How to Make Electoral Reform Work
Daniel J. Elazar
The call for electoral reform for Israel has now become
public on both sides of the ocean, as the Jewish state's
"deadlock of democracy" takes on the characteristics of
paralysis. The expectation is that once electoral reform is
introduced, the minor parties and most especially those of the
extreme Orthodox will no longer be able to block the formation of
a stable government capable of acting.
Electoral reform is truly a necessity for Israel. It is
important to more closely link the average citizen and his/her
representative. It is vital to break down the exclusive power of
the party oligarchies to determine candidates for the Knesset and
thereby stifle the entry of new blood and new ideas into the
country's government. But even as we press for electoral reform,
we must understand that electoral reform is not enough.
If the goal of electoral reform is governmental stability,
and rule by a party with a majority then electoral reform will
not do the job. Israel is not the United States where
differences of opinion are confined to a relatively narrow
spectrum and two parties, each a coalition of groups, are enough.
As in the countries of continental Europe, divisions of opinion
and ideology in Israel are far more broader and more intense (As
we have seen in recent years, even Great Britain has had a hard
time holding onto the two party system. The Conservatives and
Labour must contend with the Liberals and Social Democrats). The
canons of democracy require that the permanent groups in Israeli
society be appropriately represented in the country's legislative
body, and the Israelis would not have otherwise. There are
different ways that can be done but no way that could be
considered by Israel for electoral reform will change the reality
of two permanent groups - the ultra-Orthodox Jews and the
Israeli-Arab minority holding the balance of power. Even if all
the various small parties are eliminated, these two permanent
groups would coalesce into two medium-size parties, each with
approximately between 15-20% of the vote potentially behind it.
From the power point of view it makes little difference for
the ability of one or another of the major parties to form a
government or to maintain its stability if each of the two has
approximately forty seats and forty more are distributed among
the small parties, or each has approximately fifty-five seats and
the remaining ten are so distributed. The lack of the majority
is still the lack of the majority. It is likely that the two
main permanent subgroupings are likely to have at least thirty
seats between them; especially if they are encouraged to organize
into unified blocks in order to get any seats at all, as would be
the case with most of the proposed reforms. Both minorities
constitute significant percentages of the total population and
also are sufficiently concentrated geographically to win seats
even in a territorially based system. One can expect them to
exercise such leverage as long as parliamentary system is
maintained as presently constituted.
The only way out of this dilemma is to embrace the other
major constitutional reform proposed in Israel in the last two
years -- namely the direct election of the head of government
(Prime Minister) by the people. There are several proposals that
have been submitted. The best call for popular voting for
individual candidates for head of government who would be, in
effect, the chief executive, with the individual winning the most
votes, providing that he reached at least 45 percent of the
total, becoming the head of the government for a four year term.
Israeli voters would cast at least two ballots; one for the head
of government and the other for the Knesset. Since it will be
clear that only a candidate backed by one of the two major
parties could get elected, the smaller parties would probably
develop coalitions with one or another of the two largest parties
and agree upon the candidate to be supported in advance. Even so
it might be necessary to have runoff elections between the two
leading vote getters if no candidate receives at least 45
percent, as is done in France.
Since proposals call for full separation of powers between
the executive and legislative branches with the head of
government appointing a cabinet that would be simply subordinate
to him as in the United States. Other proposals are similar to
the French model in requiring the cabinet to win the confidence
of the legislature. Even the latter arrangement, which might be
more appropriate for Israel, the fact that the head of the
government would be elected to office in his own right for a
fixed four-year term and would sit there whether or not his party
has the leading number of seats in the Knesset, gives him a very
strong bargaining chip and introduces real stability into
government.
Some proposals provide that a Knesset could vote no
confidence in the head of government and remove him by a
two-thirds vote, or seventy of the one hundred and twenty Knesset
members, or some other such extraordinary majority. In that case
the Knesset would also be dissolved and there would be new
elections for both. This would provide additional protections
against a runaway chief executive who, of course, would also be
dependent on a Knesset rendered more independent by not being
tied to his coattails for survival, to provide a legislative
basis for his policies and to vote the finals for them.
What of electoral reform? If this reform were adopted, then
it would be possible to have an electoral reform that would allow
full representation of all permanent groupings, giving them a
vote but not a veto. With a separation of powers system in
place, several systems could be considered. I would still
suggest that the best system would be that used in a number of
Spanish-speaking countries in Europe and in the New World and in
some of the Scandinavian ones as well; namely the division of the
country into a limited number of permanent districts -- say,
twelve -- whose boundaries would follow present administrative
subdistrict lines so that they could not be gerrymandered. Every
ten years, the one hundred and twenty Knesset seats would be
reapportioned among the districts on the basis of population so
that each district would have the number of seats appropriate to
its share of the country's total population. Under this system,
voters would cast as many votes as there are seats in their
district. They could either vote for a party list -- that is to
say, a straight ticket, or could pick and choose among the
candidates offered on the several party lists, thus encouraging
the parties to nominate more attractive candidates with closer
ties to the people in their district.
This system would allow for the representation of those
permanent groupings in the society that deserve to be
represented. From the democratic point of view that, when
combined with the direct election of the head of government,
would prevent those smaller groups from exercising inordinate
power in determining who would govern.
Where does all of this stand today? Over the past two years
there has been a movement among Israeli politicians favoring
reform to move first to secure the direct election of the head of
government. The first time that this proposal became more than a
slogan was in December 1988 after the agonizing and the
distasteful process of forming the Shamir-led National Unity
Government. At that point, four private bills were introduced in
the Knesset, three by Likud members with tacit agreement of Prime
Minister Shamir.
As the National Unity government settled in and seemed to be
capable of enduring, reform got lost in the shuffle, but with the
latest government crisis leading to a collapse of that broad
coalition, another round of distasteful maneuvering by the
leaders of the two major parties to secure the requisite majority
to form a government, and the resultant public disgust, the bills
have been introduced once again. And again there seems to be
some likelihood that both major parties will support the change
out of desperation if not out of conviction. Thus the prognosis
step in that direction is mildly favorable.
Now it is necessary to develop a proper system of checks and
balances that would strengthen the Knesset as a legislature even
while it strengthens the Prime Minister as the head of
government. Unfortunately it is just as easy (or hard) to do
reform badly as it is to do it well. So those of us supporting
reform have two obstacles to overcome. First, we must win
agreement to make these far-reaching changes and then we must
design a change that would do what we want it to do, and
strengthen rather than weaken Israeli democracy.
