The Geo-Demographics of American Christian
Attitudes Towards Jews and Israel
Daniel J. Elazar
Jews often treat "Christian attitudes" toward them and their state
as if those attitudes were of a piece, internally
undifferentiated. In fact, Christian attitudes differ by
religious denomination, ethnicc background, socio-economic status,
and, in the United States, even geographic location.
Understanding these differences is vital for the development of
appropriate strategies in Jewish attempts to relate to Christian
groups and to mobilize Christian influence in public policy issues
of concern to Israel in particular and to the Jewish people in
general.
In 1984, Stuart Rothenberg and Frank Newport conducted a
countrywide survey in which they attempted to identify and define
the Evangelical voter and analyze his voting patterns. The survey
was conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Government
and Politics of the Free Congress Research and Education
Foundation and the results were published in a volume entitled The
Evangelical Voter: Religion and Politics in America. Although
Rothenberg and Newport focus strictly on the Evangelical vote,
they collected a large bocy of data not used in their book which
dealt more specifically with the attitudes toward Jews and Israel
of non-fundamentalist Christian groups as well. These data offer
us an opportunity to examine the geo-demographic patterns of
Christian attitudes toward Israel.
Upon analysis, these data point to some important convergences
which can help guide the policy of the Jewish community in its
external relations.
Attitudes Toward Israel
With regard to their attitudes towards Israel, American Christians
divide into three groupings: positive attitudes are displayed in
the South proper and the Mountain and Pacific West; slightly less
positive attitudes are found in the West South Central region; and
the least positive attitudes are grouped in the bloc of states
from the Northeast through the Midwest. The West North Central
states are ambivalent and share the low levels of "really dislike"
characteristic of the South and West, but there are also the low
levels of "really like" characteristic of the Northeast.
This is crucial for presidential politics and in fact works to
Jewish advantage. Where Israel is least popular, in the New
England, Mid-Atlantic, and East North Central states, the Jews are
also politically the strongest because of local population
concentrations and involvement. Hence they are in a position to
counterbalance public opinion with their votes. Where it has the
strongest support, Jews are, with the exception of Florida and
California, somewhat less politically influential because they do
not have the numbers or presence to be influential. The real
problem geographically is in the West South Central states
meaning, in particular, Texas, where there is a softness towards
Israel.
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS/CENSUS AREAS
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| New Engl/Mid Atl | 20.77 | 33.08 | 46.15 | 130 |
| East/North Centr | 19.16 | 35.98 | 44.86 | 214 |
| West/Nrth Centrl | 11.29 | 43.55 | 45.16 | 62 |
| South Atlantic | 11.71 | 34.63 | 53.66 | 205 |
| East/Sth Central | 10.23 | 35.23 | 54.55 | 88 |
| West/Sth Central | 19.08 | 31.58 | 49.34 | 152 |
| Mountain/Pacific | 10.74 | 34.23 | 55.03 | 149
|
This pattern is carried over in the responses of the political
target groups. The Conservative Republicans are by far the most
positive and among the least negative, followed by the moderate
liberal Democrats. The most negative are moderate liberal
Republicans and the Catholics, who are also more likely to be
fencesitters on this issue. The moderate liberal Republicans are
mostly in the northeast and help bring down that region's overall
positive rating, while most of the Conservative Republicans are in
the West or, increasingly, the South.
POLITICAL GROUPS
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| Cons GOP | 14.57 | 29.13 | 56.30 | 254 |
| Mod/Lib GOP | 20.29 | 33.33 | 46.38 | 69 |
| Ticket-Splitter | 13.59 | 41.75 | 44.66 | 206 |
| Cons Democrat | 18.47 | 32.93 | 48.59 | 249 |
| Mod/Lib Democrat | 12.61 | 37.39 | 50.00 | 222
|
The pattern is further reinforced by denomination and type of
church. Again, among the least positive and by far the most
negative are the high status denominations, most of whose members
are probably also moderate liberal Republicans living in the
Northeast or Midwest. This suggests that here we have a
convergence of upper strata genteel anti-Semitism, the economic
interests of big business and banking interests who do not want to
alienate the Arabs with their wealth, and contemporary liberalism
as underdoggism which is especially characteristic of these
archetypical "WASPS," domestically and in foreign affairs.
Catholics are the second most negative group, again probably
reflecting at least residual ethnic anti-Jewish feelings, also
concentrated in the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and East North
Central states. The Baptists turn out to be the most favorable,
which correlates with the recent fundamentalist love affair for
Israel and also among the least unfavorable, which in all
likelihood reflects a residue of their older anti-Semitic
predelictions. At the same time, the other conservative
denominations are more or less in the middle.
The high ranking among the Lutherans cannot be explained by the
lmited data. They are not a group noted for pro-Israel or
pro-Jewish feelings in the past. Obviously there is a split in
their ranks, since they also have the third highest negative
rating after the high status Protestant denominations and the
Catholics.
DENOMINATION/TYPE OF CHURCH
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| Baptist | 13.14 | 33.58 | 53.28 | 274 |
| Methodist | 12.50 | 41.67 | 45.83 | 120 |
| Lutheran | 16.92 | 30.77 | 52.31 | 65 |
| High Status Denm | 23.08 | 30.77 | 46.15 | 65 |
| Conservatv Denom | 15.33 | 35.77 | 48.91 | 137 |
| Catholic | 18.81 | 32.11 | 49.08 | 218 |
| Other Denom | 12.07 | 37.93 | 50.00 | 58 |
| No Specfc Denom | 11.11 | 39.68 | 49.21 | 63
|
Given the configuration of presidential politics in the United
States, this means that Israel is likely to continue to maintain
White House support because of the convergence of constituencies,
especially since Israel does well in the test for turnout
propensity: the higher the turnout propensity the more favorable,
while the most unfavorable have a low turnout propensity. On the
other hand, Texas and the high status Protestant eastern
Republican establishment need particular attention. The ethnic
Catholics need less, for two reasons. First, they are losing
power and, second, the data on respondents' ages suggests that in
any case what is likely to have caused weaknesses in their
attitude may be diminishing in the younger generation.
Overall, while there is relatively little spread with regard to
positive attitudes towards Israel by age. Those below the age of
44 seem to be more positively predisposed than those above,
indicating no decline in pro-Israel feeling among the great bulk
of the American people. On the other hand, those under 34 are
also the most anti-Israel in percentages that equal those of
between 55 and 64. There is less neutrality among the younger
people and more polarization. One would guess that a lot of the
"anti" feeling is a result of the trendy liberalism of the young.
That could pose a problem, unless the young grow out of it.
Obviously, it is not enough to leave things to that hope. Negative
feelings towards Israel are at their minimum between the ages of
35 and 54 and over the age of 65.
RESPONDENT'S AGE
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| 18-24 | 16.38 | 26.72 | 56.90 | 116 |
| 25-34 | 8.56 | 24.32 | 67.12 | 222 |
| 35-44 | 11.23 | 25.67 | 63.10 | 187 |
| 45-54 | 8.51 | 36.17 | 55.32 | 141 |
| 55-64 | 12.82 | 34.62 | 52.56 | 156 |
| 65 and Above | 15.48 | 35.12 | 49.40 | 168 |
| DK/No Answer | 30.00 | 50.00 | 20.00 | 10
|
This analysis is reinforced by the age-education correlation.
Thus under 35 and those with no college education are more likely
to be neutral than those over 54, while college education seems to
increase positive responses in every age group. No doubt this is
a reflection of the way in which college education lessens
culturally transmitted prejudice. The most favorable/least
unfavorable group by far in any of the categories dealt with so
far in this discussion are the 35 to 54 year olds with some
college or more. These are the people who were raised in the
period when prejudice was most forcefully repudiated -- during and
after World War II, and whose impressions of Israel were
undoubtedly formed when Israel was considered positively in almost
every respect. The most anti-Israel feelings were to be found
among those under 35 with at least some college education: people
who came of age when Israel already was considered to be an
occupier and a denier of Palestinian civil rights, and
anti-Zionist prejudice was becoming somewhat more acceptable. All
in all, in looking at respondents' education, education is more
likely to produce favorable feelings toward Israel and to reduce
negative ones.
AGE/EDUCATION
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| Undr 35/No Collg | 17.97 | 32.81 | 49.22 | 128 |
| Undr 35/Som Colg | 19.52 | 28.10 | 52.38 | 210 |
| 35-54/No College | 13.69 | 44.05 | 42.26 | 168 |
| 35-54/Som Colleg | 8.75 | 31.25 | 60.00 | 160 |
| Ovr 54/No Colleg | 14.87 | 36.92 | 48.21 | 195 |
| Ovr 54/Som Collg | 16.55 | 36.69 | 46.76 | 139 |
| Aggregate | 15.30 | 34.80 | 49.90 | 1000
|
This pattern repeats itself when the data are analyzed according
to type of work. Upper and lower white collar and upper blue
collar have almost identical positive responses, substantially
separated from lower blue collar. However, the lower blue collar
and upper white collar are almost equally the most anti-Israel.
The latter, one would assume, reflect again the upper class high
status Protestant denominations and moderate to liberal
Republicans.
TYPE OF WORK
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| Uppr White-Collr | 18.29 | 28.05 | 53.66 | 246 |
| Lowr White-Collr | 12.04 | 35.19 | 52.78 | 108 |
| Upper Blue-Collr | 13.84 | 32.59 | 53.57 | 224 |
| Lower Blue-Collr | 18.80 | 38.46 | 42.74 | 117 |
| Retired | 12.32 | 41.71 | 45.97 | 211 |
| Nt in Labr Force | 17.02 | 37.23 | 45.74 | 94
|
The same patterns hold true for total family income, excluding
"others" in race and ethnicity where the sample is too small to
draw a proper conclusion. There is very little difference in
positive or negative attitudes by either race, ethnicity, or sex,
with the exception of males, which can be accounted for by any of
the variables discussed above.
TOTAL FAMILY INCOME
| | Really Dislike |
Neutral | Really Like | Total |
| Under $10,000 | 12.94 | 43.53 | 43.53 | 85 |
| $10,000-$19,999 | 15.98 | 36.07 | 47.95 | 244 |
| $20,000-$29,999 | 13.44 | 33.20 | 53.36 | 253 |
| $30,000-$39,999 | 14.94 | 33.33 | 51.72 | 174 |
| $40,000 and over | 15.58 | 27.27 | 57.14 | 154 |
| Refused | 21.11 | 43.33 | 35.56 | 90
|
Overall, registered Republicans are both more favorable and
unfavorable to Israel, with Independents more likely to be
neutral. Serious Christians are substantially more favorable and
less unfavorable which, of course, is reflected in questions on
the stand on religion and politics, attendance at religious
services and importance of religion in daily life, and
fundamentalist beliefs with regard to creation and the Bible. All
of these reinforce the geodemographic analysis presented at the
beginning of this article.
