Electoral Reform for Israel:
A Realistic Proposal
Daniel J. Elazar
Any change in a state's electoral system clearly represents a
fundamental change in its constitution, since it alters the very
basis of political representation -- one of the major elements,
if not the very essence of democratic government. Consequently,
electoral changes are among the hardest to effect. If such a
change is to be effectuated, it must be made in a way that is
most harmonious with the overall political style of the state in
order to be as acceptable as possible to the broadest public, so
as to meet the demands of public consensus.
Any way out of this apparent impasse must take into
consideration the existence of the present party system and the
reluctance of any of the present parties to accept any electoral
arrangement that does not give at least those parties in the
coalition some hope of survival. At the same time, any electoral
reform -- to be worth the effort -- must meet the demands of the
"non-party" population which is increasingly dissatisfied with
the status quo by providing for closer relations between the
voters and their representatives; broader representation of the
different interest, ethnic, and geographic groups that make up
Israel's society; and greater independence from their party
hierarchies for Knesset members.
An electoral system can be devised that meets all the above
requirements. If Israel were to be divided into a small number
of large multiple-member districts, constructed along fixed and
rational geographic lines to be meaningful entities, with the
number of members from each district apportioned regularly and
impartially on the basis of its population, it would be possible
to combine the best features of both the present system and the
proposed ones for the good of the state and even the long-range
good of the existing political system.
The details of this proposal are simple. Israel can easily
be divided into twelve districts, based on the country's present
planning and administrative subdivisions. Those twelve districts
will have permanent boundaries and each will be apportioned a
specific number of Knesset seats based on its share of Israel's
total population.
A ready-made basis for such a division presently exists.
Pre-1967 Israel is presently divided into fourteen planning and
administrative subdistricts as shown on the map, which, with two
minor changes, would meet the requirements for permanent
electoral districts. These subdistricts are not used for the
administration of elections. Since they follow the country's
regional geographic divisions, they can properly serve as the
basis for a new electoral system. Since their boundaries are
permanently fixed, they obviate the necessity for politically
painful decisions in drawing district lines. While this system
is based on the present boundaries and excludes all the
administered territories, it would be easy to make any electoral
adjustments based on territorial changes in the future or on
present settlements beyond the green line. The Golan, for
example, could be added to the Naftali district; settlements in
the Shomron and the northern Jordan Valley could be attached to
the Yizrael or Central districts. The settlements in the Etzion
bloc, Hebron, and the Dead Sea area could be attached to the
Jerusalem or the Beersheba districts; the Gaza settlements could
be attached to the Ashkelon district.
Each of the electoral districts would be allocated its share
of Knesset seats in proportion to its percentage of the country's
total population. In order to give each district at least four
seats, the fourteen planning subdistricts would be reduced to
twelve by combining the Safad and Kinneret subdistricts and the
Ramle and Rehovot subdistricts. Under this arrangement, each
district would be sufficiently large in population and varied in
interests to offer several parties a fair chance to elect
representatives to the Knesset. At the same time, each district
will be sufficiently distinct as a regional entity to encourage
its residents to develop a long-range community of interest
internally. Each of the three major cities with its environs
would constitute a separate district as they already do for
governmental and planning purposes, which would tend to
concentrate the smaller parties in a few centers where they would
compete with the larger parties on equal terms without putting
the latter at a permanent disadvantage.
After allocating seats to the districts in this manner, the
remaining seats would be allocated on the basis of major
fractions of the required figure, in descending order. Thus, if
the average number of voters per seat is 22,000 a district with a
population of 150,000 would be allocated seven seats.
Periodically -- every ten years is the usual interval -- the
seats would automatically be reapportioned among the districts by
a nonpartisan commission on the basis of population changes.
Under the new system, all candidates would be elected at
large within each district. This means that every voter will be
able to vote for as many candidates as the number of seats
allocated to his district. Any party may nominate candidates for
any and all of the seats in each district, subject to the
national election laws. Candidates would carry party
designations on the ballot and would be listed under party
columns. Voters will be able to vote for individual candidates
or for a straight party ticket. The parties will thus be able to
attract the voters as before but the burden of attracting new
votes will be placed on the candidates they choose rather than on
the ideologies they espouse. The parties will be able to attract
voters by nominating exceptionally good candidates who could pull
votes away from the larger parties in districts where the
candidate's parties, as such, have little support, or by
convincing the voters in districts where they have abundant
support to vote a straight ticket for them. It even may be
possible for one party to elect a majority and be able to form a
stable government by careful construction of tickets in the
various districts.
While the full consequences of such a change in the state's
electoral system can only be a matter of conjecture, it is clear
that the proposal system would eliminate the debilitating
consequences of system of proportional representation among which
are the extreme multiplicity of parties; the virtual necessity
for narrowly based coalition governments; the strengthening of
the party bureaucracy at the expense of the party activists and
the voters; the unhealthy deepening of political divisions in the
country as a whole, and the increasing sense of political
alienation that envelops many Israelis.
There would be created an electoral system that will offer
the voters a choice of both candidates and parties (rather than
just a choice of party lists) in Knesset elections. Knesset
members would be elected on the basis of local as well as country
wide attachments thereby increasing the voice of the citizen in
state affairs and better reflecting the spread of social and
economic interests in the country. This, in turn, is likely to
encourage the election of capable people regardless of their
party standing since they will be able to challenge the party
organizations within their localities. Finally, such a system
could be used to foster healthy regionalism and local political
activity since the electoral districts could also be used as the
basis for locally concerned democratic decentralization of
decision-making.
Under the electoral system proposed here, it should be
possible to eliminate the deficiencies of the present system and
institute an arrangement which comes closer to the model of the
world's most stable and successful democracies. Yet, by
providing a means for the present party system to be maintained
within the framework of districts already the repositories of
important governmental functions and that are also tied to
traditional and geographically meaningful divisions, the system
would embody characteristics uniquely Israeli.
