How to Achieve Electoral Reform
Daniel J. Elazar
The debate over the reform of Israel's electoral system has
nearly attained the status of a perennial issue -- always in the
air, frequently discussed, but essentially stalemated because the
proposed reforms conflict with basically immovable political
interests of long standing. Any change in a state's electoral
system clearly represents a fundamental change in its
constitution, since it alters the very basis of political
representation -- one of the major elements, if not the very
essence of democratic government. Consequently, electoral
changes are among the hardest to effect. If such a change is to
be effectuated, it must be made in a way that is most harmonious
with the overall political style of the state, in order to be as
acceptable as possible to the broadest public, so as to meet the
demands of public consensus.
The Need for Reform
The present party system, which antedates the state, was
developed to meet the needs of pioneering the resettlement of the
land as they were perceived by the settlers from Eastern and
Central Europe. As vehicles for pioneering before the existence
of a Jewish government, the individual parties -- particularly
the labor and religious parties which embraced strong doctrinal
positions -- developed educational, welfare, and social service
institutions of their own that went far beyond the normal
political purposes of party organizations in other countries.
After the establishment of the state, the new government gave
active assistance to these party institutions in order to
facilitate the development of the country and the absorption of
the mass of new imigrants that arrived after 1948. Thus the
parties have consolidated their position in Israel's political
system in ways that transcend the usual political concerns of
access and representation to become virtually self-contained
provinces within the state. This, in turn, has strengthened the
vested interests opposed to electoral reform, since any threat to
the existence of a particular party could undercut the life
structure of many people.
It is hard for outsiders to visualize the degree to which the
parties or ideological camps (groups of parties sharing an
overall ideology such as Labor's socialism, Likud's populist
nationalism, or the Religious parties' traditional religion) have
dominated the lives of ordinary Israelis, something which
Israelis take for granted. In their heyday before the state,
everything from sports clubs to paramilitary forces, from schools
to banks, was organized by party or camp. While many of these
functions were subsequently nationalized when the state was
established, many others still remain in party hands. This has
helped create a very centralized party system with considerable
power in the hands of the party leadership and bureaucracies
through their control not only of normal electoral politics but
also of economic opportunity for party members.
Even as the parties were being consolidated within the framework
of the state, however, the change in Israel's population
introduced large numbers of people -- either immigrants or
members of a new native-born generation -- who have no
ideological stake in any particular party and do not particularly
care to be dependent upon the parties for services they consider
to be rightfully the province of government. As those people
increase in number, they provide a base of support for electoral
reform, but one that is limited because it is unorganized and
must face the united opposition of those who actually hold
political power in the country.
The real problem that has developed out of all this is that
central control over the nominations process has led to an
increasing mediocritization of Israeli politics. Party business
is conducted so that, with rare exceptions, only professional
politicians -- people who are prepared to spend all their time in
partisan political activity -- can gain enough seniority and
recognition to be nominated to high office. Citizen involvement
in politics is minimal under such a system, while the number of
good people willing to kowtow to the party leadership for a
sufficiently lengthy period of time to rise in the ranks is quite
limited.
The results stand in stark contrast to what happens in local
politics where the direct election of mayors, introduced in 1978,
has led to a flowering of political talent as interested people
find it easier to run for office on the basis of their personal
talents.
How to Achieve Electoral Reform
Any way out of this apparent impasse must take into consideration
the existence of the present party system and the reluctance of
any of the present parties to accept any electoral arrangement
that does not give at least those parties in the coalition some
hope of survival. At the same time, any electoral reform, to be
worth the effort, must meet the demands of the "non-party"
population which is increasingly dissatisfied with the status
quo, by providing for closer relations between the voters and
their representatives; broader representation of the different
interest, ethnic, and geographic groups that make up Israel's
society; and greater independence from their party hierarchies
for Knesset members.
An examination of the political situation in Israel today in
light of these contradictory factors would seem to indicate that,
while electoral reform remains a live issue, it is a stalemated
one that requires a massive effort at mobilization of public
opinion to move the political establishment. Various proposals
for change have been advanced, ranging from continuing the
present parlimentary system, with a certain percentage of the
Knesset's 120 seats elected from districts and the remainder
elected at large, to a complete constitutional change instituting
presidential government. What is necessary at this point is not
to decide on the specific system but to mobilize the public so
that change may be effectuated. It is clear that any proper
change adopted would have to eliminate the system of proportional
representation and its debilitating consequences, among which are
the extreme multiplicity of parties; the strengthening of the
party bureaucracy at the expense of the government and the
voters; the unhealthy deepening of political divisions in the
country as a whole; and the increasing sense of political
alienation that envelops many Israelis.
Electoral reform should lead to an electoral system that will
offer the voters a choice of both candidates and parties (rather
than just a choice of party lists) in Knesset elections. Knesset
members should be elected on the basis of local, as well as
national, attachments, thereby increasing the voice of the
citizen in governmental affairs and better reflecting the spread
of social and economic interests in the country. This, in turn,
is likely to encourage the election of capable people regardless
of their party standing, since they will be able to challenge the
party organizations within their localities. Finally, such a
system could be used to foster healthy regionalism, local
attachments and local political activity, since the electoral
districts could also be used as the basis for locally concerned
democratic decentralization of decision-making.
Only the Knesset can bring about such reform. Since this is
unlikely to happen in the present political climate, what is
necessary is to organize a democratic "citizens revolt" in the
form of a massive campaign of public mobilization. A half
million to million signatures on a petition that would demand a
change in the electoral system presented to the Knesset by 50,000
citizens marching in Jeruksalem could have the effect of breaking
down present resistance to electoral reform on the part of the
powers that be. The process of obtaining that number of
signatures would in itself involve a major public effort, with
all that this entails in the way of public education accompanying
it.
Such an effort has excellent prospects for success. While the
Israeli establishment appears to be very conservative, in every
case where there has been a massive public outpouring, the
establishment and the government has responded rapidly to the
pressure. One need only look at the response in the aftermath of
the Yom Kippur War or the aftermath of the massacres in Beirut,
not to speak of a number of less prominent situations. What is
needed is a public figure to take the lead and an organization to
provide him with proper support and funding necessary to mount a
campaign. The first two are now available.
Possible Alternatives
1. Raising the Threshhold of the Present System
The simplest change in the electoral system would be to retain
proportional representation as at present, but to raise the
minimum percentage needed to win a seat. Today slightly over one
percent of the total vote will gain a seat in the Knesset. (That
is how Kahane was elected.) Were that threshhold to be raised to
a three percent minimum, all the present fly-by-night splinter
parties established to foster the ambitions of some individual
would be eliminated while preserving those parties - large,
medium-sized and small - that have demonstrated staying power on
the political scene over the years and thus arguably deserve
representation. Such a change would alter the present system
which rewards splintering by encouraging leaders of factions
within existing parties to set up their own parties prior to each
election and thereby improve their chances of gaining election to
the Knesset.
2. The Westminster System
Named after the system which prevails in Great Britain, this
would involve dividing the country into 120 single member
districts, in each of which candidates would be elected on a
winner-take-all basis. David Ben Gurion thought this system
would automatically lead to a two-party system, but as we know
from Britain itself where four parties presently divide the
districts among them (Conservatives, Labour, Social Democrats and
Scottish Nationalists). This is not necessarily the case, nor is
it likely to be the case in Israel. On the other hand, it would
make it difficult for minorities with real ideological and
political interests that are scattered throughout the country to
achieve adequate direct representation in the Knesset. They
would have to negotiate within larger party coalitions for
influence instead. This system might eliminate the need for
coalition government, but then again, it might not.
3. Equal Multi-Member Constituencies
Under this system the country would be divided into between 24
and 40 districts, roughly equal in population, each of which
would elect 3 to 5 members on a party list. If it used weighted
voting (that is, allow voters to cast up to three or five votes,
with the option of casting all of their votes for a single
candidate), this presumably would allow minority representation
while at the same time introducing a strong element of geographic
representation. While it probably would allow the perpetuation
of a limited multi-party system and require coalition government,
it should reduce the present fragmentation.
4. Mixed Systems
Some reformers have advocated electing a percentage of the
Knesset through districts while continuing to elect the remainder
through the present proportional representation system, that is
to say, single state-wide lists, presumably to get the advantages
of both systems.
5. A Fixed District System
Under this system, the country would be divided into a fixed
number of districts, 8 or 12, and the 120 Knesset seats
apportioned among them periodically on the basis of population.
Within each district as many parties as wished could submit lists
but voters could vote either for party lists or for individual
candidates up to the total number of seats alloted to that
district. This would reduce the number of parties able to
compete in the election, allow voter choice of individual
candidates and not simply party lists, thereby encouraging the
parties to nominate attractive candidates in every district, and
at the same time would allow permanent groupings -- religious,
ideological, ethnic or communal -- an opportunity to be
represented in the Knesset as at present.
6. Presidential System
Some reformers are advocating a complete change in the structure
of the Israeli political system from a parliamentary to a
presidential one, whereby a chief executive would be directly
elected by the voters independently of the Knesset and would
relate to the Knesset on a separation-of-powers basis similar to
that of the United States or France. Those who would suggest
this concentrate on the direct election of the president rather
than on the form of election to the Knesset, though most are also
in favor of some system of district election.
Of these proposed reforms, the first seems most easily achieved
although at present both major and minor parties oppose it as
strongly as any other system change. The last seems most
difficult to achieve and most problematic, given the nature of
Israeli politics to date. All told, in this writer's opinion,
the best plan is that of fixed multi-member districts which offer
representation to the major geographic regions of the country,
yet in such a way that the non-territorial minorities can be
properly represented as well. Perhaps best of all would be a
combination of this system with a separately elected executive
which would strengthen the separation of executive and
legislative powers, enable the development of stronger executive
leadership, but at the same time with stronger legislative checks
on the executive.
