Why No Separate Palestinian State
West of the Jordan
Two Peoples--One Land:
Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan
Daniel J. Elazar
Around the world more and more voices are being rised calling for
recognition of the Palestinians' right of self-determination.
Few would disagree that the Palestinians should have a place in
the sun with sufficient authority and power to shape their own
collective destiny. They question remains as to how this can
best be done without jeopardizing Israel's survival and security.
The Problem of a Second Palestinian State
While Israel should be willing to take risks for peace, they must
be prudent risks. There is the rub in arguments on behalf of a
separate Palestinian state west of the Jordan River.1 There is
little or nothing in the past behavior of the Palestinians to
suggest that, other than a handful of moderates, they are likely
to respond in a measured way to a measured Israeli offer of
statehood. Instead, Israel's concessions are viewed by most of
them as signs of weakness, not efforts at rapprochement.
The often bewildering shifts in relationships among Arab states
and political leaders appear to most Westerners to be simply a
chaotic melange of shifting alliances and seeming betrayals.
Students of Arab politics, however, understand that this
particular way of relating to one another is characteristic of
Arab political entities from Bedouin tribes to the Arab summit
and that there are indeed rules to the game. Those rules,
however, are not those that non-Arabs would want to live by.2
Those rules also make it especially difficult to accept any Arab
agreement involving the concession of territory believed to be
rightfully Arab as more than a temporary expedient, to be
abandoned as soon as it seems possible to reclaim additional
territory. Hence any Israeli concession in the way of a
Palestinian entity west of the Jordan River must be accompanied
by as close to iron-clad devices to prevent that as possible.
Had the Palestinian Arabs embraced less than a maximalist
position on any number of occasions between 1917 and 1948, they
could have had their Palestinian state -- an even larger state
than those Israelis willing to do so are prepared to offer
them now. In 1948 they could have had their own state in nearly
half the territory of western Palestine. Yet they have always
insisted on the maximalist position -- and they have always
lost.3
Late in 1988, PLO and PLO-related spokesmen for the Palestinians
made a series of statements and declarations that made it appear
that they had retreated from their previous maximalist position
that called for the destruction of Israel and a Palestinian state
in all of western Palestine. For the first time they publicly
stated that they were prepared for a two-state solution, although
it is not entirely clear whether even at this point they will be
content with the territory occupied by Israel in 1967, not to
speak of the border adjustments required to meet Israel's
security needs. In their ambiguous statements, these
Palestinians keep referring to the 1947 United Nations partition
resolution as still binding, encouraging some to interpret the
PLO view to suggest that it is binding not only to the extent of
embracing a two-state solution but also leaving open the
possibility that the borders it defined should also be
considered binding for any peace agreement.
Even these statements, directed to the non-Islamic world, were
frequently accompanied by very different presentations in Arabic
which reaffirmed the maximalist position and argued that the use
of salami tactics such as first gaining a small Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza and then using that state to pursue
maximalist goals was what the PLO had in mind. At this writing
there is not yet any reason to simply take PLO statements to the
Western world at face value. They are still too ambiguous to be
treated as more than a softening of the PLO position. For
example, while demanding self-determination for the Palestinians
as a separate people -- despite the fact that they are an
acknowledged part of the larger Arab nation -- the PLO still
refuses to recognize the Jews as a people, claiming that they are
merely a religious group and hence not entitled as a people to
self-determination.
Since the Palestinians in the territories have indicated that
they overwhelmingly support the PLO as their sole representative,
we must take them at their word and accept PLO statements as the
stated Palestinian position. A softening of the PLO position
allows Israel to consider more generous arrangements than might
otherwise be possible, but it does not make it wise for Israel to
consent to a separate Palestinian state west of the Jordan.
Those who advocate the establishment of a Palestinian state argue
that Israel's military power is so overwhelming that should there
be terrorist attacks from that state or should the state violate
the peace agreement, military force could easily be employed to
invade it and put an end to these violations. That is a delusion.
First of all, it is impossible to invade a neighboring state for
what the world considers to be trifling reasons, even if they may
not be trifling from the perspective of those who suffer the
consequences. Even major violatons may not be subject to
military correction if Israel's superpower friends object. We
saw how this was so after the Israel-Egypt ceasefire along the
Suez Canal in 1970. Almost immediately the Egyptians brought
ground-to-air missiles up to the Canal to defend against Israeli
air attacks in clear violation of the agreement. Israel could
have wiped them out as they were being brought up and wanted to,
but the United States indicated its strong objections so Israel
refrained. Once entrenched and nearly invulnerable, those same
missiles and others brought in their wake played a decisive role
in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War three years later. Thus
Israel could effectively use its armed forces only under the most
severe provocation.
More than that, military operations cost lives. For Israelis,
the life of each of their soldiers is precious. Difficult as the
intifada has been psychologically and in terms of Israel's image,
Israeli casualties have been very light -- a situation much
preferable to the invasion alternative.
In presenting the best possible case for Israel's conceding a
Palestinian state, it is suggested that unless we try it we will
never know. But this is not a laboratory experiment. Once a
Palestinian state is established there is no way back. It is an
irrevocable step. Borders between states can be readjusted;
balances of power can change. But in our world states themselves
are sacrosanct. Should a Palestinian state be established,
widely recognized, and admitted to the United Nations -- which it
would be immediately -- even if it were to provoke Israel into a
war in which once again the Israel Defense Forces would be
successful, Israel would certainly have to withdraw and let the
state of Palestine continue to exist, thus making any military
victory pyhrric since it could not bring about a positive
political result.
In other words, Israel would be acquiescing to a situation that
could put it in an even more Sisyphean position than it is in
now. Sisyphus, the mythic Greek figure, was condemned by the
gods to roll a rock up a hill; as soon as he got near the top, he
was fated to slip and fall, so the rock rolled back down. And
this happened again and again.
This has been Israel's problem with regard to the neighboring
Arab states. No Israeli military victory can be more than
partial, since Israel cannot occupy Arab capitals and hold them
until the Arabs sue for peace. Hence Israel has always had to
withdraw with an interim agreement or to make peace under
unfavorable terms, as with Egypt. At least all of those capitals
have been at some distance from Israel proper. A Palestinian
state next door would bring that Sisyphean situation into
Israel's backyard.
This does not mean that territorial compromise would not be
possible if the territories heavily populated with Palestinians
were linked to Jordan. If that were the case, even in the event
of another war and the necessity of further boundary adjustments,
the possibility for negotiation would remain because Israel would
not have to challenge the very existence of a state, only the
location of its borders.
The establishment of a Palestinian state would require Israel to
withdraw from essentially all the territories it captured in 1967
on the grounds that no truncated West Bank Palestinian state
could possible satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs.
Unfortunately, such a total withdrawal would, from the first
moment, endanger Israel's security. Israel would not only have
to give up all chances of achieving strategic depth, but even
minimum defensive positions. If Israel were to give back all the
territories, there is some question as to whether there would be
enough ground for IDF training maneuvers, much less room to
station forces close enough to the critical points along the
coast and near Jerusalem where they would be needed in case of
attack in order to block the first assaults on Israel's
population centers. While it might have been possible for the
smaller armies with less equipment of the pre-1967 period to be
so placed, the exponential increase in armament and military
equipment, not to speak of the increased size of the forces more
than twenty years later which require more space.
It is hard to say that doubling the seven miles between the
Mediterranean Sea and the old Green Line near Netanya would
create strategic depth, but at least it would be fourteen rather
than seven miles. To achieve a mere twenty miles of "strategic
depth" in Israel's most populated areas, it will be necessary to
draw the new borders near the mountain crests of Judea and
Samaria. We have seen how Israel suffered losses whenever it was
surprised, as in 1973 and in 1987. Unless Israel has sufficient
depth to contain those losses, it will be destroyed. And since
everybody gets surprised at one time or another, Israel must
never lack that depth.
It has been suggested that the Palestinians are likely to be
constrained from taking advantage of their new position by the
pleasures and the responsibilities of statehood that would
preoccupy and ultimately deter them from risking what they have.
There is no sign of that from their past behavior. It is true
that people can change under appropriate circumstances, but we
have all too many examples of peoples for whom statehood has not
brought moderation, but simply more power to do mischief. When
Pol Pot and the Khymer Rouge took over Cambodia, they did not
become responsible -- they simply used the power of the state to
commit genocide on their own people. Two generations ago, many
German conservatives supported Hitler because they believed that
only he could stabilize the country and save them from the
Bolsheviks. They argued that once he gained power, the
responsibility of office would moderate his radicalism. We all
know the result. To suggest that moderation will occur among the
Palestinians is nothing more than a pious hope at this point,
especially since the PLO is now challenged by the Muslim
fundamentalist movement, Hamas, that rejects any kind of Jewish
state in "Palestine."
There are those who suggest that the establishment of a
Palestinian state would provoke internal troubles for the new
state as the local leaders confronted the diaspora PLO leadership
who would seek to move into a position of power. This indeed is
quite likely, but there is no reason to believe this internal
Palestinian dissension will distract them from making trouble for
Israel. It may very well be that both sides will be tempted to
seek a way out of their troubles through provoking a conflict
with Israel, especially once their statehood is guaranteed by the
world community. That is at least as much a feature of
historical experience as the other scenario.
Perhaps most worrisome is what to do about the irreconcilables in
a Palestinian state. Look at Ireland today. The Irish Republic
has a peaceful, stable government with no desire to conduct a war
with Britain or even with the Protestants of Northern Ireland,
much as it may sympathize with the Catholics in that unfortunate
province. Moreover, the Irish Republican Army is down to a tiny
hard core of irreconcilables. Nevertheless, without
circumscribing the civil liberties of its citizens to such a
degree that no self-respecting Western government would do so,
there is no way that the Irish Republic can totally suppress the
IRA or keep it from using its territory as a base.
In any Palestinian state, there would be a far greater number of
irreconcilables dissatisfied with the settlement, wanting to
continue the struggle. Moreover, they would have a level of
weaponry that so far has not been available to the IRA. hey
could shoot missiles at airplanes landing at Ben-Gurion Airport
about three miles from the Green Line, or, for that matter,
rockets at the heart of Tel Aviv, another few miles away. All
the Israeli coastal areas and the Jerusalem area -- where six out
of seven Israelis live -- would be in the gunsights of individual
terrorists. It is unlikely that the Palestinian government would
have either the will or the wherewithal to control these
irreconcilables, especially if it were preoccupied with an
internal power struggle that could well lead to civil war (as it
did under similar circumstances in Ireland immediately after
independence in the 1920s).
If an internal Palestinian power struggle develops, scoring
points against Israel will most likely become one of its
principal features. True, the Israeli army can retaliate. But
we have learned from experience what the limits of retaliation
are. Indeed, it is not sensible to retaliate for everything;
when one side retaliates it only provokes counter actions. A
state cannot go to war over every terrorist incident; on the
other hand, people can be killed by any individual terrorist.
Informal border raids by both sides are hardly the answer. Many
Israelis remember the days when to walk through the fields of
Netanya, a city on the Mediterranean coast 30 miles north of Tel
Aviv, at night was to risk being murdered by terrorists who had
come across the border from the area now full of Israeli suburban
settlements. Few Israelis are prepared to go back to those days
again.
Sober advocates of a Palestinian state try to protect Israel
against such a situation by requiring that the establishment of
such a state would have to be preceded by, in the words of Mark
Heller, perhaps the most sober of them all, "an explicit,
unambiguous Palestinian commitment to peace and to the
renunciation of all further claims against Israel...by...the
PLO...and [this must] have active ratification by other Arab
states."4
Advocates of a Palestinian state would require a comprehensive
peace that would include Arab states' economic support for the
new Palestinian state and, again quoting Heller, would require
"closing down refugee camps and disbanding UNRWA" coupled with
"the military neutrality of the Palestinian state,...limitations
on the size, equipment and deployment of Palestinian military
forces, consistent with internal security needs, as well as
procedures for verification, monitoring and early warning."
Heller would also require "a special regime for Jerusalem" and
probably a transitional period for staged withdrawal of Israeli
forces.5
All this is the minimum that realistic Israelis who are prepared
to accept a Palestinian state would require. Indeed, most
Israelis who would accept a Palestinian state call for its total
demilitarization. Heller is more realistic; he understands that
it is impossible to have a completely demilitarized state. But
that is one of the reasons why so many Israelis object to such a
separate state in the first place. For most Israelis, the
conditions Heller lists are the minimum necessary for any kind of
political concessions, much less a separate Palestinian state.
The economic viability of the Palestinian state is not the issue.
So many non-viable states have been established with the
assistance, or under the protection, of one or another of the
world's larger powers that the point has become moot as long as
there is some other state or group of states around to provide
needed assistance. In fact, given the talents, energy and
education of the Palestinians, it would be far from last among
the Arab states. Still, as recent unsuccessful efforts on the
part of the Palestinians to develop separate marketing
arrangements with the European Community have demonstrated,
finding a place in today's world economy is not easy, even where
an energetic and talented population is involved. A state has to
be competitive in a world where the competition is growing ever
more fierce. It is precisely the lack of economic viability and
limited opportunity for improvement that is likely to encourage
some segment of an increasingly frustrated population to seek
nationalist and irredentist solutions.
It has been suggested that continuing to allow Arabs to work in
Israel will help matters. This is feasible (although it will be
opposed by some), but it will also have to be accompanied by
appropriate economic links in other spheres, especially in
connection with trade, currency controls, worker benefits and the
like. By the time we begin to add up those needs, we begin to
move away from the idea of a fully sovereign Palestinian state
into something like a confederation. This becomes even clearer
when we add the necessary security guarantees and means of
inspection and monitoring.
If there are the expected acts of terrorism by the
irreconcilables, workers crossing the borders will have to be
subject to careful search and screening similar to what is now
done at the Jordan River crossings. To do this on a daily basis
would be a hardship and added cost for everyone. The Arabs will
feel demeaned and the Israelis will feel harassed.
Then there is the issue of Israeli settlements across the Green
Line, which Heller ignores. Nearly 200,000 Jews now live in
what the Palestinians and others refer to as the West Bank.6Approximately 60 percent of these Jews live in the new
neighborhoods of Jerusalem built across the Green Line since
1967. Most of the remaining 40 percent live along the western
border of Samaria. Still others are scattered throughout the
Judean and Samarian highlands. Even assuming that the scattered
highland settlements are expendable -- that they could be
evacuated or removed either as part of a peace agreement or
through natural processes of emigration once the territory is
ceded to a Palestinian state -- Israel is not likely to evacuate
Jerusalem neighborhoods or western Samaria under any
circumstances. There would be very little sentiment even among
the most forthcoming Israelis to concede those territories to a
Palestinian state. That, in itself, would probably make the
establishment of a separate Palestinian state impossible. The
Palestinians would not give up their claims to those territories
and the Israelis would not leave them -- for good reason. This,
too, suggests that some other solution must be sought, even by
those who want to provide the maximum possible self-determination
for Palestinian Arabs.
Divisions Among the Palestinians
Politically the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza can be
divided into five groups:
The old elites -- the notable families that for generations
dominated public life in their respective communities, and most
particularly the heads of those families.
The old left -- which, since the days of the British Mandate,
has been identified with the Communist party.
The active PLO supporters -- generally but not exclusively the
younger leadership.
The fundamentalists -- a growing group, especially among
students and intellectuals who are undergoing a religious
revival.
Finally there is the vast majority of the working and middle
classes who are relatively apolitical and basically try to go
about living their private lives, even more so than in countries
with a democratic tradition since they have never expected
to be involved in politics.
The old elites and the old left are in decline. The notable
families have been discredited as part of a general
transformation of the quasi-feudal order which characterized Arab
Palestinian society and indeed the Arab world as a whole. As
ordinary people acquire greater education, new economic
opportunities have opened up, supplemented by the political
currents of modernization, the power of the notables has been
significantly weakened. They have been additionally weakened
because so many of those families were the mainstays of the
Jordanian regime between 1948 and 1967 and continued to back the
return of Jordanian rule in the subsequent decades, secretly if
not openly.
The Communist left has become irrelevant as have Communist
parties elsewhere. Their radical thunder has been stolen by
others. The apolitical working and middle classes continue to be
frightened into silence. Thus the field is left open for the PLO
and the fundamentalists to take over and to fight each other for
control.
At the very least that fight would continue after the
establishment of a Palestinian state. In this respect the spread
of Muslim fundamentalism is most worrisome.
Given what we know about religious fundamentalism, of which
Muslim fundamentalism seems to be the most extreme in its
willingness to engage in political violence to gain power, the
establishment of a Palestinian state, offering something very
concrete to control, would intensify that conflict. More than
that, the arrival of the diaspora PLO would probably lead to an
alliance between the old elites and the apolitical working and
middle classes against it, which would turn the struggle into a
three-way affair, complete with assassination and terror, as has
been the Palestinian habit in the past.
Those who advocate a Palestinian state are right about several
things. One is that the Palestinians do need some kind of
territorial political entity to satisfy their legitimate group
aspirations. Moreover, it would be better for Israel if it were
separated from the vast majority of Palestinians, who will never
be happy as a minority living in a Jewish state and who, if they
become a majority, would certainly change the Jewish character of
the state.
On the other hand, it is also true that Israeli security requires
an Israeli presence in all the territories west of the Jordan
River. In addition, Jews should have the right to settle in all
parts of Eretz Israel. Jordan, which occupies the eastern third
of the historic land of Israel/Palestine also has to be
considered. Its population is approximately 70 percent
Palestinian, with Palestinians dominating the economy and
occupying many of the key positions in the Jordanian government,
outside of the army.7 More Palestinians live in Jordan than in
the West Ban and Gaza. Most of the Palestinians west of the
river do not want to be ruled again by the Hashemite kingdom.
Given their experiences between 1948 and 1967, we can hardly
blame them. On the other hand, the Hashemite dynasty will not
last forever.
Israel need not acquiesce to two Palestinian states, one east and
another west of the Jordan, in a land promised to it not only by
God according to the Bible but by mandate according to the League
of Nations, especially since the PLO makes no secret of its grand
ambition to take over the existing states on both banks of the
Jordan and to consolidate them into one Palestinian whole.
Israelis have long since agreed, even if somewhat reluctantly,
that the land that was once called Palestine by Europeans
(including the land east of the river) should be partitioned
between a Jewish state and an Arab state. Few Israelis have any
objection to that Arab state being Palestinian. Indeed, most
Israelis believe justice requires that the state be Palestinian.
But that is a question for the Arabs to answer. The most we can
do is to decide that if Hussein cannot deliver as a partner for
peace, then Israel no longer needs to support him.
There can be no solution based on two entirely separate states --
one Jewish and one Arab -- apart from Jordan. Once Jordan is in
the picture, then we can negotiation with the Palestinians about
the division of the land; we can negotiate about how the
territory west of the river will be used; we can try to reach an
accommodation that will be far from ideal for both sides but as
fair as possible under the circumstances.
New Realities in the Territories
Time does not stand still -- rather, it inexorably moves on,
changing circumstances as it passes by. It is now well over two
decades since the Six-Day War and the political realities which
emerged in its aftermath for both Israel and the Palestinian
Arabs.
Any new solution which is to be found to the Arab-Israeli
conflict must take into consideration the situation as it exists
today. The approaches used in the past are no longer applicable
or realistic. The growth of Jewish settlements throughout the
territories, and the web of economic integration and public
services -- roads, water sources, electricity and communications
lines -- all have contributed to weaving a connecting fabric
between the territories and Israel that cannot be easily cut. At
the same time, the existence of limited de facto joint rule
involving Israel and the Palestinian residents of the
territories, and Jordan until 1988 offers possibilities for
utilizing that fabric to weave a long-term settlement of the
conflict between those parties to the benefit of all.
Certain other trends have also continued and must be taken into
consideration. There has been a consistent, if uneven,
out-migration of Palestinian Arabs from the territories since
1948. The continued influx of Palestinian Arabs has added
further to Jordan's role as the main center of the Palestinian
Arab population. Another trend is the growing sense of
"Palestinian-ness" on the part of that population. This
Palestinian identity is based on a sense of isolation from the
larger Arab world which does not seem to care what happens to the
Palestinian Arabs as people. Real as it may be, it is not
necessarily committed to a PLO-centered solution to the conflict.
Several of these new realities stand out in particular, affecting
the immediate future of any negotiations: (1) the extent of
Israeli settlement in Judea and Samaria; (2) the shifting
fortunes of the PLO establishment in the territories; (3) the
growth of economic interdependence between Israel and the
territories; and (4) the emergence of de facto, if limited, shared rule under Israeli administration.
1. The Israeli Settlements8
Since the Likud's rise to power in 1977, the administered
territories have been transformed from relatively self-contained
Arab areas to integral parts of the Jewish settlement network in
the Land of Israel. The fact that these new settlements were
established in empty territory or on lands purchased locally
without displacing the local residents, itself reflects that
there was -- and is -- space for both people in those
territories. This has created new realities which now heavily
influence the possible ways to resolve the conflict. Israeli
settlements in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District fall into
five groups:
The neighborhoods, towns and settlements surrounding
Jerusalem;
Settlements in the Jordan River Valley;
Settlements on the western fringes of the Samarian mountains
overlooking the coastal plain;
The security belt of settlements at the southeastern edge of
the Gaza District;
Settlements in the heartlands of Judea and Samaria adjacent to
major cities such as Nablus, Ramallah, el-Bireh, and Hebron.
Each of these five groups is reflective of a particular stage or
set of goals in Israeli settlement policy. All have some, if not
substantial, support from most sectors of the Israeli population.
At least the first four are essentially non-negotiable according
to the positions of all the major parties in Israel.
1) The neighborhoods, towns and settlements surrounding
Jerusalem, in addition to housing the increased population of
that city, are designed to provide the city with a buffer zone
and to strengthen its Jewish hinterland to the north, east, and
south. While most are satellites of Jerusalem, they include the
Etzion Bloc to the south. These are settlements originally
established before 1948 to guard the southern approaches to
Jerusalem, that were destroyed by the Arabs in the War of
Independence, and rebuilt in the years immediately after 1967.
Seventeen miles south of Jerusalem, the Etzion settlements,
including the town of Efrat have been expanded into true
satellite cities and now divide Arab Judea into two districts,
one centered around Bethlehem/Beth Jallah, and the other around
Hebron. They combine agriculture with local and regional service
industries and have many commuters who work in Jerusalem. East
of Jerusalem is Maale Adumim, a new city, and a number of smaller
settlements surrounding it.
2) The settlements in the Jordan River Valley were also
established in the years immediately after the 1967 war by the
Labor government, in accordance with the Allon Plan, which
provided for the absorption into Israel of the Jordan Valley and
the ridges immediately to its west, desert areas almost entirely
unpopulated at the time. Fourteen settlements were established
in that region between 1967 and 1977 and since then another
seventeen have been established. They are almost entirely
agricultural in character.
3) The initial settlement of the western ridges of the Samarian
mountains overlooking the coastal plain was also undertaken by
the Labor government, again reflecting the Israeli consensus that
somehow Israel's coastal strip had to be widened even if part of
Samaria were to be turned over to Arab rule. There, however, the
Likud government greatly expanded activities, in effect setting
off a land rush. Because of the territory's proximity to
Israel's heartland, it is eminently suitable for suburbanization,
offering low cost housing within easy commuting distance of most
of Israel's major industrial and commercial centers. Most of its
settlers are commuting suburbanites looking for more housing for
their money rather than ideologically motivated.
4) It has been the policy of both the Labor and the Likud
governments to build a security belt of settlements at the
southeastern portion of the Gaza District. Indeed, the Labor
government expanded that security belt into northern Sinai (the
Yamit area). The Israeli evacuation of the Sinai led to
intensified efforts in the territory of former Mandatory
Palestine. Between 1967 and 1977, only two settlements were
established in the Gaza District. Since 1977, another nine have
been erected.
5) Jewish settlements in the heartland of Judea and Samaria,
except for the Etzion Bloc, have been the most controversial
element of Israel's settlement policy, although even there the
establishment of Kiryat Arba, the Jewish city abutting Hebron,
was initiated and advanced under the Labor government, if
somewhat reluctantly. It is the expansion of settlement in the
heartland which is gradually dividing Judea and Samaria so
thoroughly that repartition is increasingly impossible. Between
1967 and 1977 only ten settlements were established in all of
Judea and Samaria. Since 1977 their number has been augmented by
more than sixty new ones. They combine cottage industries, a bit
of agriculture, and commuting to jobs in Jerusalem or along the
coast.
A cumulative effect of Israeli settlement activity has been to
transform Judea, Samaria, and Gaza from separable territories,
detachable from Israel for whatever future they may have, into
integral parts of the Israeli network. Since the region's
geography lends itself to that kind of integration, even a modest
concerted effort on the part of the Israeli government has been
able to capitalize on geographic reality. As time passes, the
success of that effort will become even more pronounced.
The changing character of the settlements is also indicative of
the change that has taken place. In the first stages of
settlement, only hardy ideologists went forth to the territories,
whether in the form of the young pioneers of the Jordan Valley,
or the ideologically motivated settlers of Gush Emunim in the
Judean and Samarian heartland, or the sons and daughters of the
original settlers of the Etzion Bloc who saw themselves as
returning home. Toward the end of the 1970s, these settlers were
joined by those who shared the government's view that the
territories should be absorbed by Israel but were not ideological
crusaders. They saw opportunities for personal benefit in the
territories in ways which also allowed them to be of service to
their people.
Subsequently, those groups were joined by a third category of
settlers, those who have no ideological motivation but simply
want to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire better
living conditions at a price they can afford. It is precisely the
prosaic character of this last group -- which greatly outnumbers
the first two -- that marks the transformation of a collection of
outposts to an extension of Israel proper into the territories.
In the mid-1980s, the pace of Jewish settlement slowed down, in
part for lack of money and in part for lack of Jews. Thus the
plans for more extensive settlement, which were reflected in the
extensive lands acquired by the Israeli military government, the
Jewish National Fund, and private purchasers, remained
unfulfilled. Subsequently, the intifada added another obstacle
to more settlement, although as of this writing it has not led to
any Jewish out-migration from existing settlements or to a
cessation of new settlement efforts. Thus the Jewish settlement
effort will likely continue as long as there is no peace. On the
other hand, it could be halted with the lands acquired in
anticipation included in the negotiations over the future status
of the territories.
While few Soviet Jewish immigrants will choose to settle in the
territories, some will, offering increased possibilities for
"deepening" the Jewish presence. Thus with every month that
passes, there is less chance the Arabs have missed the
opportunity to secure a complete or even substantially complete
Israeli withdrawal and the Arabs must now reckon with a changed
map.
2. The Shifting Fortunes of the PLO Establishment9
At this writing, the PLO is in perhaps its strongest position
ever in the territories. But its present status is not the
result of steady growth. Rather it is one more peak in a series
of peaks and valleys that has marked its standing among the
indigenous Palestinians since 1967. Nor is its present status
guaranteed to continue. Indeed, it was only after a struggle
with the United National Committees (UNC), the body that has led
the intifada locally, that the PLO has been able to hold on.
Given past history, one can assume that it will continue to do so
only insofar as it appears to be able to deliver.
The PLO had a difficult time in the years between the Six-Day War
and the Yom Kippur War as the local population was unwilling to
extend it serious credibility. The problems Israel had in
winning the Yom Kippur War led to a resurgence of nationalism in
the territories with a concomitant strengthening of the PLO,
which reached its peak when Yasser Arafat appeared before the
United Nations in November 1975 and PLO-backed candidates
virtually swept the 1976 municipal elections in Judea and
Samaria. A subsequent Israeli crackdown, including the removal
from office of mayors known to be active PLO supporters and the
disruption of the flow of PLO-dominated funds from Jordan into
the territories, led to a decline in PLO influence in the latter
years of the 1970s.
Early in the 1980s PLO strength in "Fatahland" in southern
Lebanon once again raised its profile and influence in the
territories. The Israeli success in overrunning Fatahland and
securing the ouster of the PLO as a major organized entity from
Lebanon in 1982 and 1983 once again led to a decline in PLO
fortunes among the indigenous Palestinians, again on the
assumption that the PLO was too weak to deliver. PLO fortunes
reached their lowest point in the Amman Arab summit in the fall
of 1987, only to be given a new lease on life as a result of the
intifada and the ability of the PLO leadership outside of the
country to capitalize on the Arab uprising to launch its own
peace offensive. What is clear is that the issue is not closed.
No doubt the PLO leadership is mindful that they need some
successes or their fortunes may take another downturn.
3. Growth of Economic Interdependence and the Provision of Public
Service Delivery Systems10
Since 1967, Israeli policy has been to enable Palestinian Arabs
to work freely in Israel. Before the intifada, these Arab
workers account for 36 percent of those employed in construction,
15 percent in agriculture, 5 percent in industry. The highest
percentages are employed in tourism and household services. At
the same time, Arab labor in Israel has substantially increased
the standard of living in the territories. In 1972, for example,
6.5 percent of the families in the Gaza District owned a gas or
electrical appliance for cooking; in 1987, 87.1 did. Comparable
figures for refrigerators were 8.7 to 78 percent. The increase
in private automobiles has not been nearly as spectacular but has
been significant enough, from 3.2 percent in 1972 to 14.5 percent
in 1988.
The economic development of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District
from 1967 until it was halted by the intifada attests to the
benefits derived by the Palestinians in the territories from
contact with Israel. The gains achieved from this interaction
result from both contact with a more advanced economy and to the
framework of relationships instituted by Israel since 1968. An
exclusive relationship with either Israel or Jordan would not
have served the economic interests of the territories. While some
Palestinians argue that an independent Palestinian state would
have offered them the possibility for the development of a
stronger indigenous economy, there is no evidence to that effect.
Where they have been able to operate independently, the
Palestinians have demonstrated that it would be as hard for them
to compete in the world market as it is for other small
underdeveloped countries. For example, the European Community
pressured Israel to allow the Palestinians to market their citrus
products directly to Europe, not through the Israel marketing
boards. The end result was a disaster. The Palestinians could
not get their shipments to the market on time, the agents who
were willing to serve them in Europe were not competent to serve
their needs, and their prices were too high.
Essentially, the economic interaction which has developed between
Israel and the territories has taken the form of a common market.
This common market also incorporates industrial growth and
agricultural development. Needless to say, the unusually high
economic growth rate that was a feature in the territories until
overwhelmed by political events was paralleled by substantial
gains in economic welfare, reflecting a steep rise in the
disposable income of the Palestinians and a shift in their
occupational structure toward that of a more developed economy.
Furthermore, the provision of public service systems -- roads,
electricity, water sources, and communications lines -- have also
been integrated. For example, the Jerusalem metropolitan area
provides public services to the hinterland comprising Bethlehem,
Ramallah/El-Bireh, and Jericho.
Any drastic transformation in the present network of economic
relationships and public service systems would inflict grave
costs on the population of those territories. Under any future
political arrangement, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District
should, for their own benefit, maintain close economic relations
with both Israel and Jordan.
4. Existing De Facto Shared Rule11
In the years following 1967, a de facto shared rule developed in
Judea and Samaria that until 1977 gave the Palestinians almost
complete internal self-government involving a minimum of coercion
and a maximum of consent, and for the next decade nearly as much
self-rule. Overall, Israel and Jordan provided the umbrella.
Israel controlled security and the economy while Jordan shaped
the relationships between individuals and groups in Judea and
Samaria and the Arab world. Jordan provided the Palestinians
with a legal identity; the Jordanian curriculum was (and is) used
in their schools; Jordan registered organizations and controlled
the operation of trade relations between the territories and the
Arab world, in addition to being the second most important outlet
(after Israel) for their exports. In short, for two decades the
portion of land that is the focus of the dispute was already in
joint tenancy, with local inhabitants enjoying considerable
autonomy de facto in their internal matters and daily life.
This arrangement was disrupted by Palestinian extremists and the
PLO on the eve of Israeli-Jordanian negotiations to give it a
more permanent character. Their disruption of these arrangements
was based on their struggle for what they believed to be would be
a greater long-term gain, namely independent statehood. In the
meantime, it is the indigenous Palestinians who are paying the
price. In 1986, Israel and Jordan again came close to
establishing a more formal shared rule arrangement, actually
agreeing to a de facto condominium which was launched at the end
of August 1986. It was disrupted by Shimon Peres' premature
efforts to bring about an international peace conference which
was scheduled for the end of a period of consolidation of this
arrangement.
Changes in the Legal System
The extent of the integration of Israel and the territories is
manifested clearly in the changes that have taken place in the
legal system serving Judea and Samaria and to a lesser extent the
Gaza District since 1967. It is accepted practice under military
occupation of territories whose future status is not yet settled
to retain the laws previously in force, subject only to necessary
modifications which can be introduced by occupation authorities
under international law. Israel firmly adopted this position in
1967 but here, too, the pressures of the passage of time have
been inexorable. Over the years what is, in effect, a new legal
system has been introduced, built upon Jordanian legal
foundations but modified in the direction of incorporating
substantial elements of Israeli law. This has been true for both
the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of the territories, those who
retain their Jordanian citizenship and those with Israeli
citizenship who settled within them. Thus the Israeli Supreme
Court has extended its jurisdiction to all the inhabitants of
Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district on the grounds that, since
they live under the Israeli flag, they are entitled to the basic
civil rights protections that Israel as a western democracy seeks
to secure.
The application of Israeli law is particularly extensive in the
case of the Israeli citizens who have settled in the territories.
It can be said that they and their settlements are almost fully
under the laws of Israel in fact, if not technically.12 The
turning point was in March 1978, a few days prior to the signing
of the Israeli-Egypian peace treaty, when the military commander
of Judea and Samaria, as supreme authority in those territories,
established local and regional councils for the Israeli settlers
by legal order (Hebrew: tzav) and established a system of by-laws
based on Israeli law, for them. The pace of Knesset legislation
applicable to the territories also has increased over the years.
Israel's original negotiating position with regard to the
extension of autonomy to the Palestinian Arab residents of Judea,
Samaria and Gaza under the Camp David agreement was based upon
certain basic guidelines, namely that the autonomy should be
extended to people, not territory; that Israel must maintain
sufficient control over security matters, water and other
essentials that directly affect its safety and the lives of
Israeli settlers in the administered territories; and that the
right of Jewish settlement remain open. While these points were
basic to Menachem Begin's government, they were not
self-executing. For example, even if the Israeli government had
been successful in securing endorsement of its stand that
autonomy should fall upon people rather than territories, still
there were and are territories predominantly Arab in population,
including most of the duly constituted municipalities in Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza region. At the very least, for the
foreseeable future, there will be clearly separate Arab and
Jewish cities and villages. Hence some relationship between
people and territory would have to be worked out so that the
people in those territories will implement the autonomy within
them. Any successful solution depends upon how it combines the
governance of peoples and territories, for there cannot be
governance of one without the other.13 Even if the emphasis will
be on peoples, it will be necessary to govern those peoples in
their territories.
The Territories in the Context of the Metropolitan Frontier
Beyond the political and military reasons why Israel is seeking a
solution that does not involve complete withdrawal from the
administered territories, there are others which also reinforce
the necessity to reach an accommodation based upon some
combination of self-rule and shared rule in the territories in
the interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. These reasons
lie in the changed circumstances of settlement and economic
development in which both find themselves. They can be seen
through the prism of the unfolding frontier of development
initiated in the land by the Zionist enterprise over a century
ago and which has continued through all the frontier stages which
have shaped the frontier societies of the modern and postmodern
worlds.
As an extension of the great frontier of the Western world, the
original Zionist settlements were principally rural in
character.14 With the establishment of the State, Israel moved
into a second frontier stage which also had its parallel in other
Western countries, that of industrialization and urbanization. In
the latter years of the 1960s, approximately coincident but not a
result of the Six-Day War, Israel began to move into the next
stage of development, namely metropolitanization. Its industrial
base was transformed through the application of sophisticated new
technologies while its patterns of settlement were being
transformed by new modes of transportation and communication.
The earlier unity of place of residence and place of work began
to disappear as the possibility of moving quickly across
substantial distances on a daily basis became real. So, for
example, during the days of the urban frontier, Israeli Arabs
living in the Galilee had to forego involvement in the
industrialization process because their villages did not attract
industry, or move to Jewish cities away from their own cultural
frameworks and live lonely lives in order to achieve economic
advantage. With the coming of metropolitanization, the same
Arabs could remain residents of their villages and take a bus to
some destination in the Haifa Bay metropolitan region to work in
the morning and then back again at night without being unduly
burdened as a result.
Israel's urbanization and metropolitanization began along the
coast in the Tel Aviv and Haifa Bay regions. Jerusalem, whose
urban development had always taken a very different turn, never
really entered the urban-industrial frontier because at the time
it was cut off at the end of the Jerusalem corridor surrounded by
territory under Arab rule. Then came the Six-Day War and
suddenly Jerusalem was reunited with its potential hinterland,
precisely at the time that metropolitanization was beginning to
engulf the country.
In the ensuing decade, Jerusalem not only gained strength as a
focus for Jewish development activities related to servicing the
metropolitan frontier, such as higher education, government and
other public sector activities, but also was re-integrated with a
hinterland in Judea and Samaria that was increasingly drawn
toward it. From an agricultural point of view, the region from
Hebron on the south to Nablus on the north, Jericho on the east
and Bet Shemesh on the west, became a single market with produce
flowing into Jerusalem daily from every part of it. Jerusalem, in
turn, became a magnet for employing the residents on the mountain
ridge along the same axis, particularly as development of first
its Jewish sections and then its Arab areas required more hands
for building, a need met principally by the Arab population.
Some of these new workers moved to the city, others remained in
their native towns and villages and commuted. Thus the country's
newest metropolitan region united both Jewish and Arab nodes
within a single economic framework whose prosperity rested upon
their mutual interaction.15
This new development, as much as any security or other
considerations, makes a return to partition an atavistic step.
This is not to say that it cannot be done. History has shown
that politics can overrule economics even in such circumstances.
Jerusalem probably could be cut off at the end of a corridor
again and returned to the peripheries of Israel. The Arab areas
around the city could be cut off from their natural focal point
if political decisions are made to that effect. But in such a
case everybody would suffer, not only the individuals who would
lose their only significant opportunities for employment but the
two peoples as peoples would lose a major opportunity for
economic and social development enhancing their prosperity which
has been the result of the reconnection since 1967.
Thus there should be a major interest on the part of both parties
to work out a political arrangement that will recognize the unity
of the country even as it provides for maximum self-government
for its peoples combined with shared rule where necessary.
Think of some of the possibilities. Jerusalem by its very nature
does not lend itself to becoming a major industrial center.
Indeed there are many reasons why the city and its environs have
escaped the impact of industrialization so as to preserve
Jerusalem's special character. Prior to the metropolitan
frontier, this, in effect, doomed Jerusalem to being a backwater
and its region to suffer from lack of development. One of the
characteristics of the metropolitan frontier, however, is that
other nodes in the metropolitan region can industrialize to
everyone's benefit without damaging Jerusalem's special
character.
On the metropolitan frontier, education itself becomes a major
industry, a means of developing a population that is equipped to
participate in the sophisticated socio-economic systems of the
metropolitan era. Jerusalem is ideally suited to be a major
educational center. Indeed, education is one of the functions
that is most appropriate to the city, given its historic role.
Jewish Jerusalem has already become the educational center of the
Jewish people, through the Hebrew University, its many yeshivot,
and, increasingly through the technical colleges sponsored by the
Orthodox community and social and humanistic research institutes
of various kinds. There are, in addition, many renowned
Christian-sponsored institutions for Bible and theological study.
While no similar development has taken place in Arab Jerusalem
proper, the beginnings of serious institutions of higher
education serving the Arab population are to be found in adjacent
Bir Zeit and Bethlehem. Only peace will enable those
institutions to develop further. United within a common
metropolitan region, they will add an additional dimension to
Jerusalem's position on the world's educational map. Together,
these institutional complexes can put Jerusalem in the forefront
as a world educational center. But it is precisely the ability
to concentrate a number of separate institutions, each
maintaining its separate identity in every respect, but within
close proximity to one another so that synergism can play its
role, that will make the difference. This indeed is the essence
of the metropolitan frontier -- separate but synergistic -- and
is the way in which other great educational centers in the world
have become what they have become.
Combining People and Territory: The Local Dimension
In any solution, it will be necessary to link particular local
jurisdictions either with a Palestinian entity or with Israel.
This, indeed, is the direction in which things have developed
informally since 1967. In local government matters, Arab
municipalities and villages were given almost complete self-rule,
while Israeli settlements began with internal self-rule and were
subsequently organized into regional councils or given more
clearly cut municipal status under Israeli law so that they could
formally exercise those self-same powers.16
The importance of these local organs should not be minimalized.
In an age and region where the focus tends to be on national
governments and international relations, it is far too easy to
minimize the importance of local self-government. Jews with good
historical memories will know how the local community became the
focal point for Jewish self-government and the maintenance of a
Jewish corporate identity throughout the long years of the exile
in very meaningful ways. Similarly, it can truthfully be said
that the Palestinian Arabs have never had so much self-government
as they have had since 1967 under the Israeli policy of
maximizing local self-rule through Arab municipalities.
This is not to suggest that the Palestinian Arabs would be
satisfied with a simple continuation of that arrangement. There
are certain areas of self-government which are closed to them,
some of which are substantively important and others symbolically
necessary. Be that as it may, the possibilities of building an
appropriate combination for governing people with some local
territorial base is a real one that offers many advantages.
Whatever the final arrangements, there is enough experience
around the world and, for that matter the territories themselves,
with regard to the mechanisms for autonomy to develop proper
substitutions for its implementation. For example, all the tools
are available and much has already been done to establish a legal
basis for an arrangement in which persons take precedence over
territory in determining who belongs where legally. There are
over one hundred models of diversity of jurisdiction
arrangements, mixed governments, power-sharing and the like
presently in operation around the world from which to draw, not
to speak of the highly significant and, in the end, the most
important fact that there are twelve years of experience behind
us of de facto autonomy in the territories.17 The problems that
often are presented as the most difficult in fact can be overcome
technically without any particular inventiveness.
What Then?
No Jew need to deny the Jewish people's historic claim to all of
Eretz Israel; no democrat can deny the principle that, insofar as
humanly possible, no one should be governed without his or her
consent. In the twentieth century, government by the consent of
the governed for identifiable peoples has been associated with
self-determination.
There are two problems with this extension of the democratic
principle. One is that self-determination has all too often been
used as a cover and justification for one internal tyranny or
another which does not advance the democratic principle. Often
it does not even secure whatever modest benefits there might be
in transferring power from an external tyrant to an internal one
since in many cases the external power was far more benign, even
democratic, than its successor regime. Thus the two principles
should not be confused in that regard.
The second reason is that self-determination does not necessarily
require totally independent, politically sovereign statehood to
be achieved. We have already noted that in the present world of
intense interdependence there are no fully sovereign states
anymore. Not even the superpowers can act as they please.
Beyond that, some peoples, out of desire or necessity, gain their
self-determination through federal arrangements. Some, like the
native American (American Indian) tribes, because of their size
alone, can never be more than "domestic dependent nations," to
use the defining phrase applied to them by the United States
Supreme Court. That is the kind of self-determination possible
for "nations" of a few hundreds to a few thousands in size, where
even the largest of them, the Navaho nation, does not reach
200,000.
In other cases, for the Basques and Catalonians, for example,
self-determination has been achieved within the land that they
share with other Spaniards, even though both are large enough in
terms of population and resources to maintain independent states
and are the strongest and most vigorous peoples on the Iberian
Peninsula. The nature of their identity and situation is such
that this was the most feasible and probably the most equitable
solution available to them and the other parties involved. Nor
is politically sovereignty feasible for the six republics that
have federated to form Yugoslavia. In their case external
enemies have made it necessary for the peoples of Yugoslavia to
seek self-determination together, whatever the tensions and
animosities between them.
The Palestinians as individuals and as a group need to be
governed with their consent, something which is not presently the
case. They, too, have their claims to the land which they
believe to be as legitimate as the Jewish claims. In fact,
neither side will be able to fully exercise its claims. All will
have to concede something on that point.
Israel has long since given up exercise of its claims east of the
Jordan and most Israelis have come to recognize that Israel will
not be able to exercise exclusive control to all the territory
west of the river. Jordan has now formally relinquished its
claims west of the river, which it had originally exercised,
presumably, in the name of the Palestinians, a claim which many
Palestinians disputed. On the other hand, Hashemite claims to
rule east of the river must be considered in light of the fact
that 70 percent of the residents of Jordan are Palestinians with
roots in the West Bank. The Palestinians may now have come to
realize that they will never be able to exercise their claims to
the entire land. They have yet to determine how they will
exercise their claims east of the river, and must come to realize
that even west of the river they will not be able to have
exclusive control over territory. This does not mean that they
cannot achieve self-determination or government with the consent
of the governed, but it does mean that they, as well as Israel
and Jordan, will have to rely upon federal arrangements to do so.
Notes
1. On a separate Palestinian state, see Arieh Eliav, Land of the
Heart: Israelis, Arabs, The Territories, and A Vision of the
Future (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America,
1974); Eliahu Eliachar and Phillip Gillon, Israelis and
Palestinians (London: R. Collings, 1978); Mark Heller, A
Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press, 1983) and "A Palestinian State:
Thinking the Unthinkable," Moment 13:6 (September 1988);
Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in
International Politics (Chappaqua, NY: Rossel Books, 1983);
Yehoshafat Harkabi and Moshe Maoz, "The Palestinian Problem: A
Palestinian State or a Jordanian Solution," Middle East Review 71
(1974): 60-67.
All the above advocate that as a solution to the conflict. For
the views of those opposed, who addressed the issue, see Daniel
J. Elazar, "Palestinian State--Don't Buy It," Moment (September
1988); Hirsh Goodman, A Palestinian State: The Case Against
(Jerusalem: Israel Information Center, 1979); Moshe Aumann, The
Palestinian Labyrinth (Israel Academic Committee on the Middle
East, 1982).
2. On the ways of Arab politics, see R. Taylor, The Arab Balance
of Power (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982); Bassam
Tibi, Arab Nationalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981);
Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and
Practice Since 1967 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
Yehoshafat Harkabi, Three Articles on the Arab Slogan of a
Democratic State (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Department of Information, 1970).
3. On the Palestinian position in the conflict, see Emile
Nakhleh, "Israeli Occupation and Self-Rule in the Territories:
The Inhabitants Perspective," in Governing Peoples and
Territories (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982); Yehosafat Harkabi, "The
Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and
Their National Covenant," Journal of International Law and
Politics 3:1 (1970).
4. Mark Heller, "A Palestinian State: Thinking the Unthinkable."
5. Ibid.
6. "Data Base: 191,700 Jews in the 'Occupied Territories',"
Survey of Arab Affairs No. 13 (August 15, 1988).
7. On the Palestinians in Jordan, see Avi Plascov, The
Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-1957 (London: Cass, 1981);
D.L. Price, Jordan and the Palestinians: The PLO's Prospects
(London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975); Eliezer
Be'eri, The Palestinians Under Jordanian Rule: Three Issues
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press and Hebrew University, 1978).
8. On Israeli settlement in the territories, see Aaron Dether,
How Expensive are West Bank Settlements (Jerusalem: Jerusalem
Post and West Bank Data Project, 1987); Arieh L. Avneri, The
Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs
1878-1948 (Efal, Israel: Yad Tabenkin, 1982); Anne Mosely Lesch,
"Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories," Journal of
Palestine 8:1 (Autumn 1978): 103-105; Chaim Waxman, "Beyond the
Green Line: American Jewish Settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza,"
Jerusalem Letter 84 (December 17, 1985); Mordechai Nisan, Israel
and the Territories (Ramat Gan: Turtledove, 1978); R. Watson, "An
American Presence (Jewish Settlers from the United States in the
West Bank)," Newsweek 103 (June 1984): 40-41.
9. On the PLO's shifting status, see E. Rouleau, "The Future of
the PLO," Current 258 (December 1983): 42-58; G. Russell,
"Maneuvering for Position," Time 126 (November 11, 1985): 38-39;
John W. Amos II, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a
Nationalist Movement (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981);
Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Resistance: Developments and
Setbacks 1967-71," Journal of Palestine Studies 1:3 (1972):
64-84; W.L. Chase, "Arafat's Back, Reshaping Outlook For Mideast
Talks," U.S. News and World Report 102 (May 4, 1987): 40.
10. On the economic interdependence of Israel, the territories,
and Jordan, see Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria, and Gaza:
Views on the Present and Future (Washington and London: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982); "The
Economy of the Territories and the Future of the Arab
Palestinians," Survey of Arab Affairs No. 2 (November 21, 1985);
David Kahan, Agriculture and Water Resources in the West Bank and
Gaza (1967-1987) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and West Bank Data
Project, 1987); Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project:
1987 Report (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1987); Simcha Bahiri, Industrialization in the West Bank and Gaza
(Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and West Bank Data Project, 1987).
11. On the existing de-facto shared rule and its changing
character, see Daniel J. Elazar, ed., From Autonomy to Shared
Rule: Options for Judea, Samaria and Gaza (Jerusalem: Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, 1983); Daniel J. Elazar, ed.,
Governing Peoples and Territories; Shmuel Sandler and Hillel
Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank: A Study in
Intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984).
For futher discussion of what has developed in the administered
territories since 1967 from both the Palestinian and Israeli
perspectives, see Emile Nakhleh, ed., A Palestinian Agenda for
the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, 1980); Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria, and
Gaza: Views of the Present and Future.
12. Cf. Moshe Drori, "Israeli Settlement and Israeli Law in Judea
and Samaria," Jerusalem Letter 106 (1 February 1989).
13. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Daniel KJ.
Elazar, ed., Governing Peoples and Territories.
14. The frontier thesis underlying this argument is, of course,
based on the work of Frederick Jackson Turner in The Frontier in
American History (New York: Holt, 1920), as extended by Walter
Prescott Webb in The Great Frontier (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1952), and subsequently applied on a comparative basis to the
various new societies of the modern world, e.g., Louis Hartz, The
Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1964), and Walker D. Wyman and Clifton B. Kroeber, The Frontier
in Perspective (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).
This writer has suggested an extension of the Turner thesis as
the urban-industrial and metropolitan-technological frontiers in
Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American
Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1970) and The Metropolitan
Frontier, A Perspective on Change in American Society (New York:
General Learning Press, 1973). I have applied this model to
Israel through several studies beginning with Israel: From
Ideological to Territorial Democracy (New York: General Learning
Press, 1971).
15. Saul Cohen, Jerusalem Undivided (New York: Herzl Press,
1980).
16. See Moshe Drori, Local Government, Democracy and Elections in
Judea and Samaria: Legal Aspects (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem
Institute for Federal Studies and Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University,
Institute of Local Government, 1980); and Sasson Levi, Local
Government in the Administered Territories (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan:
Bar-Ilan University, Institute of Local Government, 1978).
17. See Daniel J. Elazar, et al., A Handbook of Federal and
Autonomy Arrangements (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, forthcoming).
