelled by the results of the municipal
elections on February 28, 1989. The 1989 local elections saw
Likud gain control of most of the major cities and almost all of
the development towns. While for the past five years Labor
controlled cities with a total population of 1,150,000, as
compared to 600,000 for the Likud, that situation is now
reversed. In addition to retaining Tel Aviv, Herzliya and
Netanya, Likud wrested Holon, Beersheba, Ramat Gan, Petah Tikva
and Ashdod from Labor, and Tiberias from a National Religious
Party mayor.
The Likud victory was, in a sense, the completion of what the
Likud started in 1977, that is to say, the establishment of the
Likud as a full, firmly rooted and equal contender for political
power with the Labor party, if not the majority party in the
country. It also reflected the movement of the Likud toward the
center of Israel's political spectrum, so that, as Asher Arian
noted when analyzing the Knesset elections, the Likud has become,
for all intents and purposes, the centrist party in Israel
today.8
Additionally, the election results demonstrated that the Likud
has acquired the organizational capacity to take advantage of the
demographic trends that are running in its favor, whereby younger
people tend to vote Likud more than older and Sephardim tend to
vote Likud more than Ashkenazim. This time the Likud was able to
translate those factors to its advantage in local elections where
turnout is dependent upon organization to a much greater extent
than in Knesset elections. On the other hand, as the tremendous
anti-Labor feeling that originally brought people to Likud has
faded to some extent, in each election there is a larger
percentage of people who decide how to vote based on other
considerations. Hence there was a decline in the youth and
Sephardic anti-Labor vote per se. Another sign of growing
political maturity was a greater tendency toward split-ticket
voting, the opting for a charismatic local personality of one
party for mayor, while at the same time supporting another party
for the city or local council.
While Shamir was wrong to claim that those elections were a
referendum on his policies toward the PLO and the territories --
they were fought out on local issues almost exclusively in each
community -- he can legitimately claim that the serious drubbing
that the Likud administered to Labor in the municipal arena for
the first time, was strong evidence of Likud's expanded
grassroots support and superior party organization.9 The
municipal elections further stabilized his government and gave
him more of the political muscle he needs to lead the country,
especially along a path that may well lead to confrontation with
the United States and Europe, not to speak of the rest of the
world.
Decline of the Labor Party Machine
Likud's greatest triumph was to be found in its ability to field
a better organization over much of the country. In the past,
Labor has been especially known for the strength of its
organization. The old Mapai party, Labor's predecessor and core,
was a political machine par excellence. More than that, in
addition to the usual organization common to all political
machines, it also could call upon institutions like the
Histadrut, the Histadrut companies, and the kibbutzim for
resources, for buses and cars to transport voters to the polls,
for people to work at the polls even in communities where Labor
itself might not have had enough activists to do so. This year,
by all preliminary accounts, Likud was stronger than Labor in
this respect. Many people in the kibbutzim simply refused to
work for Labor because of their own problems with the Labor party
or problems related to the economic situation of the kibbutzim.
Beyond that, Likud had finally built an organization that could
turn out its voters on election day.
Forty-eight percent of eligible voters in the Jewish sector voted
in the elections. Throughout the Western world, turnout in local
elections is lower than turnout for national or parliamentary
elections. This is true in Israel as well. While it is still
much higher than the United States or Canada, it is much lower
than in Knesset elections. In the Arab sector, the turnout was
extremely high -- over 80 percent -- and in some localities
exceeded 90 percent of eligible voters. No doubt this is because
the vast majority of Israeli Arabs live in their own
municipalities, making local elections their only opportunity to
choose their own leaders. In other words, salience is clearly a
major factor affecting voter turnout.
The impact of local issues and candidates was paramount. In a
large number of localities, the Likud put up the better
candidates in the eyes of a majority of the voters, which is why
they did so well. Responsible for conduct of the Likud campaign
was Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, Shamir's closest associate, and
M.K. David Magen, Ariel Sharon's key man. Both deserve much of
the credit for the Likud victory. They prepared the Likud for
the local elections by actually intervening in local affairs to
promote "good" candidates in place of mediocre local activists.
This was accepted by the local branches of the party. According
to the new game as played by the Likud, the national party took
care of its local branches by putting in the right people, a
tactic that succeeded quite well. Unfortunately this is an
ominous sign for the local politicians who are getting the
message that they are not capable of selecting good candidates
and for the local autonomy gained over the past several years.
Labor, on the other hand, was internally quite fragmented. In
about two dozen localities there were Labor people competing on
two or even three lists. Hence at best their vote was divided.
What was the impact of the election results on the leadership of
the Labor party? Under normal circumstances one would have said
that this would have been the last nail in Shimon Peres's
political coffin. While there are never normal circumstances in
Israel, the odds are strong, though not overwhelming, that he
will not lead the party in the next Knesset elections. On the
other hand, the future of the Labor party depends upon whether
they can make a change of leadership or whether Peres can somehow
rebuild the party while staying in power.
The Religious Parties Deal for Benefits
With regard to the religious parties, this election witnessed a
modest extension of the process begun back in 1981 when Agudat
Israel partially joined the Begin coalition, a process which
strengthened with the rise of Shas in 1984, and which really took
off last November with the integration of the ultra-Orthodox
parties into the political system. Working in local elections is
one of the most prominent signs of integration into the political
system and the religious parties achieved significant benefits
for themselves as a result.
One example of this could be seen in Ramat Hasharon where out of
43,000 citizens there are about 1,000 religious voters split
among 4 parties. Due to the fact that they voted as a bloc, for
the first time they managed to gain a seat on the city council.
They also made a deal beforehand with the Labor candidate for
mayor and nearly all of the religious voters voted for him
because they had won advance agreement to receive a number of
benefits. In many other localities the religious parties gave
their support to the Likud, which is one of the reasons why the
Likud won in many places where the power of Labor and Likud was
almost equal.
Any assessment of the impact of the religious parties in the
local elections must consider the specific situation in each
community. In many communities there are few conflicts over
issues of religion, while in some, such as Jerusalem or Petah
Tikva, there have been chronic problems. It may be expected that
the religious parties in the local arena will gain or at least
maintain their power irrespective of what happens on the
statewide scene. The one party that may still be expected to
gain in strength is Shas, and this at the expense of Likud. It
depends on the issues that come up, because a good number of not
necessarily religious people would vote for Shas for ethnic or
other traditional attitudes which are prevalent among Sephardim.
The New Zionist Left - Israeli "Greens"
The Zionist left, which has acquired more cohesiveness as the
political voice of the Israeli "doves," especially as the Labor
party has lost power, puts on a different and very successful
face in the local elections. Locally the parties of the Zionist
left -- the Citizens Rights Movement (CRM) and Mapam, plus the
more centrist Shinui -- attract the suburban-type voters of the
upper middle class. These are the people who want more
efficient, effective and cleaner municipal government. They are
environmentalists and see themselves on the progressive side of
issues. In some cases, two or three of the parties joined
together in a common local front, representing Israel's
equivalent of the European "Green" party phenomenon which is
finding expression around the world. The curious thing is that as
CRM and even Shinui become even more leftward oriented in the
Knesset elections and have begun to form a more cohesive bloc,
they have also gained strength for very different reasons in the
local elections.
In the actual campaign, the left and center-left was split, with
CRM and Labor competing in almost every city. In Ramat Hasharon,
for example, the wealthiest families voted for CRM and Shinui.
It was not only a matter of local interest but rather a sign that
they simply are no longer willing to vote for Labor anymore. With
CRM running so strong locally, Labor has a real problem on the
local level. This emerged as a trend in the Knesset elections and
is being continued in the local arena. At the same time, the
parties of the far right did not compete in the local elections
this time, allowing the Likud to succeed by sweeping the entire
right, plus the center.
The Rise of Fundamentalism in the Arab Sector
In the Arab sector, the big news was the arrival in strength of
Islamic fundamentalism. The impact of this phenomenon is not yet
clear because part of it was a reaction against the inefficient,
unconcerned, oligarchic, entrenched governments of the old elites
-- the leaders of the notable families -- in a situation where
there have not been many opportunities even for the circulation
(or rotation) of elites. Under such conditions, any movement for
change requires cohesion around a party that came out with a very
strong message, which the Islamic fundamentalist party could do.
On the other hand, there is no question that Islamic
fundamentalism is sweeping the entire Arab world. Only the
future will tell us to what degree the voting results were a
reaction to local conditions and to what degree they were part of
the worldwide trend toward the entry of religious fundamentalists
into politics.
In the Knesset elections, Labor received substantial Arab
support, though in numbers smaller than in previous elections.
This factor was not present in the local elections where most
Arabs voted in their own municipalities for their own parties.
In fact, the Likud advantage in November 1988 became even greater
in the local elections because the Jewish vote was separate and
distinct.
The Future of the Likud
In the 1984 Knesset elections, a large number of mayors were
included in the Likud list. This definitely strengthened the
Likud as the party with a younger generation of leaders who were
ready to be integrated into state politics and who were given
responsible positions in the state government. In the 1988
Knesset elections, there were few additions of this sort in the
Likud list, but Labor took the cue and included a number of
mayors on its Knesset list, with good results. Many politicians
now see local government as a more attractive, vibrant and
politically worthwile place to invest their efforts, realizing
that it can be a springboard to the Knesset, bypassing the
traditional 20 or 30 year period of working up through the party
ranks.
It is also becoming more attractive to run for local office today
because to be a Knesset member is less important now than to be
mayor of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or even smaller cities. In terms
of recognition, benefits and power, the position of mayors today
compares much more favorably than it used to to that of Knesset
members, especially backbenchers.
On the other hand, Likud does not have the internal strength to
consolidate its power position beyond a certain point. This was
reflected in the Histadrut elections of November 13, 1989.
Though given a good chance to seriously threaten Labor control of
the powerful General Workers Federation for the first time in
Israel's history, Likud managed to field a lackluster candidate
for Secretary-General against an attractive incumbent of Yemenite
background who appealed to Histadrut's normal constituency. After
a campaign that concentrated on criticism of the present
Histadrut administration without putting forward a program of its
own, the result was a Labor victory.
Since 1977 it has been apparent that Israel's demographics are
such that, all other things being equal, the Likud should gain
one to two additional seats at every quadrennial election. It is
only the Likud's failure at actual governance that has prevented
this result. Even so, the demographics have meant that Likud
does not lose. This situation is likely to persist, especially
if Labor cannot revivify and revitalize itself with new
leadership that will be attractive to Israel's floating vote. At
present, Likud seems strong, if relatively inflexible, and still
not highly competent at governing, while Labor seems flexible but
weak, torn apart by internal struggles, and obsolete, with no new
leadership visible in the wings. Under such circumstances Likud
will continue to constitute the political center and a generally
victorious one at that.
Notes
1. Howard Penniman, Israel at the Polls, 1977 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1979); Howard Penniman and Daniel
J. Elazar, Israel at the Polls, 1981 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1986); Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler,
Israel's Odd Couple, The 1984 Elections and the National Unity
Government (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990); Asher
Arian, ed., The Elections in Israel, 1977 (Jerusalem: Academic
Press, 1980) and The Elections in Israel, 1981 (Tel Aviv: Tel
Aviv University, 1982).
2. See Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, Israel at the Polls,
1988 (forthcoming).
3. See Ilan Greilsammer, "The Religious Parties," in Israel's Odd
Couple; Shmuel Sandler, "The Religious Parties," in Israel at the
Polls, 1981, especially pp. 110-119; Yael Yishai, "Factionalism
in the National Religious Party: The Quiet Revolution," in The
Elections in Israel, 1977.
4. A Peace Initiative by the Government of Israel, Cabinet
Communique, Jerusalem (14 May 1989).
5. Cf. Jerusalem Post, week of July 1, 1989.
6. An account of recent developments can be found in Options and
Strategies for Peace (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, 1989).
7. For a comparison of the bills introduced, see tables prepared
by the staff of the Interministerial Committee.
8. See Asher Arian, "The 1988 Israeli Elections - Questions of
Identity," Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, No. 83 (15 January 1989).
9. See Daniel J. Elazar and Chaim Kalchheim, "The 1989 Local
Elections: What Happened?," Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, No. 87
(1 May 1989).
