Foundations of the Jewish Polity1
People and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry,
Chapter 1
Daniel J. Elazar
Jews can be fully understood only when they are recognized as
members of a polity -- a covenantal community linked by a shared
destiny, a promised land, and a common pattern of communications
whose essential community of interest and purpose and whose
ability to consent together in matters of common interest have
been repeatedly demonstrated. In traditional terms, Judaism is
essentially a theopolitical phenomenon, a means of seeking
salvation by constructing God's polity, the proverbial "city upon
a hill," through which the covenantal community takes on meaning
and fulfills its purpose in the divine scheme of things.2 From a
more secular point of view (if such a distinction can be made),
Jewish peoplehood, has been the motivating force for communal
life and creativity throughout the long history of the Jewish
people. The power and pervasiveness of this force has certainly
been demonstrated in our own time.
The Jewish polity has some special characteristics. It is
worldwide in scope but territorial only in a limited sense. it
is not a state, although a state is an essential part of it.3 It
is authoritative but only for those who accept citizenship within
it. It does not demand the exclusive loyalty of those attached
to it, because many of its members share multiple loyalties.4
And, finally, it exists by virtue of a mystique, and orientation
toward a future that looks to the redemption of humanity.
Preeminently, the Jewish polity survives because of the will
of its citizens and their active application of that will to
carve out an area of autonomous existence in the midst of peoples
who would absorb or eliminate them.5 As it turns out, this is as
true of Israel in its own way as it has been of the diaspora
Jewish communities, just as it was true of all the earlier Jewish
commonwealths.
It is always a mistake to underestimate the continuity of
culture. Individuals are formed early in their lives by the
cultures into which they are born. So, too, is a people. The
seeds of whatever Jews are today were planted at the very birth
of the Jewish people. Certain key characteristics visible then
and deriving from those original conditions have persisted over
time despite all the subsequent changes in the Jewish situation.
The Jewish polity is a product of a unique blend of kinship
and consent. The blend is already reflected in the biblical
account of its origins: a family of tribes that becomes a nation
by consenting to God's covenant.6 (It should be noted that the
term federal is derived from the Latin foedus meaning covenant.)
It continues to be reflected in later biblical narratives.7
Postbiblical Jewish history gave the blend a new meaning.
That Jews were born Jewish puts them in a special position to
begin with, one which more often than not forced them together
for self-protection. Yet sufficient opportunities for
conversion, assimilation, or the adoption of a posture of simple
apathy toward any active effort to maintain Jewish life were
almost always available as options. The survival of organized
and creative Jewish life, then, can only be understood in the
light of the active will of many Jews to function as a community,
in itself a form of consent ratified by repeated consensual acts
over the millennia.
Beyond the sheer fact of communal survival, consent has
remained the normal basis for organizing the Jewish polity. Jews
in different localities consented (and consent) together to form
congregations and communities -- in Hebrew the terms are
synonymous.8 They did (and do) this formally through articles of
agreement, charters, covenants, and constitutions. The
traditional Sephardi term for such articles of congregational-communal agreement, askamot, conveys this meaning
exactly. The local communities were (and are) then tied together
by additional consensual arrangements, ranging from formal
federations to the tacit recognition of a particular halakhic
authority, shtadlan, or supralocal body as authoritative.9 When
conditions were propitious, the de facto confederation of Jewish
communities extended to wherever Jews lived. When this level of
political existence was impossible, the binding force of Jewish
law served to keep the federal bonds from being severed.
Covenantal Foundations
Jews have traditionally organized their communities into coherent
bodies politic on a constitutional basis. In Jewish law, every
Jewish community is a partnership of its members. There is no
such thing as "the state" existing independently of the people in
halakhah or Jewish tradition. The ultimate constitutional basis
of that partnership is the original covenant establishing the
Jewish people, the covenant that tradition records as having been
made between God and the twelve tribes of Israel at Sinai. From
that covenant came the Torah, the traditional constitution of the
Jewish people.
When Jews speak of Torah, they do not refer to the five books
of Moses alone but to the Torah as it has grown, with the Talmud
added to it, with the interpretations and commentaries added to
both, in the light of the historical experience of the Jewish
people. Until modern times, nobody disputed the traditional
constitution. Jews accepted the Torah. They may have argued
over its interpretation, but they accepted it. And out of that
acceptance the Jewish polity was given constitutional form.
A covenant is a morally informed agreement or pact between
parties having an independent and sufficiently equal status based
upon voluntary consent and established by mutual oaths or
promises involving or witnessed by a transcendent authority. A
covenant provides for joint action to achieve defined ends,
limited or comprehensive, under conditions of mutual respect in a
way that protects the respective integrities of all the parties
to it. Every covenant involves consenting, promising, and
agreeing. Most are meant to be of unlimited duration, of not
perpetual. Covenants can bind any number of partners for a
variety of purposes, but in essence they are political in that
their bonds are used principally to create relationships best
understood in political terms.
As much as covenant is a theological and a political concept,
it is also informed by a moral or ethical perspective that treats
political relationships in the classical manner. That is, it
links power and justice -- the two faces of politics -- and
preserves the classic and ancient links between ethics and
politics. Again, the emphasis is on relationships rather than
structures as the key to political justice. Structures are
always important, but ultimately, no matter how finely tuned the
structures, they come alive (or fail to) only through the human
relationships that inform and shape them.
Covenant is tied in an ambiguous relationship to two related
terms, compact and contract. On one hand, both compacts and
contracts are closely related to covenant, and sometimes the
terms are even used interchangeably. Moreover, covenantal
societies tend to emphasize contractual arrangements at every
level of human affairs. However, there are real differences
between the three terms. Covenants and compacts differ from
contracts in that the first two are constitutional or public and
the last private. As such, covenantal or compactual obligation
is broadly reciprocal; those bound by one or the other are
obligated to respond to one another beyond the letter of the law
rather than to limit their obligations to the narrowest
contractual requirements. Hence, covenants and compacts are
inherently designed to be flexible in some respects and firm in
others. As expressions of private law, contracts tend to be
interpreted as narrowly as possible as to what the contract
explicitly mandates.
A covenant differs from a compact in that its morally binding
dimension takes precedence over its legal dimension. In its
heart of hearts, a covenant is an agreement in which a higher
moral force, traditionally God, is either a direct party to or
guarantor of a particular relationship. A compact, based as it
is on mutual pledges rather than guarantees by or before a higher
authority, rests more heavily on legal as well as moral grounding
for its politics. In other words, compact is a secular
phenomenon.
This is historically verifiable by examining the shift in
terminology that took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Although those who saw the hand of God in political
affairs as a rule continued to use the term covenant, those who
sought a secular grounding for politics turned to the term
compact. Though the distinction was not always used with strict
clarity, it does appear consistently. the issue was further
complicated by Rousseau and his followers, who talk about the
social contract, a highly secularized concept, which, even when
applied for public purposes, never develops the same moral
obligation as either covenant or compact.
In its original biblical form, covenant embodies the idea
that relationships between God and humans are based on morally
sustained compacts of mutual promise and obligation. God's
covenant with Noah (Genesis 9), which came after Noah had
hearkened fully to God's commands in what was, to say the least,
an extremely difficult situation, is the first of many examples.
In its political form, covenant expresses the idea that people
can freely create communities and polities, peoples and publics,
and civil society itself through such morally grounded and
sustained compacts (whether religious or otherwise in impetus),
establishing thereby enduring partnerships.10
The covenantal approach is closely connected with
constitutionalism. A covenant is the constitutionalization of a
set of relationships of a particular kind. As such, it provides
the basis for the institutionalization of those relationships;
but it would be wrong to confuse the order of precedence. Again,
the biblical model whereby a covenant provides the basis for
constitutional government by first establishing a people or civil
society which then proceeds to adopt a constitution of government
for itself, is paradigmatic. Here the constitution involves the
translation of a prior covenant into an actual frame or structure
of government. Sometimes the constitution includes the covenant
within it, serving both purposes simultaneously.
The American Declaration of Independence is an excellent
example of a political covenant. The diverse inhabitants of the
thirteen colonies reaffirmed that they consented to become a
people. It was not without reason, therefore, the Abraham
Lincoln fondly described the union created by that act as "a
regular marriage."11 The partners do not unquestionably live
happily ever after, but they are bound by covenant to struggle
toward such an end, a commitment well understood and made
explicit by Lincoln during the Civil War.
The covenantal approach not only informs and animates the
Jewish polity but represents the greatest Jewish contribution to
political life and thought. It is possible that covenant ideas
emerged spontaneously in different parts of the world. If
covenant thinking is rooted in human nature as well as nurture,
it is to be expected that some people everywhere would be
oriented toward the idea somehow. However, it is not sufficient
for random individuals to be disposed to it for an idea to take
root and spread. Somehow a culture or civilization must emerge
that embodies and reflects that idea.
The first such civilization or culture was that of ancient
Israel whose people transformed and perfected a device originally
developed among the west Asian peoples who inhabited the area.
The first know uses of covenant were the vassal treaties through
which the empire builders of west Asia secured the fealty of
lesser peoples and their domains through pacts secured by oath
before their respective deities.12 These international or
intra-imperial pacts laid out the form that covenants have taken
ever since, which included five elements: a prologue indicating
the parties involved, a preamble stating the general purposes of
the covenant and the principles behind it, a body of conditions
and operative clauses, an oath to make the covenant morally
binding, and stipulated sanctions to be applied if the covenant
were violated.
Either parallel to or derived from these ancient vassal
covenants there emerged domestic political and religious usages
of covenant. The two were connected in the bible to form the
classic foundation of the covenant tradition.13 God's covenant
with Israel established the Jewish people and founded it as a
body politic, while at the same time creating the religious
framework that gave that polity its raison d'etre, its norms, and
its constitution, as well as the guidelines for developing a
political order based on proper, that is, covenantal,
relationships.
Biblical adaptation of the forms of the vassal covenants
involved a transformation of the purpose and content so great as
to mean a difference in kind, not merely degree. A covenant was
used to found a people, making their moral commitment to one
another far stronger and enduring that that of a vassal to an
imperial overlord. The Bible draws a distinction between "sons
of the covenant," bnei brit in Hebrew, and "masters of the
covenant," ba'alei brit. Bnei brit is used where the covenant
has created a new entity whose partners are bound together as
siblings in a family. The covenant that unites and forms the
Jewish people in the biblical account and in all later Jewish
history makes all Jews bnei brit. However, where the term used
is ba'alei brit the covenant is essentially an international
treaty. It does not create a new entity, but establishes a
relationship of peace and mutual ties between separate entities
that remain separate for all purposes outside the limited-purpose
pact.
This new form of covenant was understood to be not simply
witnessed by Heaven, but as bringing God in as a partner, thus
informing it with religious value and implication for the
Israelites, who saw no distinction between its religious and
political dimensions. The covenant remained a theopolitical
document with as heavy an emphasis on the political as could be.
The strong political dimension reflected God's purpose in
choosing one people to be the builders of a holy commonwealth
that would be a model for all others.
It was only later with the rise of Christianity and the
beginning of the long exile of the Jews from their land that
covenant took on a more strictly religious character for some, in
which the political dimension was downplayed, if not downright
ignored by Christian theologians on the one hand and diminished
by Jewish legists on the other. Christianity embraced the
covenant idea as one of its foundations but reinterpreted the old
biblical covenant establishing a people and a polity to be a
covenant of grace between God and individual humans grated
unilaterally and mediated by Jesus.14 Jewish legists simply took
the basic covenantal framework of Judaism for granted and
concentrated on the fine points of the law as applied to daily
living or the expected messianic redemption.15
In the Jewish world, the political dimension of covenanting
received new impetus in the eleventh through fourteenth centuries
to provide a basis for constituting local Jewish communities
throughout Europe. That effort ran parallel to the establishment
of municipal corporations throughout the continent, which were
legitimized by royal charter, usually negotiated between the
municipality and the throne.16
All this is well documented in Jewish sources. Because Jews
were always moving, either by choice or by necessity, when they
came to new places they had to organize communities, for Jews
cannot function Jewishly without organized communities. It was
to ease the process that model covenants for setting up
communities and communal institutions came into existence. Thus
Sefer HaShtarot (The Book of Contracts), a late eleventh or early
twelfth century compendium of model laws (significantly, in the
form of contracts) by Rabbi Judah HaBarceloni, a Spanish Jew,
includes model laws for every contingency, all of which are in
accord with the Torah, that is, constitutional.17 It is the first
such compendium that we know of in Jewish history. Perhaps it is
the first in history. It includes model covenants or contracts
for establishing welfare societies, for organizing synagogues,
for organizing assistance to widows and orphans, for establishing
schools, and many others. Most especially, it includes a model
covenant for establishing a kehillah, a local community whose
preamble reads as follows:
We, the elders and leaders of the community of
________, due to our many sins we have declined and
become fewer and weaker, and until only few have been
left of many, like a single tree at the mountaintop,
and the people of our community have been left with no
head or nasi [magistrate] or head justice or leader,
so that they are like sheep without a shepherd and
some of our community go about improperly clothed and
some speak obscenely and some mix with the gentiles
and eat their bread and become like them, so that only
in the Jewish name, are they at all different. We
have seen and discussed the matter and we agreed in
assembly of the entire community, and we all, great
and small alike, have gone on to establish this
covenant in this community.
The model covenant continues to describe how the community,
by this action, establishes its right to enact ordinances,
establish institutions, levy and collect taxes -- in short, carry
on all the functions of a municipal government.
The principles of community enunciated in the forgoing
document are clear. For the actions of a community to be legally
binding in Jewish law, it had to be duly constituted by its
prospective members, preferably through a constituent assembly
and a constitutional document. They must be able to say that "we
have met together as the elders, that we have discussed the
matter, that we have agreed in assembly of the entire community."
If these patterns were not followed the action would not be
valid.
Covenant and the Origins of the Polity
Since its beginnings, political science has identified three
basic ways in which polities come into existence: conquest,
organic development, and covenant.18 These questions of origins
are not abstract; the mode of founding of a polity does much to
determine the framework for its later political life.
Conquest can be understood to include not only its most
direct manifestation, a conqueror gaining control of a land or a
people, but also such subsidiary ways as a revolutionary conquest
of an existing state, a coup d'etat, or even an entrepreneur
conquering a market and institutionalizing his control through
corporate means. Conquest tends to produce hierarchically
organized regimes ruled in an authoritarian manner: power
pyramids with the conqueror on top, his agents in the middle, and
the people underneath the entire structure. The original
expression of this kind of polity was the pharaonic state of
ancient Egypt. It was hardly an accident that those rulers who
brought the pharaonic state to its fullest development had
pyramids built as their tombs. Although the pharaonic model has
been judged illegitimate in Western society, modern totalitarian
theories, particularly fascism and nazism, represent an attempt
to give it theoretical legitimacy.
Organic evolution involves the development of political life
from its beginnings in families, tribes, and villages to large
polities in such a way that institutions, constitutional
relationships, and power alignments emerge in response to the
interaction between past precedent and changing circumstances
with the minimum of deliberate constitutional choice. The result
it a polity with a single center of power, dominated by an
accepted political elite, controlling the periphery, which may or
may not have influence at the center. Classic Greek political
thought emphasized the organic evolution of the polity and
rejected any other means of polity-building as deficient or
improper. The organic model is closely related to the concept of
natural law in the political order. Natural law informs the
world and, when undisturbed, leads to a kind of organic
development, which, in turn, results in this model of the polity.
The organic model has proved most attractive to political
philosophers precisely because, at its best, it seems to reflect
the natural order of things. Thus it has received the most
intellectual and academic attention. However, just as conquest
produces hierarchically organized regimes ruled in an
authoritarian manner, organic evolution produces oligarchic
regimes, which, at their best, have an aristocratic flavor and,
at their worst, are simply the rule of the many by the few. In
the first, the goal is to control the top of the pyramid; in the
second, the goal is to control the center of power.
Covenantal foundings emphasize the deliberate coming together
of humans as equals to establish bodies politic so that all
reaffirm their fundamental equality and retain their basic
liberties. Polities whose origins are covenantal reflect the
exercise of constitutional choice and broad-based participation
in constitutional design. Polities founded by covenant are
essentially federal in the original meaning of the term --
whether they are federal in structure or not. that is, each
polity is a matrix compounded of equal confederates who come
together freely and retain their respective integrities even as
they are bound in a common whole. Such polities are republican
by definition, and power in them must be diffused among many
centers or the cells within the matrix.
Recurring expressions of the covenant model are found among
the Jews, whose people started out as rebels against pharaonic
Egypt; the Swiss, whose people started out as rebels against the
Holy Roman Empire; and the Dutch, Scots and Puritans who rebelled
against the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the Reformation era. In
the modern epoch, republicans who were rebels against either
hierarchical or organic theories of the state adopted the
covenant model in one version or another. Frontiersmen -- people
who have chosen to settle in new areas where there are no
established patterns of governance in which to fit and who,
therefore, have had to compact with one another to create
governing institutions -- are to be found among the most active
covenanters.
What is common to all political societies rooted in the
covenant idea is that they have drawn their inspiration
proximately or ultimately from its biblical source. There is
evidence of other contractual or oath-bound societies and, of
course, constitutionalism of various kinds exists outside the
biblical tradition. But there is no evidence of any developed
covenantal tradition that is not derived from the Bible.
The biblical grand design for humankind is federal in three
ways. (1) It is based on a network of covenants beginning with
those between God and man, which weave the web of human,
especially political, relationships in a federal way -- through
pact, association and consent. (2) The classical biblical
commonwealth was a fully articulated federation of tribes
instituted and reaffirmed by covenant to function under a common
constitution and laws. Any and all constitutional changes in the
Israelite polity were introduced through covenanting, and even
after the introduction of the monarchy, the federal element was
maintained until most of the tribal structures were destroyed by
external forces. The biblical version of the restored
commonwealth in the messianic era envisages the reconstitution of
the tribal federation. (3) The biblical vision for the "end of
days" -- the messianic era -- not only sees a restoration of
Israel's tribal federation, but what is, for all intents and
purposes, a world confederation of nations, each preserving its
own integrity while accepting a common divine covenant and
constitutional order. This order will establish appropriate
covenantal relationships for the entire world. Although it
shares many of the same positive ends, it is the antithesis of
the ecumenical world state envisaged by the Roman and Christian
traditions, which see the merging of everyone into a single
entity. The biblical-covenantal-Jewish view sees peoples
preserving their own integrities within a shared whole.
Covenant theory emphasizes human freedom because only free
people can enter into agreements with one another. It also
presupposes the need for government and the need to organize
civil society on principles that assure the maintenance of those
rights and the exercise of power in a cooperative or
partnership-like way.
Covenantal (or federal) liberty, however, is not simply the
right to do as one pleases within broad boundaries. Federal
liberty emphasizes liberty to pursue the moral purposes for which
the covenant was made. This latter kind of liberty requires that
moral distinctions be drawn and that human actions be judged
according to the terms of the covenant. This does not preclude
changes in social norms, but the principles of judgement remain
constant. Consequently, covenantal societies, founded as they
are on covenantal choice, emphasize constitutional design and
choice as a continuing process.
The Edah as a Classic Republic
The Jewish polity has followed the covenant model since its
inception, adapting it to variegated circumstances in which Jews
have found themselves over the millennia -- as a tribal
federation, a federal monarchy, a state with a diaspora, a
congress of covenantal communities, a network of regional
federations or confederations, or a set of voluntary
associations.
The classic Hebrew name for this kind of polity is edah. The
edah is the assembly of all the people constituted as a body
politic. Edah is often translated as congregation; that term has
a religious connotation today that it did not have when
introduced in sixteenth and seventeenth century biblical
translations. Then it had a civil meaning as well. It was a
"congregation -- an institutionalized gathering of people who
congregate (come together) that meets at regular times or
frequently for common action and decision making.19
In Mosaic times edah became the Hebrew equivalent of
"commonwealth" or "republic," with strong democratic overtones.
The idea of the Jewish people as an edah has persisted ever since
and the term has been used to describe the Jewish body politic in
every period to the present. In this respect, the term parallels
(and historically precedes) similar phenomena such as the
landesgemeinde in Switzerland, the Icelandic althing, and the
town meeting in the United States.
The characteristics of the original edah can be summarized as
follows:
- The Torah is the constitution of the edah.
- All members of the edah, men, women, and children,
participate in constitutional decisions.
- Political equality exists for those capable of taking full
responsibility for Jewish survival.
- Decisions are made by an assembly that determines its own
leaders within the parameters of divine mandate.
- The edah is portable and transcends geography.
- Nevertheless, for it to function completely, the edah needs
Eretz Israel.
These basic characteristics have been preserved with such
modifications as were necessary over the centuries. This, in
biblical times, taking full responsibility for Jewish survival
meant being able to bear arms. Subsequently, the arms-bearing
measure of political equality gave way to one of Torah study.
Today the diaspora measure is contributing to the support of
Israel, while arms-bearing is again the measure in Israel. The
principles of assembly, leadership and decision making have
remained the same although modes of assembling, leadership
recruitment, and leaders' roles and responsibilities have changed
from time to time. The portability of the desert-born edah is as
notable a characteristic as is its attachment to Zion. The Torah
has persisted as the edah's constitution albeit with changing
interpretations.
The regime most common in Jewish experience has been the
aristocratic republic, in the classic sense of the term -- rule
by a limited number who take upon themselves an obligation or
conceive of themselves as having a special obligation to their
people and to God. For Jews, this has been manifested in some
combination of a perceived obligation by those of greater status
or wealth to utilize their privileged position to help other Jews
and by those learned in Torah to serve the will of God by serving
the community.
Jewish republicanism is rooted in a democratic foundation
based on the equality of all Jews as citizens of the Jewish
people. All Jews must participate in the establishment and
maintenance of their polity, as demonstrated in the Bible -- at
Sinai, on the plain of Moab, before Shechem, and elsewhere -- in
Sefer HaShtarot, and in many other sources. Nor is that
foundation merely theoretical; even where power may not be
exercised on a strictly democratic basis, it is generally
exercised in light of democratic norms.
There are problems associated with the use of these terms,
but they do help us understand that the Jewish polity often has
been governed by a kind of trusteeship. It is a trusteeship
because the community is republican, because it is a res publica,
a public thing or a commonwealth -- a body politic that belongs
to its members. The Jewish people is a res publica with a
commitment to a teaching and law, which its members are not free
simply to alter as they wish but must be maintained to be
faithful to principles.
The Western world today takes the republican revolution for
granted. Yet the republican revolution was one of the great
revolutions of modernity. It is the foundation of modern
democratic government. The West pioneered in the idea and
practice of republican government. The Jews were among the first
many centuries ago. then came the Greeks and the early Romans.
Except for a few outposts, including the Jewish kehillah,
republicanism died under the realities of imperial Rome and
medieval feudalism, replaced by absolutism. In modern times, a
revolution was needed to restore the republican principle. Before
the republican revolution, the prevailing view was that the state
was the private preserve of its governors. When Louis XIV said
"I am the state" he was articulating a classic antirepublican
position.
The rise and fall of dictators in the Third World today shows
the situation in a region that is in transition from
prerepublican to republican government. It is no accident that
most of the Arab states, after their revolutions in the 1950s and
early 1960s, added the word "republic" to their new names, to
signify that they sought to be part of the republican revolution.
The Islamic world, far more than Europe, held to the notion for
centuries that the organs of governance belonged to whomever held
power. The people sought to stay clear of involvement with their
governors. At best, the ruler was benevolent; he was Harun
al-Rashid, who put on a disguise and wandered in the marketplace
and, as he saw injustices, rectified them on the spot. He was a
benevolent despot, but it was still despotism; it was not a
republican government. More often than not, the despotism was
just that, hence the postcolonial revolutions in the Arab world
and the at least symbolic embracing of republicanism, which, in
most Arab states, has yet to become real.
Still, an aristocratic republic always has a darker side in
that it has a tendency to degenerate into oligarchy. the history
of governance in the Jewish community ha been one of swinging
between the two poles of aristocratic republicanism and
oligarchy. Though this is a perennial problem, the basic
aristocratic republicanism of the Jewish polity has worked
equally well to prevent absolutism or autocracy.
The Jewish people rarely has had anything like dictatorship
and then only locally and de facto under unique circumstances.
Jews are notably intractable people, even under conditions of
statehood where coercion theoretically has been possible; hence,
dictatorship has not been an acceptable regime for Jews.
Nor have Jews in the past had anything like the open society
of the kind envisaged by many contemporary Westerners, in which
every individual is free to chose his or her own "life-style."
One of the reasons for this is that being Jewish and maintaining
the Jewish polity has not been simply a matter of survival. it
has also been a matter of living up to specific norms based on
divine teaching and law, which establish the expectation that
private and public life is to be shaped according to that
teaching and law.
The Three Arenas of Jewish Political Organization
From earliest times, the Jewish polity has been organized in
three arenas. Besides the edah, or national, arena, there are
countrywide or regional, and local arenas of organization. The
immediately local arena comprises local Jewish communities around
the world of varying sizes, under varying forms of communal
organization. Whether we are speaking of Yavneh or Saragossa,
Mottel or Chicago, the local community remains the basic cell of
Jewish communal life. Here the institutions that serve the
Jewish community are organized and function.
Beyond the local arena, there is a larger, countrywide arena
in which the Jews in particular regions, countries, or states
organize for common purposes. The organizational expressions of
that arena have included such phenomena as the Resh Galuta
(Exilarch) and Yeshivot of Babylonia, the Vaad Arba Aratzot
(Council of the Four Lands) of late medieval Poland, the State of
Israel, the Board of Deputies of British Jewry, and the congeries
of "national" (meaning countrywide) organizations of American
Jewry framed by the Council of Jewish Federations. Fund-raising
for Israel, for example, depends on work in local communities but
is generally organized in this second arena on a
country-by-country basis.
Beyond the second arena, there is the third, that of the
Jewish people as a whole: the edah. This arena was extremely
weak for nearly a millennium but has been given new institutional
form within the last century, most particularly in our time. The
edah is the main focus of the reconstitution of the Jewish people
in our time.
This threefold division into separate arenas of governance,
once formulated in early Israelite history, has remained a
permanent feature of Jewish political life. This is so despite
frequent changes in the forms of organization of the several
arenas and in the terminology used to describe them.
The Bible delineates the first form in which these three
arenas were constituted. The edah was constituted by the
shevatim (shevet, tribe), each with its own governmental
institutions. Each shevet was, in turn, a union of batei av (bet
av, extended household). After the Israelite settlement in
Canaan, the most prominent form of local organization was the ir
(city or township) with its own assembly (ha'ir) and council
(sha'ar ha'ir or ziknai ha'ir).
Subsequently, in the local arena, just at the bet av gave way
to the ir, the ir gave way to the kehillah (local community)
wherever the Jewish population was a minority. The kehillah
became the molecular unit of organization for all postbiblical
Jewry, especially because new kehillot could be established
anywhere by any ten adult Jewish males who so constituted
themselves. Although the kehillah survives in the diaspora, in
contemporary Israel, the local arena is once again governed by
comprehensive municipal units -- cities or villages.
Similarly, the breakdown of the traditions tribal system (a
phenomenon that long preceded the first exile) resulted in the
replacement of the shevet by the medinah (properly rendered as
autonomous jurisdiction or province in its original meaning), a
regional framework, which embraces a congeries of kehillot that
it unites in an organizational structure, as in Medinat Yehud
(Judea in the Persian Empire). In the diaspora, the term medinah
became almost interchangeable with eretz (country) to describe
the intermediate arena, as in Medinat Polin (the organized Jewish
community in Poland) or Eretz Lita (the organized Jewish
community in late medieval Lithuania). In modern times, the term
came to mean a politically sovereign state and is now used only
in connection with Medinat Yisrael (the State of Israel).
The term edah, as an expression of the widest form of Jewish
political association, retained its original usage unimpaired
until transformed in colloquial modern Hebrew usage, where it
came to denote a country-of-origin group in Israel. Occasionally,
it was replaced by such synonyms as Knesset Yisrael. The edah
managed to survive the division of Israel into two kingdoms, the
Babylonian exile, and the Roman conquest of Judea by developing
new forms of comprehensive organization.
During the period of the second commonwealth (c. 440B.C.E. -
140C.E.) and again from the second to the eleventh centuries, it
was particularly successful in constructing a fully-articulated
institutional framework that embraced both Israel and the
diaspora. The breakdown of the universal Moslem empire and the
consequent demise of the edah-wide institutions of Resh Galuta
and Gaonate in the middle of the eleventh century left world
Jewry bereft of comprehensive institutions other than the
halakhah itself. From then until the mid-nineteenth century, the
edah was held together principally by its common Torah and laws
as manifested in a worldwide network of rabbinical authorities
linked by their communications (responsa) on halakhic matters.20
The Three Ketarim
Classically, leadership in the Jewish polity has been divided and
shared among three domains known in Hebrew as the three ketarim
(crowns): the keter torah, the domain of the Torah; the keter
kehunah, the domain of the priesthood; and the keter malkhut,
literally, the crown of kingship but more correctly understood as
the domain of governance. Each of these ketarim has functions it
must perform if Jewish life is to be complete; hence, all are
necessary for the survival and development of the edah.21 There
has never been a time when the edah has not in some way
functioned through some kind of division of authority and powers
among the three ketarim. This is not separation of powers in the
modern sense. The ketaric division is for comprehensive polities
which embrace more than the organs of government in the modern
sense. Hence it comes prior to the executive-legislative-judicial division. Each keter combines a range of functions,
institutions, and roles within its domain.
The keter torah embraces those who are responsible for the
maintenance and application of the Torah, its laws, principles,
and spirit in the life of the Jewish people and governance of the
edah. Its roots go back to Moses, the first navi (prophet) and,
as such, the first to bear that keter. After the age of
prophecy, it passed to the soferim (scribes) and then to the
Sanhedrin with its hakhamim (sages) and rabbis. In the
traditional Jewish polity, its bearers functioned primarily as
teachers and judges.
The keter kehunah embraces those who are responsible for the
ritual and sacerdotal expressions of Jewish being, designed to
bring Jews closer to Heaven individually and collectively (and
hence to each other as Jews). From a public perspective, the
functions of this crown play a major role in determining the fact
and character of citizenship in the edah. Originally granted in
the Torah to Aaron and his heirs, it is principally identified
with the cohanim, but after the destruction of the Second Temple,
its functions passed to other religious functionaries,
principally hazzanim and, more recently, congregational rabbis,
and generally were confined to the most local arena of Jewish
organization.
The keter malkhut embraces those who are responsible for
conducting the civil business of the edah: to establish and
manage its organized framework, its political, and social
institutions, to raise and expend the money needed for the
functioning of the edah, and to handle its political and civic
affairs. Although like the other, it is bound by the
Torah-as-constitution, this keter has existed as a separate
source of authority since the beginning of the edah, with its own
institutions, responsibilities, and tasks. It is the oldest of
the ketarim, emerging out of the patriarchal leadership of the
original Israelite families. Later, it passed to the nesi'im
(magistrates), shofetim (judges), and zekenim (elders), and then
to the melekh (king). After the end of Jewish political
independence in Eretz Israel, it was carried on by the Nasi
(patriarch) in Eretz Israel and the Resh Galuta (exilarch) in
Babylonia, the negidim of Spain, and the parnassim of the
kehillot.
Thus, one of the ways in which Jews attempted to prevent the
corruption of their governing bodies was through the division of
powers in the polity. The legitimacy of the division is made
explicit in many texts. For example, Bereshit Rabbah, the
Midrashic commentary on the Book of Genesis, comments on the
verse: "The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's
staff from between his legs" (Gen. 49:10). According to the
Midrash, the "scepter" is interpreted as the exilarchs in
Babylon, who rule the people, Israel, with the stick; the
"ruler's staff" are the patriarchs of the family of Rav, who
teach Torah to the populace in the land of Israel.
Another explanation of the verse if offered: "The scepter is
the Messiah, son of David (Mashiah ben David) who will rule over
the kingdom, that is to say, Rome, with a stick. And the ruler's
staff are those who teach halakhah to Israel." Even after the
Messiah comes there will have to be a separation of powers, for
even he is not to be trusted with all the powers alone. Even if
he can rule over Rome, there still must be the great Sanhedrin to
teach halakhah to Israel.
This traditional pattern underwent many changes in the modern
epoch but continued to be the basic model for the edah and its
kehillot, if only out of necessity because the classic division
persisted in new forms. In the Western world in the nineteenth
century, the institutions of the keter kehunah became stronger at
the expense of the others as Jewish life was redefined under
modernity to be primarily "religious," even as Jews ceased to
rely on the Torah as binding law. The synagogues became
elaborate institutions and their rabbis the principal
instrumentalities of the keter kehunah. Today, however, the
Jewish polity is in the midst of a resurgence of the keter
malkhut. This is principally because of the reestablishment of a
Jewish state in Eretz Israel, but it also reflects changes in the
orientation of Jews in the diaspora.
The increasing narrowness of approach of the traditional
bearers of the keter torah, coupled with the growing
secularization of Jews which made that sphere and the sphere of
keter kehunah less attractive to them, all contributed to this
power shift. In the political world, that domain with the key to
political power obviously had an advantage. In addition, as the
other two domains were fragmented among different movements, each
claiming to be authoritative, the keter malkhut became the only
domain in which all groups would meet together, at least for
limited political purposes, further strengthening the latter's
position in the edah. These shifts in power are only several of
many in the history of the edah, part of the continuing and
dynamic tension among the ketarim.
The Constitutional Periodization of Jewish History
Implicit in the foregoing discussion and otherwise a matter of
commonsense knowledge is that the edah has gone through periodic
regime changes in the course of Jewish history. the key to
understanding those changes is to be found in the patterns of
constitutional development of the Jewish people and its polity.
Indeed, it is possible to suggest that Jewish history can be read
as the progression of the generations through a series of
historical epochs, each marked by the unfolding and subsequent
undoing of its own constitutional synthesis within the overall
framework of the Torah, leading in turn to a new epoch and the
necessity for a new constitutional synthesis. It has been the
genius of the Jews as am and edah to keep the flow of generations
intact via those periodic reconstitutions, through exile and
dispersion. Hence the issue of constitutionalism and
constitutional change is central to the study of Jewish political
history in its entirety and provides a base for its
periodization. Basically, this is because the Jewish
constitution has differed from modern constitutions, most
significantly because of its all-embracing character. It is not
confined to the delineation of the political power of a secular
society, but extends into virtually all phases of life. A study
of constitutionalism in Jewish history, accordingly, must embrace
far more than the record of specific fundamental political laws.
A reconstruction of the communal constitution of any particular
period of Jewish history must come to terms with the entire range
of communal living during that time and thereby provide a
framework that can encompass virtually all aspects of Jewish
civilization.22
The Torah is, in this respect, both an exemplar
and a touchstone. It contains all the characteristics of organic
and all-embracing law; it has also (for the vast majority of
Jewish history and by the vast majority of the Jewish people)
been perceived to be of Divine origin. On both counts, the Torah
must be regarded as the basic and foremost constitutional
document of Jewish history. Its subsequent modifications and/or
amplifications must, therefore, be considered to be necessitated
by overwhelming pressures for constitutional change. All
subsequent constitutional referents claim, whether explicitly or
implicitly, to maintain the traditions embodied in the Torah; but
all nevertheless do so in a manner which supplements and
redirects the original in line with the pressures of contemporary
conditions. The Mishnah, Gemara, and the great halakhic codes
(to cite only a few such documents) thus constitute indices for
the identification and analysis of such adjustments and an
explanatory device for relating the change from one epoch to
another. Indeed, the Torah-as-constitution can be understood as
a kind of nucleus to whose original core have been added layers
of additional material, each of which becomes compacted onto the
original to the point where it is bonded to it permanently and
there is no operational difference between earlier and later
materials even where it is possible to distinguish between them.
At the same time, the Torah is a uniquely Jewish constitution
in that it is first and foremost a teaching, as the word Torah
itself indicates. Although binding on Jews through the Sinai
covenant, as a teaching it is based on the recognition that, in a
covenantal system, its binding character still requires consent.
Jews must hearken to their constitutional teaching, and since
hearkening begins with hearing, they must be rendered open to
hearing. In Jewish tradition, this openness comes as a result of
learning, not by nature or grace. This characteristic of the
Jewish constitution is reflected, inter alia, in the use of terms
which refer to teaching to describe the most important
constitutional referents, e.g., Torah, Mishneh Torah
(Deuteronomy), Mishnah, Gemara, Talmud.
The idea of Jewish history as constitutional history is not
new, just as explicit reference to the Torah as the fundamental
constitution of the edah is at least as old as Philo and
Josephus.23 Applying this idea in the special way in which the
constitution of the Jewish people embraces more than fundamental
political law, it is possible to discuss meaningfully
constitutions and constitutionalism in Jewish history. Indeed,
the principal value of the constitutional approach to the study
of Jewish history lies in its ability to provide a framework that
can embrace virtually every aspect of Jewish life without either
deemphasizing or overemphasizing the political dimension.
What is distinctive about this approach is its deliberate
emphasis on the political facet of Jewish history. Accordingly,
it is not bound by conventional historiographical categories.
Most conspicuously is this so in the thorny matter of
chronological divisions. The traditional breakdown into
"ancient," "medieval," and "modern" periods is superseded by a
more refined typology based on the rhythm of political life; so,
too, is the less obtuse (but hardly more helpful) division into
standard subperiods: "biblical," "postbiblical"; "talmudic,"
"posttalmudic"; "premodern," "modern," and the like.
Patterns of Constitutional Development
We begin, the, by distinguishing periods of constitution-making
and constitutional change in the course of Jewish history on the
basis of the Jewish response, or series of connected responses,
to challenges from within or without the edah. In doing so, we
can rely first on recognized constitutional texts and the
benchmarks of Jewish political history and constitutional
development, noting how they relate to one another. Out of those
relationships temporal patterns emerge, with each period
representing a particular rhythm of challenge and response. Once
that rhythm is identified, the framework within which it moves --
and which it modifies -- can be identified as well. Each epoch
is not only characterized by its constitutional synthesis but
also by particular institutional expressions of that synthesis.
Each is set off by founding, climactic, and culminating events
which set its constitutional agenda, bring that agenda to
whatever degree of fruition is achieved, and tie off the epoch's
loose ends in such a way as to start the movement toward a new
constitutional agenda for a new epoch.
Constitutions are changed or modified only as the necessity
for change becomes overwhelming. In the Jewish polity this is
particularly true because of the traditionally Divine nature of
Jewish fundamental law. Hence these epochal transitions occur
relatively infrequently. By tracing the subsequent
constitutional modifications of the Torah which supplemented and
redirected the original Torah in line with the demands of later
ages, we posit that Jewish history can be divided into fourteen
constitutional epochs, each of approximately three centurie's
duration and each of which can be seen to possess a distinct
political character of its own, as follows:
- Ha-Avot/The Forefathers c. 1850-c. 1570 BCE
- Avdut Mizrayim/Egyptian Bondage c. 1570-c. 1280 BCE
- Adat Bnei Yisrael/The Congregation
of Israelites c. 1280-1004 BCE
- Brit ha-Melukhah/The Federal Monarchy 1004-721 BCE
- Malkhut Yehudah/The Kingdom of Judah 721-440 BCE
- Knesset ha-Gedolah/The Great Assembly 440-145 BCE
- Hever ha-Yehudim/The Jewish
Commonwealth 145 BCE-140 CE
- Sanhedrin u-Nesi'ut/The Sanhedrin
and the Patriarchate 140-429 CE
- Ha-Yeshivot ve Rashei ha-Golah/The
Yeshivot and Exilarchs 429-748 CE
- Yeshivot ve-Geonim/Yeshivot and the
Geonim 748-1038 CE
- Ha-Kehillot/The Kehillot 1038-1348 CE
- Ha-Va'adim/Federations of the Kehillot 1348-1648 CE
- Hitagduyot/Voluntary Associations 1648-1948 CE
- Medinah ve-Am/State and People 1948- CE
There are fourteen constitutional epochs of Jewish
history as delineated in accordance with the above criteria.
The thirteen epochs that have been completed were remarkably
uniform in duration. Each epoch extended over nine historical
generations (the years available to mature humans for
participation in public affairs), between 25 and 40 years in
length. The shortest epochs were approximately 280 years in
length and the longest 320. This seems to indicate rise and
decline of historical epochs within a similar general pattern.
Each of these epochs corresponds with parallel periods of general
history which had their impact on the Jewish people. but what is
of the essence in this scheme is the Jewish response to whatever
challenges are posed, external as well as internal. Indeed, its
emphasis on the internal Jewish rhythm of events is one of the
marks of its authenticity. Significantly, the patterns itself is
suggested in the Torah, which marks off epochs on a similar
basis, i.e., ten generations from Adam to Noah (nine preflood and
then the generation of the new founding), ten more from Noah to
Abraham, 322 years from the birth of Abraham to the death of
Jacob, ten generations in Egyptian bondage, and ten more from
Moses to David.
The Generational Rhythm
The structure of each constitutional epoch reflects the
generational rhythm of human affairs. Man's own biological
heritage provides him with a natural measure of time. We often
use the concept of the generation in a commonsense way for just
that purpose, as when we talk about the "lost generation" or the
"generation gap." In fact, social time does move in sufficiently
precise generational units to account for the rhythm of social
and political action. If we look closely and carefully, we can
map the internal structure of each generation in any particular
civil society and chart the relations among generations so as to
formulate a coherent picture of the historical patterns of its
politics.24
During a period rarely, if ever, less than twenty-five and
rarely, if ever, more than forty years, averaging thirty to
thirty-five, most people will move through the productive phase
of their life cycles and then pass into retirement, turning their
places over to others. Every individual begins life with
childhood, a period of dependency in which his role as an
independent actor is extremely limited. Depending upon the
average life expectancy of his society, he begins to assume an
active role as a member of society sometime between the ages of
sixteen and thirty -- at which point he has between twenty-five
and forty years of "active life" ahead of him during which he is
responsible for such economic, social, and political roles as are
given to mature men and women in hi society. Sometime between
the ages of sixty and seventy-five, if he is still alive, he is
relieved of those responsibilities and is by convention, if not
physically, considered ready for retirement.
Human political life reflects this generational pattern on
both an individual and a collective basis. Because political
beginnings occur in history from time to time, they establish a
much greater regularity of generational succession in social and
political life than the random processes of human biology.
Biology taken alone should lead to a constant "changing of the
guard" because births and deaths constantly occur. In fact, the
biological basis for the progression of generations is modified
by historical and social processes -- what may be termed factors
of geo-historical location. These regularities reflect the
influence of founding -- of peoples, civil societies, and
polities -- on human events. Stated simply, foundings as
beginnings establish a more or less orderly pattern of
generational succession because founders are generally people at
the threshold of their public careers. In the course of founding
the new entity, they not only establish the institutions,
offices, and roles to be filled but become the first incumbents,
remaining in those positions of authority and power until
retirement, a generation later. Only when they vacate their
positions can a new generation occupy them and, since they
generally start together, their retirement tends to come at the
same time, thereby opening the way for beginning the process all
over again. Given sufficient data, we could probably trace the
generational cycles and patterns back to the very foundations of
organized society. In the United States, for example, a society
whose foundings are recorded in detail, we can do just that.
Each new generation to assume the reins of power is
necessarily a product of different influences and in a historical
society (as distinct from a preliterate or primitive one), is
shaped to respond to different problems, heightening the impact
of the change and encouraging new political action to assimilate
the changes into their lives. At the same time, the fact that
three or (at the most) four biological generations are alive at
any given time creates certain linkages between generations
(e.g., the influence of grandparents on grandchildren) that
ensure a measure of intergenerational contacts and social
continuity and also help shape every generation's perception of
its past and future.
Here we come to the linkage between generations of people and
generational patterns of events. Individual generations not only
have their own integrity but combine to become the building
blocks of historical epochs. Each epoch follows a process of
constitutional development which parallels the intragenerational
process of political change. A review of Jewish constitutional
history indicates how this process works. A specific
constitutional framework -- at first the Torah and in subsequent
epochs structured elaborations or restatements of the Torah --
emerges at the beginning of the epoch, based on a Jewish response
to the needs of the age and locale, usually embodied in a
critical series of events. With the exception of the second,
each of the first seven epochs was inaugurated in its first
generation by a formal covenant involving the people, their
leader or leaders, and God, which, beginning with Epoch III, was
then followed (approximately a generation later) by the
acceptance of a text of constitutional character. All
but one of the next six epochs were inaugurated by the
introduction of a code in some form. This
constitutional framework becomes the basis for action and
interpretation during the historical period in which it is
dominant. The epoch itself unfolds through a series of
generations until, about midway through it, a generation of
climactic events occurs. Those events bring out the character
and thrust of the epoch and usually are of constitutional
significance. The remaining generations in the epoch basically
follow the patterns established by the climactic events and the
entire epoch comes to an end with a series of culminating events.
Epochs, Covenants, and Constitutions in Ancient Israel
Epoch | Covenant | Constitution |
1. Ha-Avot | Brit bein ha-Betarim
(Abraham's Covenant) |
- |
2. Avdut Mizrayim |
- | Masoret he-Avot
(Patriarchal Tradition) |
3. Adat Bnei Yisrael | Brit Sinai
(Sinai Covenant) | Torat Moshe
(Mosaic Law) |
4. Brit ha-Melukhah | Brit between David and Am before God | Torat Moshe and Mishpat ha-Melekh
(Law of Kingship) |
5. Malkhut Yehudah | Covenant renewed on Pesah by Hezekiah | Torat Moshe and Mishpat ha-Melekh and Prophetic works |
6. Knesset ha-Gedolah | Amanah (Covenant) of Ezra and Nehemiah | Torat Moshe and Takkanot Ezra ve-ha-Soferim
(Ordinances of Ezra and the Scribes) |
7. Hever ha-Yehudim | Brit between Simon the Hasmonean, the Zekenim, and the Am | Torat Moshe and Torah she-b'al Peh (Oral Torah)
|
During the epoch, a body of interpretations of the Torah, as
understood through the constitutional framework established at
the epoch's beginning, is developed, reaching its apogee in the
climactic generations and thereafter. Then after some three
hundred years, new challenges of time and place demand a more
thorough revision of the framework. Utilizing the body of
interpretations developed since the preceding constitutional
revision (some of which already set forth guidelines for the new
era), a revision emerges that provides a basis for meeting the
new conditions. Then the process begins again. In the course of
the epoch, each new revision becomes universal in its
application, not confined to the part of the world in which it
originated. So far as the local differences need to be
considered, they are provided for in the interpretative process,
but within the constitutional framework of time.
The Epochs in Outline
The first two epochs, which are by far the most obscure, reflect
the biblical traditions of the Patriarchs and the Egyptian
bondage. The first (roughly the nineteenth-sixteenth centuries
BCE) begins with the covenant with Abraham which marks the first
emergence of the Jews as a distinctive entity and culminates with
the descent of Jacob's family into Egypt. Under this original
covenant, it might be said that the family which later became the
Jewish people first began to function as Jews. The operative
elements of the constitution were probably an unwritten set of
tribal traditions rather than a written code. This does not
lessen its importance as a fundamental organic law which could
be, and was, applied and developed as the basis of Jewish life
until the time of Moses and the Exodus. The second (roughly the
sixteenth-thirteenth centuries BCE) embraces the generations of
slavery in Egypt where the descendents of Jacob retained their
identity and traditional tribal organization.
The third epoch (c.1280-1000 BCE) marks the emergence of the
Jewish people in its first "national" stage, as an edah -- a
tribal confederacy -- and as a religious civilization based on a
fundamental organic law, or constitution, the original Mosaic
Torah (Torat Moshe) that was promulgated at Sinai after the
covenant there. Under Torat Moshe, the Jewish people conquered
Canaan, became conscious of a basic common identity and destiny,
and embarked on the road toward national unity under the
monotheistic Jewish religious civilization with all that it
entailed.
The fourth epoch (1000-722 BCE) begins with the emergence of
the first major revision of the Mosaic constitution, the
establishment of a federal state under a constitutional monarchy
at the time of David. The constitutional form used in this
period was the covenant between the people through their tribes
and the king before God. Apparently, each new ascendant to the
throne had to bind himself to maintain that covenant, which was
designed, among other things, to protect the Torah as
constitution and the traditional liberties of the tribes.
The division of the kingdom after the death of Solomon
changed the framework of the monarchic covenant but did not
change its basic constitutional form, particularly since both
David and Solomon actually reigned over two separate entities,
Judah and Israel. The monarchic constitution continued as a dual
one, as it were, existing as the organic law of two related
kingdoms, with each developing its own operational variants
(e.g., dynastic consistency in Judah). The Bible itself provides
illustrations of how the common heritage of the Jewish people was
maintained in the twin kingdoms.
The real end of the fourth epoch came with the destruction of
the northern kingdom and the formal end of the tribal
confederacy. In the southern kingdom, the Davidic dynasty was
completely entrenched in a unitary state, whose boundaries were
extended by Hezekiah and his successors to include significant
portions of Israel. Hezekiah himself acted to reunify the people
through a renewal of the Pesah (Passover) observance in
Jerusalem, a covenantal act. The consolidation of the monarchy
and the centralization of political power coincided with the rise
of the prophetic tradition in its second form, as a counterweight
to king, court, and temple. It was this somewhat revised
prophetic tradition which was used by the prophets to review and
modify the revised organic law, establishing the fifth epoch
(721-440 BCE) as the period in which the Prophetic Torah took
form.
The climactic event of the fifth epoch was the Josianic
Reform. This important event followed on the heels of a period
in which the old constitution had been persistently violated and
even abandoned by the powerholders in Judah. It involved a
recovenanting between the king, the people, and God under the
auspices of the high priest. When the opportunity came for the
restoration of the fundamental law, its restorers were able to
capitalize on the chaotic situation to revise the constitution so
as to include the body of prophetic doctrine that had been
progressively developed under the Prophetic Torah. The account
of this constitutional reform is embodied in the biblical
discussion of the rediscovery of the Book of Deuteronomy. It was
this Deuteronomic constitution, as interpreted by the later
prophets, which formed the basis for the maintenance of Jewish
national existence during the transition from a rooted nation in
Judea to an exiled people in Babylonia and back to a new form of
nationhood in Judea again. Constitutionally, then, the
destruction of the Temple did not mark the end of the epoch.
Rather, it enabled the prophets to establish their constitution
more firmly without the heavy counterweights of an enthroned king
and a temple. The offices of king and high priest continued to
exist in exile but lost most of their real power.
It was only with the restoration of the national home in
Judea under Persian rule that conditions became sufficiently
different from those of the previous epoch to require another
constitutional revision, particularly once it became clear that
the monarchy would not be restored. Ezra and Nehemiah introduced
a fourth revision of the fundamental law as embodied in the Torah
and in doing so formally brought the Jewish people into a sixth
historical epoch (440-145 BCE). Its founding act was the Sukkot
(Tabernacles) covenant described in the Bible. The body of
interpretations that had developed around the Deuteronomic
Constitution to enable it to meet the new national needs was
incorporated into the new framework, which was further developed
through the takkanot (ordinances) of Ezra, the soferim (lit.
"scribes"), and the Knesset ha-Gedolah (Great Assembly). Under
the Ezra Torah, new approaches and interpretations were developed
to make possible the preservation of the greatest degree of
Jewish autonomy feasible under foreign imperial rule.
This constitution and its practical application were
sufficient until the Seleucid oppressions that led to the
Hasmonean Revolt. That event was, in great part, the result of a
constitutional crisis stemming from the attempt by the Seleucids
and the Hellenizing Jews to substitute the constitution of a
Greek polis for traditional Jewish organic law. In the process
of overthrowing Seleucid domination and reestablishing an
independent Jewish commonwealth, the sixth modification of the
Jewish constitution emerged, established by Simon the Nasi by
covenant with the people as described in 1 Maccabees, marking the
beginning of the seventh epoch in Jewish history (145 BCE-140
CE). This was the era of the Hasmoneans and the tannaim. It was
marked by Hasmonean political control so long as Jewish
independence continued and the rise of the several Tannaitic
parties (the Hasidim, the Pharisees, etc.) to a position of power
in national life and particularly in regard to the constitutional
process. By the time the monarchs of the Hasmonean dynasty
ceased to reign (some time after they had ceased to rule), Jewish
organic law was well concentrated in the hands of the tannaim
(lit. "masters of teaching"), particularly as they were
constituted in the judicial-legislative body know as the
Sanhedrin. The political upheavals of the epoch led to various
regime changes during its course and had far-reaching
constitutional implications for the Jewish people. Nevertheless,
they were tied together by a coherent and continuous
constitutional superstructure throughout.
In this respect, the destruction of the Second Temple may
have been the climactic event of the epoch, but was not, in
itself, a constitutional change. It provides a good example of
how, within the general framework of every epoch, there occur
historical events of the highest significance. It is only when
such events and the developments surrounding them significantly
alter the framework itself that constitutional revision becomes
necessary and a new period can be said to replace the old one.
Events such as the destruction of the Temple must be understood
in that context, even if that reduces their dramatic quality
somewhat.
The seventh epoch lasted until the Bar Kokhba revolt put an
end to the possibility of a Jewish state, even within the
framework of the Roman Empire. At that time, the interpretations
of the tannaim were put into a systematic framework by R. Akiva
which became the basis of the Mishnah, which was added to the
corpus of Jewish constitutional law early in the eighth epoch
(140-429 CE). The new epoch under the Mishnaic constitution
featured rule by the Nesi'im (mistranslated Patriarchs) and the
Sanhedrin. During this epoch, the Jewish community in Eretz
Israel came under Byzantine control and began to decline. The
Mishnaic constitution served as the basis which eased the
transfer of the center of Jewish life and authority to Babylonia
and whose interpretations in the process led to the compilation
of the Gemara.
The abolition of the office of Nasi marked the end of the
eighth epoch, while the compilation of the Gemara (c. 500 CE)
ushered in the ninth (429-748 CE). During the more than three
hundred years of this epoch, the definitive text of the Talmud
was completed and was applied in a new way, to a
diaspora-centered Jewish national life. The completion of the
Talmud marked the last all-embracing textual change in the
constitutional documents. Subsequent epochs are marked by the
development of codes based on the Talmud that included
progressively less in the way of basic constitutional
modifications.
The first of these periodic codal revisions was embodied in
the two codes compiled in the middle of the eighth century in
Babylonia, the Halakhot Pesukot and the Halakhot Gedolot. These
two codes have been overlooked as constitutional documents.
Despite their modest character as codes, they mark an epochal
change in the character of constitutional revision, initiating a
thousand years of codes. With them, the period of debate over
fundamentals seems to have ended. As the national homeland
became more a memory of the past and a hope for the future only,
the Jewish constitutionalists felt the need for definitive
statements, not permissive discussions. They represent the first
constitutional revisions based entirely on a diaspora-centered
Jewry, encompassing the interpretations of the early talmudic
period and preparing the way for the epoch of the Geonim and
Yeshivot (c.748-1030 CE). Hence, for the first time, the laws
concerning Eretz Israel are omitted while the 613 commandments
first appear in that form.
European Jewry, which inherited the mantle of leadership from
the Babylonian community, was the source of the next major
constitutional revision, which came in the middle of the eleventh
century. The first landmark of this revision, which also marked
the beginnings of the middle talmudic period, was the Safer
ha-Halakhot of R. Isaac Alfasi, the first comprehensive
codification of Jewish law. The epoch's high point was marked by
the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides and the controversy surrounding
it. This eleventh epoch lasted from 1038 to 1348 CE.
This epoch brought with it the development of the kehillah
and a set of constitutional devices used throughout European
Jewry to provide a basis for Jewish self-government in the
absence of overarching national or even regional political
institutions. One of the principal constitutional devices to
emerge was the rabbinical responsum as a vehicle for
constitutional interpretation. Both were authentically Jewish
responses to the new conditions of the High Middle Ages in which
the Jews found themselves. In principle, each new kehillah was
organized as a partnership with the authority of a bet din (court
authorized to enact ordinances) on the basis of a local covenant
which followed a standard halakhic mold.
The twelfth epoch (1348-1648 CE) began with the communal
reconstitutions required in the aftermath of the dislocations
generated by the Black Death (1348). The principal documentary
expressions of the new constitutional epoch were the Arba'ah
Turim, which established the organization used in all subsequent
codifications, including the Shulhan Arukh, and the codification
of communal ordinances in Spain which brought together the basic
constitutional framework for Jewish self-government. The Iberian
expulsions represented its climactive events. They actually
infused new life into Sephardic Jewry, which created its own
diaspora including the centers in Safed, Salonika, and
Constantinople. By the late seventeenth century, however, the
real decline did set in. From that point on, the leadership of
world Jewry began to pass to the Ashkenazim.
The culminating events of the epoch revolved around the
Sabbatean movement, which brought an end to medieval forms of
messianism, on one hand, and opened up new avenues for the succor
of individual Jews in new lands, on the other. This transition
was marked by another constitutional revision, the last to take
place fully within the traditional halakhic framework. It
signified the beginning of the thirteenth epoch in Jewish history
(1648-1948 CE), parallel to the modern epoch in world history.
Though it is common to date modern Jewish history from the middle
of the eighteenth century, a closer examination of the history of
recent centuries strongly indicates that a more accurate
reckoning will place the change in the middle of the seventeenth
century, when the Jews began to enter western society. Its
culmination is to be found in the Holocaust and the rise of
Israel.
The completion of the Shulhan Arukh by R. Joseph Caro and the
Mapah, its Ashkenazic modification, by R. Moses Isserles in the
latter quarter of the sixteenth century provided the code for the
new epoch, for those who remained within the fold of tradition.
These twin documents also marked the culmination of significant
constitutional revision in the halakhic pattern since they
virtually abolished the amending process. This closed pattern
was reflected in the period it served, both in the normative
Judaism of the era and its challengers. One result of this was
that, parallel to the continued life of the majority of Jews,
Sephardim and Ashkenazim alike, within the framework of halakhah,
there emerged a growing share of world Jewry who lived outside
the framework of halakhah and who had to be bound to the Jewish
community, if at all, by different constitutional devices and
forms. Emancipation, the climactic event of this period,
provided the new direction for more and more Jews. Moreover, the
emancipated Jews increasingly dominated the cutting edge of
Jewish life.
The rise of modern Zionism provided the basis and the actions
necessary for the task. In bringing together the various
currents of the nineteenth century and providing a means for
reconstitution of the Jewish people in a meaningfully Jewish way
to meet the challenges of the modern age, the Zionist movement
initiated a constitutional revolution that is still under way.
The establishment of the State of Israel marked the initiation of
a new constitutional and historical epoch in Jewish life,
parallel to the postmodern epoch in world history which began at
the same time. For the first time since the collapse of the
Second Commonwealth, the basis for inclusion in the Jewish body
politic was something other than halakhah; in this case it became
Jewish peoplehood.
It is not yet clear what kind of constitution will emerge
from the revolution, but it is likely to take the form of a new
covenant of peoplehood. It is not likely to turn on a single
constituting event or written document. Rather it is developing
through a series of pacts and procedures which are already
becoming identifiable and are govern expression through a
developing institutional framework. The results produced by the
application of this new constitution already are visible in
Israel and the world Jewish community. Today we are living in
the early stages of the fourteenth epoch of Jewish history, a
period which shows every sign of being one of great
constitutional and historical change. Nevertheless,
revolutionary as it may be, it involves a revision, not an
abandonment, of the old constitution.
Representative Government in the Edah
Representative government in the edah subsequent to the biblical
period represents, in many respects, a continuing effort to
maintain ancient forms of participation in new guises, forms that
have disappeared in other modern polities and are only now
beginning to change for the edah. The basis of governance in the
original edah (ca. 1280-1000 B.C.E.) was the assembly of all its
citizens for covenanting and other fundamental constitutional
questions, all adult males for deciding basic policy questions
(such as declarations of constitutionally permitted wars), and
the tribally selected nesi'im on an ad hoc basis for special
tasks and a permanent basis for continuing ones. Governance
between edah-like assemblies was in the hands of notables
designated apparently by some form of consensus, based on the
recognition of some families as leading ones. By the time of the
institution of kingship (1000-722 B.C.E.), it was already
apparent that the edah no longer attempted to assemble as a
whole, although there were still assemblies of notables drawn
from all the functioning tribes to play the role of the assembly
of the whole. This system may have persisted in Judah after the
fall of the northern kingdom (ca. 721-440 B.C.E.) -- evidence is
scanty -- with assemblies of the Am Ha-aretz (literally, the
people of the land), consisting of local notables replacing
assemblies of tribal leaders.
When Ezra and Nehemiah reconstituted the Jewish polity (ca.
440 B.C.E), most of world Jewry continued to live outside Eretz
Israel; hence assembly of the entire edah was impossible even in
theory. It was then that a system of virtual representation was
formally introduced through the establishment of the Anshei
Knesset HaGedolah (Men of the Great Assembly), which assembled in
Jerusalem. This new body was comprised of 120 members
symbolically representing a minyan (quorum of ten) from each of
the twelve tribes and, hence, the edah as a whole, a sign that
virtual representation was the intent behind its formulation. It
was really composed of people who lived in Judah plus one or two
members from the communities of the exile who came to settle in
Judah and could be added to the body, who spoke for the rest of
the edah. The transportation technology at the time made any
other system impossible.
This system of virtual representation continued through the
next nine hundred years of Jewish history, even after the
diaspora Jewish communities developed fully articulated governing
institutions of their own. The only changes were that in some
periods there was regularized representation from the diaspora in
the edah's sitting decision-making body, located in Jerusalem
until 70 C.E. and subsequently in other parts of Eretz Israel. It
ended only with the abolition of the Nesiut (patriarchate) by the
Romans, ca. 429 C.E.
The yeshivot (another synonym for assembly) in Babylonia
continued this pattern when power passed to them. They became
the virtual representatives of the edah in its rule-making and
adjudication functions, paralleling the Rosh HaGolah (exilarch),
who was the edah's chief magistrate. The yeshivot continued the
tradition of bringing in people from around the Jewish world to
the extent possible on a voluntary, personal choice basis,
consisting of those who decided to come, study, and stay. This
arrangement persisted for six hundred years, until the system was
disrupted by the abolition of the office of Rosh HaGolah in 1042
C.E.
After that, the edah was unable to sustain equivalent common
institutions, surviving as a communications network for halakhic
decision making through correspondence rather than an assembly.
Political organization was confined to local, countrywide, or, in
rare cases, multicountry regions. Hence the system of virtual
representation existed in principle rather than practice. The
structure of the edah changed during the next nine hundred years,
being expressed through a handful of notable halakhic figures
whose decisions gained edah-wide acceptance or a handful of
shtadlanim whose influential services were recognized edah-wide.
The problems of transportation and communication encountered
by Ezra and Nehemiah in the fifth century B.C.E. remained
unchanged until well into the nineteenth century C.E. At times,
deterioration of conditions made the problems even greater. Not
until the development of the steamboat, railroad, and telegraph
did new technology make continental and intercontinental links
feasible.
It was not until the World Zionist Congress (WZO) in 1897
that an effort was made to establish a body representative of the
edah in modern terms: through constituency elections of
delegates to a worldwide congress in which all communities were
potentially if not actually to be represented. Since that time,
there has been a striving to establish such institutions. The
WZO was and is a membership organization. It became worldwide in
scope but never embraced a majority of the edah as members. The
World Jewish Congress, established in 1936, tried to overcome
that problem by being based on country affiliates, the major
representative bodies from each countrywide Jewish community.
However, its strength was and is concentrated in Europe and Latin
America with very limited presence in the world's largest Jewish
communities -- the U.S., Israel, the Soviet Union, and France.
Framing organizations were established in the local and
countrywide arenas by the end of the modern epoch or during the
first generation of the postmodern epoch as a culmination of the
modernization process. They were accompanied by a general
revolution in transportation and communications based on air
travel and the airwaves. Jews are now engaged in the
reestablishment of effective, continuing edah-wide framing
institutions, principally through the reconstitution of the
Jewish Agency and the WZO. Because transportation and
communication technologies now permit this, it is likely that
something serious will come out of the effort. Nevertheless,
this will not be the whole story, for there are structural
limitations to the degree to which formal representatives of all
segments of the edah can assemble on a regular basis. Thus we
are returning to the situation of ancient Israel but on a
worldwide scale. Leading figures representing the elements of
the edah come together at regular intervals and are involved in
consultations in between; but the day-to-day business is still
conducted by virtual representatives, including people co-opted
into the governing circles who might not be formally chosen
through the standard processes because of their proximity or
their wealth.
It should be noted that the effort to reconstitute the Jewish
Agency as an edah-wide instrument was not initiated without a
struggle. Initially, the reestablished State of Israel was
viewed by many, especially Israelis, as the sole institutional
embodiment of the edah. Hence the Israeli Knesset was
established with 120 members in imitation of Anshei Knesset
HaGedolah and with the clear intention of being the virtual
representative of all world Jewry because of its constituent
position as the center of authority in the Jewish state. This
did not happen because the diaspora would not -- could not --
accept the Israeli legislative body as its spokesman; hence there
was the need to go back to the WZO/Jewish Agency to develop a
more broadly representative body, though one in which Israel
would play the leading role.
Jewish Communities in the Modern World
The Jewish polity has undergone many changes since its inception
somewhere in the Sinai Desert but none have been more decisive
than those that have affected it in the past three centuries.25
The inauguration of the modern epoch, born out of the revolution
in science, technology, politics, economics, and religion that
cause the Western world to take a radical turn in the
mid-seventeenth century, initiated a process of decorporatization
of Jewish communal life that gained momentum for the following
two centuries.26 Jewish corporate autonomy, a feature of diaspora
existence in one way or another since the Babylonian settlements
are all products of the modern epoch. World War I brought down
the last remnants of that kind of autonomy in Europe, where it
had been on the wane for two centuries. Only in certain of the
Muslim countries did the old forms persist until the nationalist
revolutions of the period after World War II eliminated them.
Decorporatization -- perhaps denationalization is a better
term -- brought with it efforts to redefine Jewish life in
Protestant religious terms in western Europe and North America
and socialist secular ones in eastern Europe and, somewhat later,
in Latin America. In Europe the process was promoted from within
the Jewish community and without by Jews seeking wider economic
and social opportunities as individuals and by newly
nationalistic regimes seeking to establish the state as the
primary force in the life of all residents within its boundaries.
In the Americas, it came automatically as individual Jews found
themselves in the same position as other migrants to the New
World.
Out of decorporatization came new forms of Jewish communal
organization in the countrywide and local arenas: (1) the
consistoire of postrevolutionary France which spread to the other
countries within the French sphere of influence in Europe and the
Mediterranean basin -- an attempt to create a Jewish "church"
structure parallel to that of the Catholic Church; (2) the
nineteenth-century Central European kehillah or cultesgemeinde,
essentially a religious and social agency chartered and regulated
by the secular government to provide an official framework for
all Jews parallel to the frameworks binding Christians in the
state; (3) the united congregational pattern of Britain and its
overseas settlements by which Jews voluntarily banded together to
create a board of notables ("deputies") to represent Jewish
interests to the government of the host country; (4) the
radically individualistic "congregational" pattern of the United
States by which individual Jews voluntarily banded together,
principally in the local arena, to create whatever kinds of
Jewish associations they wished without any kind of supralocal
umbrella organization even for external representation and (5)
separate communal associations based on the Landsmannschaft
(country of origin society) principle, which became the basis for
voluntary affiliation of the Jewish immigrants to Latin America.
The common denominator of all these different forms was their
limited scope and increasingly voluntary character.
While these organizational changes were taking place, a
two-pronged demographic shift of great importance began: the
live birth and survival rate among Jews rose rapidly, causing the
number of Jews in the world to soar, and the Jews began to
migrate at an accelerating rate to the lands of the Western
world's great frontier (the Western Hemisphere, southern Africa,
and Australia in particular but also in smaller numbers to East
Asia), thus initiating a shift in the balance of Jewish
settlement in the world (see Table 1).27
Table 1
JEWISH POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION BY CONTINENT
(in thousands)
| 1840 | 1900 | 1939 | 1982 |
Continent | Total | % | Total | % | Total | % | Total | % |
Europe* | 3,950 | 87.8 | 8,900 | 80.9 | 9,500 | 56.8 | 2,843 | 21.9 |
Asia | 300 | 6.7 | 510 | 4.6 | 1,030 | 6.2 | 3,417 | 26.3 |
Africa | 198 | 4.4 | 375 | 3.4 | 625 | 3.7 | 172 | 1.3 |
North and
South America | 50 | 1.1 | 1,200 | 10.9 | 5,540 | 33.1 | 6,478 | 49.9 |
Oceana | 2 | - | 15 | 0.2 | 33 | 0.2 | 79 | 0.6 |
Total | 4,500 | 100.0 | 11,000 | 100.0 | 16,728 | 100.0 | 12,989 | 100.0 |
Sources: Jacob Lestschinsky, Tfutzot Yisrael ahar haMilhamah, Tel
Aviv, 1958; American Jewish Year Book, 1968 and 1984.
* Including Russia
Finally, the modern epoch saw Jewish resettlement of the Land
of Israel. The first settlers to come as founders of new
settlements began to arrive in the seventeenth century and
continued regularly thereafter, pioneering new communities of a
traditional character within the framework of the Ottoman
Empire's millet system.28 They were followed by the Zionist
pioneers who, beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, created new forms of communal life as part of the latest
stage in the transformation of the Jewish people.29
Beginning a New Epoch
World War II marked the culmination of all the trends and
tendencies of the modern epoch and the end of the epoch itself
for all peoples. Sometime between 1946 and 1949, the postmodern
epoch began. For the Jewish people, the Holocaust and the
establishment of the State of Israel provided the pair of
decisive events that marked the crossing of the watershed into
the postmodern world. In the process, the entire basis of the
Jewish polity was radically changed, the locus of Jewish life
shifted, and virtually every organized Jewish community was
reconstituted in some way.
Central to the reconstitution was the reestablishment of a
politically independent Jewish commonwealth in Israel. The
restoration of the Jewish state added a new factor to the edah,
creating a new focus of Jewish energy and concern precisely at
the moment when the older foci had reached the end of their
ability to attract most Jews. As the 1967 crisis demonstrated
decisively, Israel was not simply another Jewish community in the
constellation but the center of the world for Jews.
The Jewry that greeted the new state was no longer an
expanding on that was gaining population even in the face of the
attrition of intermarriage and assimilation. On the contrary, it
was a decimated one (even worse, for decimated means the loss of
one in ten; the Jews lost one in three); a Jewry whose very
physical survival had been in grave jeopardy and whose rate of
loss from defections came close to equaling its birthrate.
Moreover, the traditional strongholds of Jewish communal life in
Europe (which were also areas with a high Jewish reproduction
rate) were those that had been wiped out.
At the end of the 1940s the centers of Jews life had shifted
decisively away from Europe to Israel and North America. By
then, continental Europe ranked behind Latin America, North
Africa, and Great Britain, as a force in Jewish life. Its Jews
were almost entirely dependent on financial and technical
assistance from the United States and Israel. Except for those
in the Moslem countries that were soon virtually to disappear,
the major functioning Jewish communities all had acquired
sufficient size to become significant factors on the Jewish scene
only within the previous two generations. In many cases, the
original shapers of those communities were still alive, and many
were still the actual community leaders. The Jewish world had
been willy-nilly thrown back to a pioneering stage.
This new epoch is still in its early years, hardly more than
a single generation old; hence, its character is still in its
formative stages. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the
State of Israel in 1948 the Jewish polity began a constitutional
change of revolutionary proportions, inaugurating a new epoch in
Jewish constitutional history. For the first time in almost two
millennia, the Jewish people were presented with the opportunity
to attain citizenship in their own state. Israel's very first
law (Hok Ha-Shevut, the Law of Return) specified that every Jew
had a right to settle in Israel and automatically acquire Israeli
citizenship.
To date, only a fraction of the edah have taken advantage of
Israel's availability. Most continue to live in the lands of the
diaspora of their own free will. Hence the dominant structural
characteristic of the edah continues to be the absence of a
binding, all-embracing political framework, although it now has a
focus. The State of Israel and its various organs have a strong
claim to preeminence in fields that touch on every aspect of
Jewish communal life. The Israeli leadership have argued
consistently that Israel is qualitatively different from the
diaspora and hence its centrality must be acknowledged. The
American Jewish leadership, in particular, have taken the
position that Israel is no more than first among equals.
Nevertheless, the reestablishment of a Jewish state has
crystallized the edah as a polity, restoring a sense of political
involvement among Jews and shaping a new institutional framework
in which the business of the edah in conducted.
The diffusion of authority and influence which continues to
characterize the structure of the edah and its components has
taken various forms in the new epoch. The keter malkhut has been
transformed into a network of single and multipurpose functional
authorities, most of which do not aspire to do more than serve
their particular functions, but all of which acknowledge the
place of the State of Israel at the fulcrum of the network. The
keter kehunah has become a conglomeration of synagogue movements
and their rabbinates, who are mainly responsible for ritual and
pastoral functions. Each manages -- independently -- various
ritual functions in a manner it deems appropriate to its own
traditions, perspectives, and environment. That each of these
movements has established a framework with worldwide aspirations,
such as the World Union for Progressive Judaism and the World
Council of Synagogues, merely underlines the new organizational
character of the edah.
Sectoral segmentation is most pronounced in the keter torah.
Contemporary Jews take their cues in this domain from a
kaleidoscopic spectrum of authorities. Their range stretches
from the Jewish professors and scholars who influence
contemporary Jews' understanding of what is expected of them as
Jews to the rabbinical leadership of the Orthodox, Conservative
and Reform camps, who may use the traditional devices for ruling
on matters of Torah but often in untraditional ways; to the heads
of very traditional yeshivot and the rebbes of various emigre
Hassidic communities who have reestablished themselves in the
principal cities of Israel and the United States from which they
have developed multicountry networks.
The fragmentation of the keter torah is both a reflection and
an expression of the absence yet of a clear cut, commonly
accepted constitutional basis for the entire edah. The tendency
toward a wide variety of interpretations of the Torah
(traditionally referred to in Hebrew as Torat Moshe, the teaching
of Moses) which emerged during the modern epoch, has now become
exacerbated. It is a sign of the times that if the Torah is to
be included in the definition of the constitution, it has to be
reinterpreted for a majority of Jews. The reality is that the
norms by which Jews live their lives are interpreted through
various prisms, of which the traditional prism is now only one.
Still, it seems that most Jews perceive the Torah to be a
constitutional referent in some way.
This fragmentation is further reflected in the multiplicity
of camps and parties which exert influence on the life of the
edah and its constituents. Broadly speaking, the principal camps
can be termed: the Orthodox and the Masorti (traditional) who
see themselves as continuing the ways of the Pharisees, the
Liberal religious, and the Neo-Sadducees. The last includes
Israelis seeking to express their Judaism through Israeli Jewry's
emerging civil religion -- Zionists -- and those diaspora Jews
who find their best means of Jewish expression in the Jewish
communal institutions. These camps are separate but not mutually
exclusive. Presented diagrammatically, they ought to be viewed
as a triangle, a device that stresses their points of overlap as
well as their distinctiveness. The Mizrahi Party, for
instance, straddles the Zionist and the Orthodox camps, viewing
its Zionism as one expression of its Orthodoxy. Increasingly,
too, do the Conservative (Masorati) and Reform (Liberal)
movements find themselves linked with Zionism. At the same time,
the Neturei Karta, the secular Zionists, and the surviving
classical Reform elements remain separated in their respective
camps.
Whatever its form of organization, the primary fact of Jewish
communal life today is its voluntary character. Although there
are differences from country to country in degree of actual
freedom to be Jewish or not, the virtual disappearance of the
remaining legal and even social or cultural barriers to
individual free choice in all but a handful of countries has made
free association the dominant characteristic of Jewish life in
the postmodern era. Consequently, the first task of each Jewish
community is the learn to deal with this freedom. This task is a
major factor in determining the direction of the reconstitution
of Jewish life in this generation.
The new voluntarism also extends into the internal life of
the Jewish community, generating pluralism even in previously
free but relatively homogeneous or monolithic community
structures. This pluralism is increased by the breakdown of the
traditional reasons for being Jewish and the rise of new
incentives for Jewish association. This pluralistic Jewish
polity can best be described as a communications network of
interacting institutions, each of which, while preserving its own
structural integrity and filling its own functional role, is
connected to the others in a variety of ways. The boundaries of
the polity, insofar as it is bounded, are revealed only when the
pattern of the network is uncovered. The pattern stands revealed
only when both its components are: its institutions and
organizations with their respective roles and the way in which
communications are passed between them.
The pattern is inevitably dynamic. There is rarely a fixed
division of authority and influence but, instead, one that varies
from time to time and often from issue to issue, with different
entities in the network taking on different "loadings" at
different times and relative to different issues. Because the
polity is voluntary, persuasion rather than compulsion, influence
rather than power, are the only tools available for making and
executing policies. This, too, works to strengthen its character
as a communications network because the character, quality, and
relevance of what is communicated and the way in which it is
communicated frequently determine the extent of the authority and
influence of the parties to the communication.
The reconstitution of the edah is only in its beginning
stages; its final form for this epoch cannot yet be foreseen. At
this writing, the Jewish people is in the buildup period of the
second generation of the postmodern epoch and is actively engaged
in trying to work through a new constitutional synthesis, both
political and religious. It is likely that the constitution for
the new epoch will find its source in the traditional Torah as
understood and interpreted in traditional and nontraditional
ways. The continued reliance on the Torah as a constitutional
anchor could not have been forecast during the first generation
of the new epoch, when the late modern trend of secularization
was still alive. But it is now fair to conclude that for most
Jews, the Torah continues to serve as a constitutional foundation
even though they no longer feel bound by its commandments as
traditionally understood.
A second element in the new constitutional framework is the
commitment to Jewish unity and peoplehood as embodied in the
network of institutions serving the edah. This commitment is
basically founded on a people-wide consensus. However, it is
also acquiring a documentary base through congeries of
quasi-covenantal constitutional documents generated in the new
institutions of the edah. These may develop into a comprehensive
postmodern constitutional supplement to the edah's historic
constitution, following the patters of earlier epochs.
Notes
1. This chapter is based on material originally presented in
four publications by the author, "The Reconstitution of
Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period," Jewish Journal of
Sociology, vol. 11, no. 2 (December 1969), pp. 188-226;
"Kinship and Consent in the Jewish Community," Tradition,
vol. 14, no. 4 (Fall 1974), pp. 63-79; Covenant and Freedom
in the Jewish Political Tradition, Annual Sol Feinstone
Lecture, (Philadelphia: Gratz College, March 1981); and
Participation and Accountability in the American Jewish
Community, (New York: Council of Jewish Federations and
Association of Jewish Community Organization Personnel,
1980).
2. The close connections between the theological and the
political are made manifest in Jewish literature beginning
with the Bible. In our time, Martin Buber has been the
foremost expositor of those connections. See, in particular,
his Kinship of God, trans. Richard Scheimann (London: G.
Allen and Unwin, 1967). See also Hans Kohn, The Idea of
Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1944), chap. 2; and
Harold Fisch, Jerusalem and Albion (New York: Schocken
Books, 1964).
3. Jews have always desired an independent territorial state,
but they have desired it only as a means to a larger end and
not as an end in itself.
4. Robert Pranger, The Eclipse of Civilization (following the
Bible and) Aristotle, among others, provides a useful
discussion of citizenship as the creation of official
identity, itself a culturally created necessity for every man
that enables men to become fully human. The necessity for
citizenship has become universal (p. 10): "In the language
of psychology, citizenship supplies an integral segment of
one's 'identity pattern,' something taken as second nature."
It is in this sense that the concept is used here. See also
Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation. Relevant to the Jewish
situation is D.F. Aberle et al., "The Functional
Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, vol. 60, no. 2 (January
1950), pp. 100-110. On the compatibility of multiple
loyalties, see Morton Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
5. Pranger, The Eclipse of Civilization, following Sheldon S.
Wolin in Politics and Vision (Boston: Little and Brown,
1960), defines this phenomenon as the carving out of
political space, space "shaped by a dualist structure of
tangible objects and subjective perceptions which arranges a
system of shared political meanings among citizens and also
establishes these meanings in hierarchies of valued
priorities." Pranger continues, "Around a nation are drawn a
number of physical and non-physical boundaries within which
citizens feel at home, outside of which they are foreigners.
Such a space is molded by objective factors such as
geographical frontiers, an economic system, a legal system, a
common political language..., and by the special governmental
institutions calls offices. But one also discovers certain
subjective perceptions and expectations that members share
about correct political action, expectations drawn from the
members' own individual needs and values and from the social
symbolism attributed to boundaries, economics, language, and
governments. These symbolic perceptions may not find common
agreement throughout a nation. Nevertheless, there are often
common relationships between more specialized perceptions
which entitle an observer to speak of a 'pattern' for even
the heterogeneous political life of a Switzerland or an
India.... In every political situation, no matter how
transient, one can locate such patterns of civic
expectations." Pranger defines this as the political culture
of a "national state" but with a few modifications it is
useful in defining the political space and culture of the
Jewish polity. Thus, for example, this concept being related
to the study of Jewish political life, the tangible objects
are the patterns of community organization and activity; the
subjective perceptions relate to the questions of individual
identity and involvement. See also Daniel J. Elazar and
Joseph Zikmund, eds., The Ecology of American Political
Culture: Readings (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975),
Introduction.
6. The biblical understanding of the covenant as a consensual,
theopolitical act is discussed in George E. Meandenhall, The
Tenth Generation; R.A.F. MacKenzie, S.J. Faith
and History in the Old Testament (New York, 1963);
see chap. 3, "Israel's Covenant with God."
7. The record of the reaffirmation of the covenant in the Bible
is easily discernible in the text itself. Buber, Kinship of
God, deals with this in his textual exegesis. See also the
studies of Avraham Malamut, "Organs of Statecraft in the
Israelite Monarchy," The Biblical Archaeologist vol. 28, no.
2 (1965), pp. 34-51; G.E. Mendenhall, "Covenant Forms in
Israelite Tradition," The Biblical Archaeologist vol. 17, no.
3 (1954), pp. 50-76; Hayim Tadmor, "'The People' and the
Kingship in Ancient Israel: The Role of Political
Institutions in the Biblical Period," Journal of World
History vol. 11, no. 1-2 (1968), pp. 46-68; Moshe Weinfeld,
"The Transition From Tribal Republic to Monarchy in Ancient
Israel and Its Impression on Jewish Political History," in
Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship and Consent: The Jewish
Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses (Ramat Gan:
Turtledove Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 151-166.
8. Leo Baeck discusses this phenomenon in This People Israel:
The Meaning of Jewish Existence (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1965). The historic evidence
is mustered in Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart Cohen, The Jewish
Polity (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985).
9. See, for example, Louis Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government
in the Middle Ages, 2d ed. (New York: Jewish Theological
Seminary, 1964); and H.H. Ben-Sasson, Perakim beToldot
haYehudim beYamei haBaynayim (Chapters in the History of the
Jews in the Middle Ages) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969).
10. Cf. Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., Covenant,
Polity, and Constitutionalism (Lanham, Md.: University Press
of America and Center for the Study of Federalism, 1982) and
Daniel J. Elazar, "Covenant as the Basis of the Jewish
Political Tradition," The Jewish Journal of Sociology, vol.
20, no. 1 (June 1978), pp. 5-37.
11. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Constitution, the Union, and the
Liberties of the People," Publius, vol. 8, no. 3 (Summer
1973), pp. 141-75.
12. See, for example, Delbart R. Hillers, Covenant: The History
of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Cf. Gordon Freeman, "Rabbinic Conceptions of Covenant," in
Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship and Consent: The Jewish
Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses (Jerusalem and
Washington, D.C.: Center for Jewish Community Studies and
University Press of America, 1983).
16. See I.A. Agus, The Heroic Age of Franco-German Jewry (New
York: Yeshiva University Press, 1969); "On Power and
Authority: Halachic Stame of the Tradition Community and Its
Contemporary Implications," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship
and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and its
Contemporary Uses (Ramat Gan: Turtledove Publishing Co.,
1981); Gerald Blidstein, "Individual and Community in the
Middle Ages,"; Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship and Consent;
Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart A. Cohen, The Jewish Polity:
Jewish Political Organization from Biblical Times to the
Present (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1985),
especially Epoch XI.
17. R. Judah HaBarceloni, Sefer HaShtarot.
18. In the words of The Federalist, force, accident, or choice.
See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The
Federalist (1788), No. 1.
19. Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart A. Cohen, The Jewish Polity:
Jewish Political Organization from Biblical Times to the
Present (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985),
Introduction; Robert Gordis, "Democratic Origins in ancient
Israel: The Biblical Edah" in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950); Moshe
Weinfeld, "The Transition from Tribal Republic to Monarchy in
Ancient Israel and Its Impression on Jewish Political
History," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Kinship and Consent
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983).
20. The Jewish Polity, op. cit.
21. See Stuart A. Cohen, The Concept of the Three Ketarim,
Working Paper No. 18 of Workshop in the Covenant Idea and the
Jewish Political Tradition (Ramat Gan and Jerusalem: Bar
Ilan University Department of Political Studies and Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, 1982).
22. This discussion draws heavily on the political science
literature on constitutionalism. Standard works on the
subject include James Bryce, Constitutions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1905); Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional
Government and Politics: Nature and Development (Boston:
Ginn and Co., 1937) and "Constitutions and
Constitutionalism," in David L. Sills (ed.), International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 3 (New York:
MacMillan and Free Press, 1968), pp. 318-326; Charles H.
McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947); and M.J.C. Vile,
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967). Although otherwise problematic for a
system whose origins are in a divine covenant, Hans Kelsen's
constitutional theory is particularly helpful in this
connection, cf. his General Theory of Law and State (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1961).
23. Cf. Josephus Flavius, Antiquities of the Jews, Book IV, Chap.
8, especially paragraphs 196-198 and Philo, De Specialibus
Legibus, Book IV "De Constitutione Principum." For an
analysis of Philo's political thought, with frequent
references to Josephus and to classical Jewish sources, see
Harry Aystryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious
Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (revised
edition; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962)
vol. 2, chapter 13 "Political Theory," pp. 322-437.
24. For a more complete exposition of this thesis see Daniel J.
Elazar, "The Generation Rhythm of American Politics" in
American Politics Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1978).
After developing this theory out of his work in American
political history, Elaza discovered the European literature
on the subject which thoroughly parallel his own conclusions.
Chief proponents of the generational thesis include Aguste
Comte, Karl Mannheim, Julian Marias, John Stuart Mill, and
Jose Ortega y Gasset. Comte was the fist to suggest the
historical process of generational succession. Mill
developed Comte's idea of social generations and Ortega y
Gasset added the dimension of multigenerational epochs as the
macrostructure of history based on the generation as the
microstructure. For an overview of their thought, see Julian
Marias, "Generations: The Concept" in Sills (ed.),
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 6, pp.
88-92, and his Generations: A Historical Method (translated
by H. Raley; New York: OUP, 1970).
25. Howard M. Sachar's The Course of Modern Jewish History (New
York: Dell Publishing, 1958) is a comprehensive source of
the history of Jewish life in this period. The changes
themselves are discussed by Jacob Katz in Tradition and
Crisis (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965) and Michael A.
Meyer, The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and
European Culture in Germany 1794-1824 (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1967). See also Louis Finkelstein, ed.,
The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960),
3d ed., 2 vols.; Salo W. Baron, "The Modern Age" in Leo W.
Schwarz, ed., Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People (New
York: The Modern Library, 1956), pp. 315-484.
26. For a brief exposition of this definition of the modern
epoch, particularly as it applies to the United States, see
Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie (New York: Basic
Books, 1970), Introduction and Appendix; and, by the same
author, Toward a Generational Theory of American Politics
(Philadelphia: Center for the Study of Federalism, 1968).
The writer has discussed this periodization of Jewish history
in "A Constitutional View of Jewish History," Judaism, vol.
10, no. 3 (Summer 1961), pp. 256-64.
27. Cf. Jacob Lestichinsky, Tfutzot Yisrael Ahar haMilhamah (The
Dispersions of Israel After the War) (Tel Aviv, 1958)
(Hebrew); Aryeh Tartakower, HaHevrah haYehudit (Jewish
Society) (Tel Aviv: Massada, 1957-59) (Hebrew).
28. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Toldot Eretz Yisrael beTekufah haOtomanit
(History of the Land of Israel in the Ottoman Period),
(Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben Zvi, 1955) (Hebrew); Robert
Sherevsky, Avraham Katz, Yisrael Kolatt, and Hayim Barkai,
Meah Shanah ve'od 20 (One Hundred Years and Another 20), (Tel
Aviv: Ma'ariv 1968) (Hebrew).
29. It should be noted that most, if not all, of the first
colonies were founded by covenants or articles of agreement,
thus continuing the classic Jewish pattern. Cf. Daniel J.
Elazar, Israel: Building a New Society (Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press, 1986).