The Special Case of Jerusalem
Two Peoples--One Land:
Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan
Daniel J. Elazar
A major sticking point in any solution is the status of
Jerusalem. Israelis, even those who are prepared to relinquish
territory for a separate Palestinian state, are virtually united
in their stance that Jerusalem not be redivided and must remain
under Israeli rule. This seems to be the single non-negotiable
item on the peace table from a popular point of view. By the
same token, the Palestinians and their Arab brethren have
consistently insisted on the restoration of at least East
Jerusalem to their rule. A solution to this problem has to
proceed on two levels. Locally there have to be municipal
arrangements for a heterogeneous Jewish-Arab population, but
these can only be accepted as permanent as part of a larger peace
settlement.
Jerusalem's development into one of the world's most desirable
cities came as a result of its reunification in 1967. After the
1948 war, the city was divided between Israel and Jordan,
literally by a wall down its middle. Jerusalem was at the
dead-end of a narrow corridor leading from Israel's Mediterranean
coast and cut off from its natural hinterland. Arab Jerusalem
withered as a satellite of Amman. After June 1967, united
Jerusalem blossomed as a Jewish city. In twenty years the Jewish
population rose from 190,000 to 320,000. New Jewish
neighborhoods were built to surround the city on the north, west,
south, and southeast, and in a relatively short time housed more
people than all of Jewish Jerusalem before 1967. The city's face
was lifted and it became one of the world's most beautiful cities
in its man-made as well as its natural aspects. Its educational
institutions, commerce, and governmental role expanded.
Less well-known is that post-1967 Jerusalem was not only
attractive to Jews but to Arabs as well. In the same period, the
population of Arab Jerusalem increased from just over 70,000 to
over 120,000, more than a 70 percent increase at a time when the
population of Judea and Samaria grew by only 25 percent and has
yet to reach its pre-1967 population. The Arab sector's main axis
of development was on the road from the Damascus Gate of the Old
City northward to Ramallah.
Many of these new Jerusalemites are Israeli Arabs from the
Galilee. Lacking a metropolis with a substantial Arab presence
anywhere else in pre-1967 Israel, the Israeli Arabs, like their
Palestinian brethren, found in Jerusalem a place where the
climate of opportunities is such that they can gain the benefits
of urban living without foregoing their Arabic environment. As
Israeli Arabs, they are fluent in both Hebrew and Arabic. Many
of them originally came to the city as students at the Hebrew
University and stayed to practice their professions in a place
where they can play a bridging role between Israelis and
Palestinians. They also benefit from the business generated by
the over 100,000 Arabs living just beyond the city to the north
and south, a presence which both strengthens and complicates the
case for maintaining a unified Jerusalem under any settlement.
One of the great advantages of the federal approach is that it
offers realistic ways to solve the problem of Jerusalem. The
city can become the seat of the federal government under any of
several arrangements. In an Israel-Palestine federation or
confederation it could be a triple capital, for the constituent
units as well as the seat of government for the whole. In a
federation of multiple Jewish and Arab cantons, it would be the
seat of the federal government, while each canton would have its
own capital. In a federacy arrangement the situation would no
doubt resemble the first two options. An Israel-Jordanian
confederation with the Palestinian Arabs fully incorporated into
the Jordanian polity would leave Jerusalem to be capital of
Israel and seat of government for the confederation, while Amman
would remain capital of Jordan. Should there be a
Jordan-Palestinian federation in confederation with Israel, Amman
would no doubt remain the capital of the federation, while
Jerusalem would no doubt serve as the seat of the confederation
and perhaps also as the capital of the Palestinian entity, while
continuing to serve as the capital of Israel. Under a
condominium arrangement, Jerusalem would be the seat of the
condominium council. The other options do not require separate
capitals.
Under any of these arrangements a Palestinian and Arab political
presence could be allowed in the city without changing its
sovereignty which, along with some special status for the Muslim
holy places, would secure a limited Arab presence in the city.
Any of these arrangements would make it possible to develop a
local governmental structure that would allow the Arabs of
Jerusalem a significant measure of self-rule within a shared-rule
context.
The Middle East has a long tradition of religiously and
ethnically heterogeneous populations living side by side, so
intermixed within particular localities that simple territorial
separation has not been a means for them to maintain their
particular ways of life. This is especially true within the
region's cities that have been settled on a high density basis,
further intensifying the intermixing.
Even the system of separate quarters or neighborhoods has been
more a fiction than reality in many cases. While certain
neighborhoods have been predominantly inhabited by one group or
another, rarely have they been exclusively so. Thus the famous
four quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem are formally labeled
Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Armenian; and, indeed, each group
had (and now has) its central node in "its" quarter, but in
reality members of every group lived in every quarter. In fact,
since the Jews came to constitute the largest single group in
older Jerusalem by the mid-nineteenth century and an absolute
majority shortly thereafter, they were to be found in numbers in
every quarter of the city. So, too, in predominantly Muslim
cities, Muslims lived in the minority quarters as well.
At the same time, and perhaps because of this, the Middle East
also has had a tradition of managing heterogeneity both to
sustain the separate groups and to keep the peace. The
management of heterogeneity in the Middle East has been most
successful under imperial regimes that have been able to keep the
peace or strongly encourage local authorities to do so in order
to preserve good relations with the imperial rulers. the great
problem of the contemporary Middle East is how to develop similar
techniques and institutions for managing heterogeneity within a
democratic framework.
The city of Jerusalem has done as well or better than any other
local government in dealing with its heterogeneous population in
a democratic fashion by judiciously adapting older devices common
in its region to new conditions in a way that is fully consonant
with democratic expectations. While there may indeed be
institutional devices that Jerusalem could profitably adapt from
other cities, there is much that Jerusalem can teach the rest of
the world. The limits on Jerusalem's success reflect external
factors not amenable to the city's control.
The Jerusalem authorities have managed to achieve what they have
in an ad hoc manner, without seeking formally to institutionalize
the steps they have taken since 1967. This effort to adopt
patterns customary in the Middle East and give the adaptations
the force of custom rather than law is notably consonant with the
region's general approach to many problems. It is also a useful
way to deal with the ambivalences of the city's non-Jewish
minorities who have strong primary loyalties to Jerusalem yet
want to maintain their respective ways of life as separate
communities and their strong links to their respective outside
communities, peoples, or churches. They are willing to cooperate
quietly with the authorities but are not willing to acknowledge
fully their status as citizens of a united city under Israeli
jurisdiction.
The city authorities have sought to bend the law where necessary
to avoid having to take formal steps that might prove troublesome
to accommodate the diverse populations of the city. While this
is particularly noticeable in the reunited sections, it has also
been traditionally true in other parts of the city, for example,
the ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods. Many of the most
successful efforts are not easily visible because they have no
formal expression.
No doubt this is true of other cities as well. It is possible
that those involved in managing the diversity of Jerusalem could
learn something from Brussels or Singapore or other cities, but
the learning would not involve any new overall approach.
Jerusalem's authorities have developed an indigenous approach
that has been working. However, while the ad hoc method has
worked for now, in a final settlement it probably will have to be
systematized and institutionalized, in part, if not
substantially, if only to provide a sufficient framework to
ensure democratic decision-making.
Hence it is well for all parties concerned to have some idea of
the lines along which formal institutionalization has the ability
to manage heterogeneous populations. Some of the alternatives
examined have become conventional arrangements within a
particular country. Indeed, this may be their best
recommendation.1
It should be noted that relatively little attention has been paid
by political scientists and urbanologists to the problem of
managing mixed populations within a local setting. Most studies
have focused on extralocal units of government, that is,
state-local systems or national forms of accommodation. This
indicates that perhaps the successful local arrangements of
heterogeneous populations have grown unplanned, products of a
period of evolution. If this is indeed the case, it is of great
significance to Jerusalem, whose city authorities have opted for
such a course of action.
The alternatives for local government of heterogeneous
populations will be examined under five headings:
City-county arrangements (standard counties, contractual
relationships, consolidational city-counties, federated
counties)
Federated municipalities (borough systems, federations of
existing municipalities)
Neighborhood-district programs
Functional programs (special districts, interlocal
arrangements, functional arms of general-purpose governments,
functional service entities)
Extralocal models (consociational arrangements, federacies)
All of the arrangements explored here are solutions developed in
response to the specific problems of particular localities.
Hence, the prospect of simply duplicating or transplanting any
one of them is limited. However, if the examples are viewed as
models or options open to local governments, they may well be a
source of or stimulus for ideas that can be applied to Jerusalem.
City-County Arrangements
A county in the modern sense (as distinct from premodern English
or European forms) is a unit of local government established by
state authority to provide services to a specific territory.2
Where counties exist, they are generally organized on a
"wall-to-wall" basis, that is, the state's entire territory is
divided into counties so that no area is left uncovered by county
government, whether or not it has municipal government. Within
each county there are likely to exist urban and rural areas,
incorporated and unincorporated. Cities, towns, or boroughs may
incorporate under state law as municipalities, but, in most cases
they remain within the borders of their county and under its
jurisdiction in those functional areas assigned to it. This
basic structure is a well-established Anglo-American phenomenon
that allows various government bodies to have separate and
distinct jurisdiction in the same territory.
The entire area within the county's jurisdiction receives the
range of services provided by the county government except where
special arrangements are made for municipalities to provide their
own parallel services. Thus, in the case of law enforcement, a
county may agree to provide its services to the unincorporated
areas while the cities within it maintain their own internal
police forces. In only a few cases does a county formally
relinquish jurisdiction; it reserves the right to send in the
sheriff at any time, but the tacit agreement not to do so is
rarely, if ever, violated except, perhaps, in situations of "hot
pursuit."
Even in counties where such special arrangements are common, the
county governments provide at least minimum services for all
those under their jurisdiction, regardless of where they live.
Thus a county will usually be responsible for public welfare
services throughout its area. The key to standard city-county
arrangements ("city" for the purposes here refers to incorporated
municipalities) is that, although cooperation does exist, the
provision of services does not necessitate cooperative
arrangements. Each county has its own functions to perform and
has the necessary powers to do so because the city-county system
is based on a division of functions.
With the trend toward metropolitanization and the expansion of
settlement beyond established city limits came the development of
new city-county relationships. The growth of urban settlement has
brought in its wake increased power for both municipal and county
governments as the tasks of both have been expanded. Counties,
once basically instrumentalities for rural government, have
gained more and more responsibility in urban affairs and,
increasingly, "home rule" (a U.S. term for local autonomy). Many
states now make provision in state law for a county's residents
to adopt a county charter (basic law) conferring municipal
powers. This is usually done without in any way limiting or
interfering with the municipal powers of the cities within the
county. Home rule counties provide comprehensive services for
their residents as a matter of course. In such cases,
city-county relationship also undergoes a change. Three major
new forms of relationship have developed.
Contractual Arrangements3
Contractual arrangements involve a county government providing
services to municipalities within its boundaries on a contractual
basis with each city choosing the "package of services" it
desires from the complete set offered. The Lakewood plan in
California is an example of this type of relationship. Los
Angeles County (population eight million) can provide by contract
up to 58 different services to cities within its borders. The
state legislature has created a uniform local retain and use tax,
making it financially attractive for municipalities to
incorporate to maintain their local autonomy and, at the same
time, contract with the county for services rather than providing
them unilaterally, usually at a greater cost.
The program, set up in 1954, presently involves 74 cities, each
purchasing from 4 to 42 of the available services at a uniform
rate. Newer cities purchase more at the onset and tend to
contract for less as they develop their own local administration.
Significantly, Los Angeles County also includes the city of Los
Angeles, with over three million people, which provides most city
services independently. The flexibility of the Lakewood plan
enables the county to accommodate a wide range of city sizes and
develop whichever city-county relationship is appropriate to each
municipality, even as it continues to serve as the overarching
government in certain spheres for all its residents.
Consolidation
In a few cases, particularly where suburbanization has occurred
in a single county, the central city and the county have been
consolidated into a new political entity.4 In the nineteenth
century, when unlimited city growth was a desideratum,
unincorporated territory in the county, and often other
municipalities as well, were usually annexed by the central city,
sometimes with provisions for neighborhood control of schools,
police, zoning, and public assistance on a ward basis, precisely
because of the heterogeneous immigrant populations then to be
found in large U.S. cities. Today, the process is often
reversed; and in such cases, a broadened county government
authority supersedes that of the city, which is absorbed within
it. The previously unincorporated areas fall under the new
government while the previously incorporated areas within the
county may choose to remain independent or become part of the new
arrangement.
Those incorporated areas that choose to remain independent
maintain their separate identities and provide their own
municipal services but transfer their traditional relationship
with the county to the new entity. In some cases, they contract
with the consolidated city-county for new metropolitan services
as well. Under such consolidation arrangements, three categories
of services are developed: traditional county services, which are
provided for the entire jurisdiction; municipal services, which
are provided for the urbanized area of the county only, either by
the new government or by the separate municipalities that remain
outside of it; and metropolitan services, which are the province
of the new authority.
A prime example of county consolidation can be found in
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, whose residents voted for
consolidation in 1961.5 In its case, four suburban
municipalities voted to remain outside the merger. They remain
independent but linked to the new entity for normal
county-provided services. At the same time, consolidation
extended the city services formerly provided by Nashville for its
residents alone to the unincorporated urbanized areas surrounding
the former central city.
Federated County Systems6
In the federated county a two-plane system is established. The
existing county administration is expanded in scope and powers to
become the overarching government, and the existing
municipalities become the constituent units of government in the
new federation. All preserve their respective integrities and
basic functions; but some functions are transferred to the county
in toto and others are made joint tasks, thereby establishing a
cooperative relationship between the two planes. In the
federated county, the constituent units need not be symmetrical
in size or character, although the arrangement is not feasible
where there is one single city of overwhelming size plus many
smaller ones.
Dade County, Florida, is a prime example of the federated county.
It consists of 27 municipalities (including Miami and Miami
Beach), 19 having fewer than 10,000 people, covering a
2,054-square-mile area. Miami, the largest city, has a
population of 372,000 or less than 25 percent of the county's
1.6 million total. In this instance, the county became the new
areawide government, with the municipalities functioning like
states in a federal union. The new area provides transportation,
police, fire, health, welfare, and recreation services. Other
functions remain in the hands of the municipalities. The
division of functions between the metropolitan council and the
municipalities involves a certain level of formal cooperation.
For example, rather than all phases of a function being assigned
to one plane or another, both planes share in its implementation.
Thus refuse collection is the responsibility of the municipality
but refuse disposal is a "metro" task.
Were a county system to be instituted as part of a federal
solution to the Israel-Arab conflict, there appears to be no
reason why the present city of Jerusalem could not be
reconstituted as a county possessing full municipal powers, with
the possibility of territories within it being given municipal
status in the manner of the standard U.S. county described above.
The links between the county and the municipalities within it
could be hierarchical, federal, contractual, or some combination
of all three with special districts utilized to fill any service
area gaps.
Federated Municipalities7
A federated municipality differs from a federated county system
in that, rather than relying upon an existing structure, a new
two-plane structure is created to serve a particular metropolitan
region. The new structure takes one of two forms: Either both
planes are designed anew from scratch (the borough system) or the
existing municipalities become units within a newly formed
overarching government. Although some functions are clearly
allocated to one plane or another, increasingly the key to
successful relationships in the federated municipalities is
cooperation, formal and informal, both in allocation of power and
provision of services.
The Borough System
Until its recent abolition, the London borough system was the
oldest and perhaps the classic example of two-tier local
government organization.8 At its greatest extent, the Greater
London Council (GLC) encompassed 32 boroughs, several of which
were larger than the total population of Jerusalem. With the
abolition of the GLC, each borough became an independent
municipality.
Greater Toronto in Ontario (Canada) is the most widely cited
post-World War II model of a metropolitan borough system. In
Canada, the decisions to federate or otherwise reorganize cities
and metropolitan regions are made by the provincial government
and forced upon the local authorities (unlike such changes in the
United States, which require local voter approval). Toronto was
restructured twice, first in 1953, when a metropolitan city was
constituted embracing 13 local authorities, and then again in
1967, when the 13 were combined into 6 boroughs. The federated
city covers 2441 square miles and contains 1.2 million
inhabitants. The largest borough is slightly smaller than
Jerusalem. Each borough elects a mayor and city council who deal
with the municipal responsibilities allocated to it. The elected
borough officials are also members of the Metro Council.
The Metro Council has been successful primarily in the field of
major construction of public works: new roads, schools, highways,
subways, and water and sewage facilities. Its accomplishments
are the result of the low pressure politics of the metropolis,
weak involvement of interest groups in areawide issues, lack of
factioning into parties on the Metro Council, and general
cooperation with the Metro Chairman.9 Even though its population
is relatively heterogeneous ethnically, it may be politically too
homogeneous to be a reliable model for Jerusalem.
There are a number of European examples of municipalities divided
into symmetrical boroughs by a strong central government. Paris,
for example, is divided geographically and symmetrically into
arrondissements. Only recently were the city's voters granted the
right to elect a mayor for the city as a whole. Other examples
are capital cities that are controlled directly by the central
government for reasons of state.
Federation of Existing Municipalities
Under this arrangement, the new entity is created by union of the
existing municipalities.10 In Winnipeg, Manitoba (Canada), where
the population of 500,000 more closely approximates that of
Jerusalem, the cities retained their historical boundaries while
the Manitoban provincial government created a new metro
government to embrace them. These efforts were the result of
city bureaucrats' pressures for a presumably more efficient and
equitable areawide service administrative body. Since then, it
should be noted, Greater Winnipeg has been consolidated and
redivided into boroughs. Nevertheless, the original arrangement
bears consideration if only because one of the major cities in
the metro region, St. Boniface, is overwhelmingly French, while
all the rest are English-speaking and ethnically mixed.
Israel has provided its own examples of highly successful local
federated arrangements, which, while developed for a different
scale, deserve consideration. The country's kibbutzim and
moshavim are federated into regional councils, some of which have
been suburbanized in recent years and have become, for all
intents and purposes, urban service authorities. In addition to
the standard governmental functions, the regional councils have
major economic responsibilities as operating arms of the
settlements federated within them. This economic role adds to
their strength.
At the same time, their record in dealing with heterogeneity is
distinctly mixed. Almost without exception, the regional
councils are organized around either kibbutzim or moshavim of the
same political trend or camp. The two forms of settlement are
rarely mixed within the same regional council nor is it common to
build regional councils around settlements of different political
movements. This is most particularly a reflection of the
intimacy of the connections among kibbutzim, which make it
difficult for them to work with settlements outside their own
world. Nevertheless, there is one regional council in the
Galilee that federates Arab villages and Jewish moshavim. The
development of the yishuv kehilati (community settlement) as a
non-ideological form of local settlement on an individualistic
basis -- a village, in other words -- has led to the
establishment of regional councils strictly as local government
bodies. Moreover, suburbanized older regional councils have
tended to become nonpartisan instruments for service delivery to
local populations who do not associate local government with
party politics. In short, regional councils have done rather
well in handling country-of-origin differences among Jews but
less well in handling ideological heterogeneity. To the extent
that moshavim are being transformed into ideologically neutral
villages, this is changing.11
For Jerusalem, federated city arrangements have to be weighed
against the various county-based arrangements because they
require more symmetry of size and population among units.
Jerusalem may be more asymmetrical in the size of its
neighborhoods, in the composition of their populations, and in
their fundamental interests. Jerusalem, as a "county" embracing
"cities" of different sizes, shapes, and scope, may do better to
accommodate these asymmetries.
Neighborhood-District Programs
Neighborhood district programs developed primarily in the larger
U.S. cities during the 1960s to accommodate black, Puerto Rican,
and some white ethnic demands for more control over the services
provided them. As such, this is one of the few local government
options specifically developed to accommodate ethnic
heterogeneity.
The municipal government, usually a large one, uses the
neighborhood district programs to provide a subgovernmental
framework through which to respond to citizens' demands. The
municipal government itself remains intact, undergoing no basic
structural change. Instead, a neighborhood office is set up to
manage special interest programs, to mobilize support for them,
and/or to absorb public responses. Funds, personnel, and/or
technical assistance are made available to local groups to
initiate projects within their neighborhood appropriate to their
specific needs.
During the 1960s, U.S. experiments in community development and
citizen participation did initiate some interesting programs for
various neighborhood organizations in an effort to overcome the
dissatisfaction of city dwellers with municipal services. Relying
on funding from the federal government and subsidies from private
foundations, community groups could determine and design programs
to meet some educational, housing, and health needs, to mention
just three fields. For example, housing in some sections of New
York City's Harlem was redeveloped through efforts of its
residents. New building complexes went up and old ones were
rehabilitated with the community board deciding on questions of
location. The board also contracted for builders and other
related technicians. In other cities, block associations hired
private police protection and organized neighborhood clean-up
campaigns. In Philadelphia, one community group developed an
intricate system of health maintenance programs and services.
The level of success of these programs was dependent upon some
combination of the amount of federal funding available and the
political sophistication of the community in securing and
utilizing those funds, either with their own people or by hiring
professionals to work for them. Success was also determined by
the flexibility of the government framework in allowing local
residents to initiate and explore ideas. In that sense the
concept's strength was also its weakness. The less permanent and
defined the local arrangement was, the more it was left to
citizens to perpetuate these programs. Almost inevitably, the
lifespan of the activity was short. By 1973, even the political
science literature had come to consider this alternative
outmoded. Political and social scientists have shifted their
attention toward more structured programs for accommodating
pluralistic needs in urban settings.
Considering the aforementioned results, this alternative does not
seem to be too promising. Neighborhood institutions of this kind
are at the mercy of city hall for help in any form. In the United
States, this help usually was provided only after outside
intervention, particularly on the part of the federal government.
In essence, all concerned were responding to the new ideology and
not to a new balance of power embodied in legally defined
governmental structures that could also protect and ensure the
needs of its citizens. While the neighborhood district system
sought to involve minorities, the lack of a permanent
governmental structure with real powers of its own thwarted the
system as a permanent form of accommodation.12
Jerusalem, like other large Israeli cities, has always had a wide
range of informal mechanisms that take cognizance of the
religious and cultural needs of special neighborhoods. These
included, neighborhood committees but they were advisory rather
than operational bodies. A decade ago, the city began to
experiment with formal decentralization that went further and had
greater success than the American experience. The city
government established six "neighborhood administrations" (in
Hebrew, minhalot) on an experimental basis, choosing as wide a
range of neighborhoods as possible for the experiment including
one Arab neighborhood, one mixed Arab-Jewish neighborhood, one of
the best neighborhoods in town and an adjacent very socially
traditional neighborhood, a neighborhood in the process of
gentrification, a classic working class neighborhood, and a
neighborhood on the city's peripheries, almost physically
detached from the main city. Elected councils were established in
each with a professional administrator and small staff, and they
were given formal responsibility for certain program areas of
neighborhood concern.
Evaluations of this experiment have indicated that it has
succeeded in providing better services to neighborhood residents
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, raising neighborhood
consciousness. It was subsequently extended to four other
neighborhoods and the city is committed to establishing
neighborhood administrations throughout Jerusalem to deal with
municipal issues. No doubt one reason for the experiment was to
find a structure that can be used in the event of a political
solution to give the Arab residents of Jerusalem greater control
over their own affairs in a united city.13 Its possibilities and
limits are those of any submunicipal government -- citizen
interest is sporadic and city hall intervention is continuous.
Nevertheless, this is an experiment that has worked.
Functional Programs
Under this arrangement, existing general-purpose local
governments are augmented by special-purpose authorities and
departments and/or formal intergovernmental arrangements. In
effect, new administrations are created as part of the overall
network of local government. In some cases, these are designed
to serve specific geographic areas -- neighborhoods within the
city (or cities) plus areas outside. In others, they are
designed to serve particular populations within the common whole.
Unlike the neighborhood district approach, where the formal
arrangements offer more general powers, these programs are highly
specialized.
Israel has developed analogous bodies to implement its major
urban renovation program of the late 1970s and 1980s -- Project
Renewal. In each Project Renewal neighborhood a neighborhood
committee was established whose neighborhood members were elected
and which included representatives of the municipality, the state
ministries involved in the project, and the Jewish Agency (the
principal instrument of world Jewry for developing Israel) to
plan, undertake, and oversee neighborhood redevelopment. Such
committees were established in all of Jerusalem's Project Renewal
neighborhoods and in all but one succeeded in improving the
neighborhoods. The one where it failed was where internal
conflict within the neighborhood between ultra-Orthodox religious
Jews and non-Orthodox Jews prevented the neighborhood steering
committee from functioning effectively.
Special functional authorities serve as adjunct organizations to
already established local governments, either as units within the
government or as a unit that overlaps several local governments.
The boundaries of a park district may be coterminous with the
county borders; a school board may be fully independent while
limited to each city; a water district may cut across general
government boundaries. A functional authority may serve a
distinct geographic area tailored to the function itself, for
example a sewage treatment district defined by topography and
drainage network; a distinct ethnic group, regardless of the
geographic location of its members, for example, the Montreal
system of Catholic and Protestant school boards; or a particular
population based upon geographic area, for example, a
metropolitan airport district that can tax all potential users
within its jurisdiction regardless of the municipality in which
they reside.14 The following specific arrangements can be
detailed.
Special Districts that Function as Independent Governments
This form of special functional authority is an entirely separate
local governmental unit that has the power to tax and spend, make
and execute policy, and administer programs.15 It is built
around a particular "service-shed" or "user-shed," that is, the
area or population appropriate for the function involved. Local
funding may come from a general tax on all those within the
district boundaries or from users alone. Thus the special
district may overlap several general-purpose governments to
accommodate its users or properly fill a particular function.
Special districts are generally governed by a small council
elected by residents or users that appoints a professional
manager with substantial powers. The closest that Israel comes
to such districts are regional drainage authorities and
"strawman" school districts set up in some cities to manage
school buildings built with contributions from the United States
that cannot be made to governments.
Interlocal Networks of Accommodation
In some cases, rather than separate or overarching authorities,
municipalities have developed special intermunicipal links to
handle common tasks such as planning, law enforcement, and joint
services.16 These links range from long-term formal contracts to
informal but regular contacts. While they are generally confined
to singular metropolitan regions, they can even cross state
boundaries when the patterns of urbanization call for it.17 These
networks guarantee the juridical and functional independence of a
substantial number of municipalities working together to provide
regional programs. They also encourage outside governments
(national or state) to rely on interlocal decision-making
mechanisms rather than intervene directly into local affairs on
the grounds that local jurisdictions are too limited to handle
them.
Israel has developed its own system of federations of cities for
specific purposes (fire protection, education, drainage, and
sewage disposal), which function on the same principle. Such
federations are constituted as permanent separate authorities
whose governing bodies are constituted by representatives of the
constituent units and whose budgets are contributed by those
units on a shared basis.18
Long-Term Contractual Links19
Long-term contractual links are favored in cases such as
Brussels, Melbourne, and Sydney, where the urbanized area
actually consists of a significant number of independent
municipalities of roughly equal size and the city bearing the
common name, if there is one, is actually no larger or more
politically significant than any of the others.
In the major metropolitan areas of Australia, the cities whose
names are attached to the entire area remain within their
original boundaries, much as the city of London remains confined
to its original square miles, and are surrounded by newer
municipalities. Like Brussels, they have remained independent
and linked, if at all, through functional arrangements. The
major difference is that the state governments in Australia
intervene directly in municipal affairs in a multitude of ways.
This is principally because of the country's population
configuration, whereby some 90 percent of the total population in
most states live within one metropolitan area. The state
government must function as a kind of metropolitan authority, or
it will have little to do.20
Councils of Governments (COGs)21
The COG is a U.S. device stimulated by the federal government
during the Johnson and Nixon administrations in an effort to
achieve metropolitan areawide coordination for planning services
with areawide implications and handling the distribution of
federal grants for those services. All COGs are technically
voluntary bodies; however, as long as they were required by
Congress to make local governments in metropolitan areas eligible
for certain federal aid programs, they were well-nigh United
States. Since the Reagan administration abandoned the
requirement for COG clearance of federal grants, most have
disappeared. Nevertheless, in a few cases they acquired a true
local base as useful instrumentalities for local coordination and
planning. Where that occurred they have survived.
COGs have taken two forms. In most cases they are constituted by
representatives from each local government within the
metropolitan areas. The resultant council is principally a forum
for the expression of municipal interests and the hammering out
of a joint policy to meet federal requirements -- a kind of
United Nations General Assembly or arena for bargaining rather
than decision-making. COGs of this kind disappeared once the
federal government dropped its requirements for metropolitan-wide
planning to qualify for federal funds.
Metropolitan Pueblo, Colorado (pop. 118,000), has developed a
second option. Because the entire metropolitan population is
contained within the county, either within the city of Pueblo
(pop. 97,000) or closely adjacent to it, its COG was organized to
include all seven members of the city council, all three county
commissioners, and one representative from each of the two
independent school districts and the water district serving the
metropolitan area. As a result, any decision taken in the COG
reflects the will of the constituent governments and is then
ratified automatically by each body sitting separately. The
Pueblo COG has established four planning bodies subordinate to
it, one for physical planning and development, one for planning
technical services, one for industrial development, and one for
health and welfare planning. They develop plans and monitor
programs within the community in the name of COG, thus providing
an additional measure of areawide planning and coordination.
Regional Planning Commission
These are bodies that serve multiple local jurisdictions, often
crossing state and even national boundaries, principally to
develop lines for comprehensive regional physical planning and
economic development. They are generally not governments in the
formal sense, but rather arms of some government -- state,
provincial, or local. They may even be only semipublic if local
interest demands that kind of arrangement.
The Regio Basiliensis, serving the Basel region (which includes
the cantons of northwestern Switzerland, southern Alsace in
France, and southwestern Baden-Wurtenburg in Germany) is one of
the best examples of how a semipublic regional planning
commission has succeeded in serving metropolitan regional
interests cutting across three national states and a substantial
number of federated states (in Germany and Switzerland).22
Backed by the canton of Basel Stadt and the great industrial
firms of Basel, it has dealt with such problems as a work force
that commutes across those national boundaries daily, the
construction of a Swiss-owned and -operated airport on French
territory, the maintenance of a German railroad station on Swiss
territory, and many other such problems. It is a major factor in
promoting cooperation in the Rhine River Valley. Its success has
come precisely because it is a local body rather than the
instrument of a state. So, too, its limitations are to be found
in the resistance of one of the states in the region -- France --
to anything smacking of real local autonomy. A similar
instrumentality exists in the Geneva area serving Switzerland and
France, and more are being developed in other European frontier
regions.
Functional Arms of a General-Purpose Government
Services are sometimes provided to heterogeneous populations
through specialized functional arms of a general-purpose
government in which the various groups are represented. The
Montreal school system is a dual one in which two distinct school
boards, Catholic and Protestant, administer schools. The
citizens choose the school system of their choice and their
school taxes are allocated accordingly.23 (The Jews came under
the Protestant system by their own choice, having turned down a
possible opportunity to develop a third system many years ago.)
Delhi, the Indian federal capital, has an even more complicated
variation of this system, involving private as well as public
initiatives. Four separate school systems function in Delhi. The
one sponsored by the Delhi government is the Hindi-speaking
public school system. The Indian federal government provides a
separate school system for its employees' children in which the
language of instruction is English, so as to include families of
non-Hindi-speaking civil servants and to facilitate a basic
stability in the education of children of parents who may be
transferred often in the course of their careers. There are
schools sponsored by linguistic groups identified with the
various states of India (the state of Gujarat maintains a school
in Delhi for Gujarathi speakers and the South India Education
Society, a semipublic body, for children from the several states
where Tamil is spoken). Finally, there is a private school system
that employs English as a language of instruction. Similar, but
less elaborate arrangements prevail in other major cities in
India.24
Israel's state school system is also organized on the principle
of public support for a variety of educational "streams," with
parents having free choice among them. In Jerusalem, the
municipal Department of Education serves state schools, state
religious schools, state Arabic schools, independent schools, and
private schools through its various subdivisions. Each of these
four streams has subdivisions within it supported by the state
and the municipality.
Thus the state schools include experimental schools, state
traditional schools (with greater emphasis on Jewish religious
studies), and state schools in the spirit of the labor movement.
State religious schools include a subdivision of state Torah
schools that emphasize even more traditional religious learning
than the mainstream state religious schools. The independent
schools are essentially ultra-Orthodox ones that provide a
minimum of general education and a maximum of traditional
studies. Recently an offshoot of the independent schools has
developed which gives more place to general education. Jewish
private schools are mostly very traditional chederim that exclude
general studies and try to stay as far away from any connection
with the government as possible.
There are also non-Jewish private schools in the city which come
under the jurisdiction of the municipal Department of Education.
State Arabic schools function in East Jerusalem, but most
students there go to Christian or Muslim private schools that
follow the Jordanian curriculum.
This rather bewildering array of elementary and secondary
educational opportunities seems to be capable of almost
indefinite expansion since under Israeli law any individual
school can change up to 25 percent of its curriculum by decision
of the principal in consultation with the parents while up to 20
percent can be changed by the parents in consultation with the
principal. (It is assumed that these are overlapping rather than
consecutive percentages, but given the accepted understanding of
what basic subjects are required for literacy in everyone's mind,
25 percent of a school curriculum represents almost complete
freedom of choice.)25
Functional Service Entities
In multilingual areas, separate universities are frequently
established to provide instruction in different languages and to
serve as focal points for group cultural development (and often
as centers for political expression as well, given the nature of
things). Brussels, Montreal, and the major cities of South
Africa have such arrangements. Likewise, there are separate
hospitals in Quebec for French- and English-speakers. In many
countries, religious organizations are responsible for providing
social services to their constituencies with government support.
All these are examples of quasi-public institutional arrangements
for the maintenance of heterogeneity with government backing. In
such cases the services are formally private but should be
considered public nongovernmental or "communal" in character.
Functional service arrangements offer many positive ways of
solving the problems indigenous to heterogeneous cities. These
programs ensure the interests of various populations and in
certain cases supply them with quasi-governmental institutions
that serve as vehicles for self-expression and transcend the
geographic problem by servicing the target population wherever it
may be located.
Extralocal Models
It has already been noted that most discussions of political
organization dealing with heterogeneous populations focus on
extralocal political contexts. In a few cases, those extralocal
arrangements may be relevant to the Jerusalem situation. Two
such sets of arrangements are particularly worthy of
consideration.
Consociational Arrangements26
Consociational arrangements are semiformal, based in every case
on many years of evolving accommodation among ethnic, religious,
and/or ideological groups, which reflect fundamental commitment
to structural pluralism within a particular polity. In the
Netherlands and Switzerland, the various ethnoreligious groups
have developed ways of preserving their integrities through such
devices as percentages of representation on national bodies,
separate spheres of influence, and independent organizations
supported by government funds.
Consociational arrangements often rely on some of the specific
devices described in this chapter. Their success is as much a
matter of attitude as of formal government structure. After
decades of conflict between Protestants, Catholics and Liberals
in the late nineteenth century, the Netherlands reached a
remarkable level of stability within its borders through
consociational arrangements. Lebanon, on the other hand, once
regarded as a model of consociationalism in the Middle East, has
been unable to restrain the most severe conflict-provoking
tendencies -- several of them external in origin.27 Austria and
Switzerland combine consociationalism and federalism very
successfully, and Belgium has adopted a federal system to give
its consociational system a firmer foundation.28
Observers have noted that in many ways Israel was also built on
consociational lines.29Jerusalem itself is governed by a regime
that has many consociational elements, which can be extended to
new groups as appropriate. Consociationalism needs time to
develop properly because it requires a basic consensus regarding
the virtue or necessity of intergroup power-sharing. Jerusalem
itself is an example of this. Its consociational form has
emerged out of literally centuries of intergroup accommodation
and has been sharpened by the policies pursued by the present
municipal government. It was the prior existence of tacit
consociational arrangements that shaped the approach of the
Jerusalem authorities toward East Jerusalem after 1967 and that
made this approach a workable one for all parties, even if the
Arabs were unwilling to accept a formal role in the city's
governance.30
Capital Districts
In a number of countries, capital districts are set aside with
special arrangements for their governance.31 In some cases
(e.g., France until the 1970s), they are ruled directly by
officers of the national government but divided intentionally
into neighborhoods with administrations of their own. In others
(Australia, India, and the United States) they are organized as
federal districts. Should the character of the overall
settlement between Israel and its neighbors take a federal or
confederal turn, one of these models may be worth further
examination in conjunction with others suggested earlier.
Implications for Jerusalem
As has already been suggested, Jerusalem has done as well as or
better than any city in the modern world in the development of
means to govern its heterogeneous population. This point
deserves emphasis. Jerusalem's success in this regard reflects a
combination of intelligent and far-seeing leadership. It
judiciously utilized and built upon principles of accommodating
ethnic heterogeneity that are indigenous to the Middle East and
western Asia, where civilization is built upon the determined
existence of varied ethnoreligious communities that, out of
necessity, have had to live together within the same territory
and under the same political jurisdiction. In the past, these
arrangements rested upon an autocratic base, or more properly,
were able to exist only within an overarching autocratic
framework. One of the great achievements of the city fathers of
Jerusalem has been to transform that framework into a democratic
one and to adapt older models to a democratic society.
What has emerged is something that comes closer to
consociationalism than to any other form of accommodation. In
Jewish Jerusalem, this consociationalism has been substantially
institutionalized within the municipal governmental structure.
This has been less true for Arab Jerusalem because of the Arabs'
reluctance to accept formal institutionalization. Still, it
would be a mistake to underestimate the degree to which informal
consociational devices have been institutionalized.
Were the situation to be left as it presently stands, that is,
were Jerusalem to cease to be a matter of political contention
between Jews and Arabs and simply be accepted by one and all as
an integral part of Israel in all of its sections, then the
present consociational framework would probably become further
institutionalized within the municipal structure through the
existing electoral processes. Because this is not the case, it
becomes necessary to consider how such institutionalization can
be achieved under circumstances that are likely to prevail as a
result of any settlement of the conflict.
The shape of the larger settlement will do much to determine its
expression in relation to Jerusalem. However, it is appropriate
to assume that Jerusalem will remain an undivided city and under
Israeli control -- exclusive for most of the city and perhaps
shared for certain sites or parts. This may mean the development
of a territorial formulation along with consociational ones.
Indeed, the expansion of Jerusalem's boundaries in 1967, which
has led to the development of outlying Jewish neighborhoods
within the municipal jurisdiction, probably makes such
territorial expression necessary for the Jewish population as
well as for the Arabs.
Any solutions proposed could probably utilize some combination of
several devices and mechanisms discussed in this chapter. For
example, Jerusalem could be established as a capital district;
this would give it an organic law of its own, including
provisions for extraterritorial status for certain sites or
residents within its boundaries. As a capital district, it would
become the equivalent of a county within which separate
municipalities could be established. Then most municipal
services would be provided to the municipalities by the capital
district government on a contractual basis, and the
municipalities' primary function would be to provide political
expression for specific populations or neighborhoods within the
larger whole. In addition, various functional authorities could
be established to serve those communal needs that are not clearly
geographically defined. The council governing the overall
district could be elected on an areal basis, that is, by dividing
the entire jurisdiction into districts and electing all or most
council members from them.
A less far-reaching solution could be accommodated within
contemporary Israeli law. This already provides that residents
of a particular municipality who are not citizens of the state
can vote in municipal elections, while municipalities themselves
can request the establishment of submunicipal governments for
particular neighborhoods. Thus special neighborhoods chosen for
their internal uniqueness or outlying character could be given
the status of urban quarters (the technical term under Israeli
law) and allowed to elect councils of their own while still
remaining part of the larger Jerusalem municipality.
Should the political circumstances change, other combinations are
also possible, which might emphasize federal and/or confederal
structures and relationships. Jerusalem could conceivably be
reorganized as a federation of quarters or, in most extreme form,
as a confederation of separate cities, united for shared
municipal purposes. Few if any Israelis would recommend either
of the latter two courses of action, as both would not only
involve some ceding of Israeli sovereignty over the united city
but would also introduce great complexity that might prove to be
a hostile environment.
Rule over parts of Jerusalem could be shared by Israel and the
Arab state to the east of it. In other words, the idea of
condominium, which may no longer be applicable to Judea, Samaria,
and the Gaza District, might indeed be very applicable to all or
part of East Jerusalem.
The point is that many options do exist and that, while it will
be necessary to be inventive, the inventions do not have to
emerge out of whole cloth, but rather can build upon models that
have been tested and found workable.
Notes
1. These alternatives are treated in the literature through one
or more of the following strains of political science thought:
structure of governments, public policy, and political behavior.
Recent political science literature emphasizes the latter two,
stressing different trends depending on what is current and
fashionable. Material identifying and examining the actual
structure of government is harder to find in the current
literature, which has emphasized behavioral policy problems
sometimes to the exclusion of such basics.
There are some gaps in this survey. Belgium and Australia are
mentioned only briefly. Almost no attention is given to Asian
frameworks. This is because of the shortage of published
material available and can be corrected only through more
extensive research.
2. John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its
People, Politics and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row,
1970), pp. 107-13; Clyde F. Snider and Samuel K. Grove, American
State and Local Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1965), pp. 359-416.
3. Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, pp. 358-64; Winston
Crouch and Beatrice Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 201-205;
Richard M. Lion, "Accommodation Par Excellence: The Lakewood
Plan," in Michael N. Danielson, ed., Metropolitan Politics: A
Reader (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 272-280.
4. Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, pp. 302-307; Daniel F.
Grant, "A Comparison of Predictions and Experiences with
Nashville Metro," Urban Affairs Quarterly (September 1965):
38-42, 47-48; William L. Harvard, Jr. and Floyd L. Cordy,
Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton
Rouge Area (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964);
Bruce D. Rogers and C. McCurdy Lipsey, "Metropolitan Reform:
Citizen Evaluations of Performances in Nashville-Davidson County,
Tennessee," in The Study of Federalism at Work, Vincent Ostrom,
ed., Publius 4:4 (Fall 1974): 19-35.
5. Brett W. Hawkins, Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County
Consolidation (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press,
1966).
6. Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, pp. 324-339; Edward
Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan Experiment, rev. ed. (Garden City,
NY: Anchor Books, 1966).
7. Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Federated City: Community Control in
Large Communities (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972).
8. Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan
Reform (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1965).
9. On Toronto Metro, see Harold Kaplan, "Metro Toronto: Forming a
Policy-Formation Process," in Edward C. Banfield, ed., Urban
Government: A Reader in Administration and Politics, rev. ed.
(New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 623-625, and Urban Political
System: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1967); Frank Smallwood, Metro Toronto:
A Decade Later (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963), p.
35.
10. Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, pp. 336-339.
11. All too little has been written on the regional councils in
Israel. The best sources of information are to be found in the
publications of the Center for the Study of Rural and Urban
Settlement in Rehovot. A general treatment of the subject matter
can be found in the Center's Regional Cooperation in Israel
(Rehovot, 1972) (Hebrew). For more specialized work at the
Center, see Erik Cohen and Elazar Leshem, Survey of Regional
Cooperation in Three Regions of Collective Settlements (Rehovot,
1972) (Hebrew).
12. For the strongest argument on behalf of this approach, see
Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government: The Local Foundations of
Political Life (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1965). See
also Alan A. Altshuler, Community Control: The Black Demand for
Participation in Large American Cities (New York: Pegasus, 1970).
13. On Jerusalem's minhalot, see Abraham Rabinovitch, "Boroughs
Revisited," Jerusalem Post (February 1, 1980); Daniel J. Elazar,
"Local Government for Heterogeneous Populations: Some Options for
Jerusalem," in Joel L. Kramer, ed., Jerusalem: Problems and
Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1980); Daniel J. Elazar and Chaim
Kalchheim, eds., Local Government in Israel (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1988); Robert Rosenberg, "'Borough'
Plan Resurfaces in Jerusalem," Jerusalem Post (December 23,
1979); Yehuda Yalon, "The Neighborhood Plan," Jerusalem Post
(March 2, 1980); Daniel J. Elazar, Institutional Arrangements for
Local Government of Heterogeneous Populations (Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, 1977).
14. Leonard J. Fein, The Ecology of the Public Schools: An
Inquiry into Community Control (New York: Pegasus, 1971).
15. Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Self Government by District: Myth and
Reality (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).
16. For a survey of such movements, see Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), Vol.
3, Ch. 3, "Intergovernmental Service Agreements and Transfer of
Functions," pp. 29-52. For the workings of such arrangements and
their theoretical rationale, see the articles included in Vincent
Ostrom, ed., The Study of Federalism at Work, Publius 4:4
(Fall 1974); and California Governor's Task Force on Local
Governments, "Report: Public Benefits from Public Choice,"
Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Chairman (Bloomington, Ind.: Workshop in
Policy Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University).
17. The Basle-Mulhouse airport is one example of this. See Susan
J. Stock, "Toward a Europe of Regions: Transnational Political
Activities," Publius 4:3 (Summer 1977); Steven Schechter,
"Sharing Jurisdiction Across Frontiers," in Self Rule/Shared
Rule, Daniel J. Elazar, ed. (Ramat Gan: Turtledove, 1979).
18. There are no studies of these bodies, only the periodic
reports of the Israel state comptroller on each of them.
19. Emanuel Gutmann and Claude Klein, "The Institutional
Structure of Heterogeneous Cities: Brussels, Montreal, and
Belfast," in Joel L. Kramer, ed., Jerusalem: Problems and
Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1980).
20. C.P. Harris, "Regional and Local Government," in Australian
Federalism, Russell Mathews, ed., Publius 7:3 (Summer 1977).
21. Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, pp. 364-372; Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Improving Urban
America: A Challenge to Federalism" (Washington, D.C.: September
1976).
22. On the Regio Basilensis, see Stock and Schechter, op. cit.
23. Stephen Schechter, Montreal "Metro" field notes, 1975. See
also Gutmann and Klein, "The Institutional Structure of
Heterogeneous Cities."
24. Daniel J. Elazar, New Delhi field notes, January 1977.
25. On Israel's educational system, see Daniel Bar-Tal,
Educational, National and Social Attitudes of High School Teacher
(Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, School of Education, 1978);
Deborah Milgram, ed., The Israeli Education System (Jerusalem:
Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel, 1985).
26. On the theory of consociationalism, see Arend Lipjhart,
"Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21:2 (January 1969):
207-25, and The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and
Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1968). On Austria, see Rodney P. Stiefbold, Segmented
Pluralism, Consociational Democracy and Austrian Electoral
Politics: A Theoretical and Empirical Case Study of Austria under
the Great Coalition, 1955-1966 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University
Microfilms, 1973); Kenneth MacRae, Consociational Democracy
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).
27. Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: Wiley,
1966); Daniel J. Elazar, Israel: From Ideological to Territorial
Democracy (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies,
1978); R. Hrair Dekmejjan, Patterns of Political Leadership:
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (Binghamton, NY: State University Press,
1975).
28. On consociationalism and federalism in Switzerland and
Belgium, for Belgium see Frank Delmartino, "Regionalization in
Belgium: Evaluation of an Ongoing Institutional Crisis," European
Journal of Political Research 16 (1988): 381-394; G.V.
Stephenson, "Cultural Regionalism and the Unitary State Idea in
Belgium," Geographical Review 62 (October 1972): 501-523; Jean
Beaufays, "Belgium: A Dualist Political System?" Publius 18:2
(Spring 1988); R. Denolf, "Federalism in Belgium as a
Constitutional Problem," Res Republica 10:3 (1968): 383-406. For
Switzerland, see Charles F. Schuetz, Revising the Federal
Constitution of Switzerland (Ottawa: Carleton University,
Department of Political Science, 1983); George Arthur Codding,
The Federal Government of Switzerland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965); Jurg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule:
Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1974); Kenneth D. McRae, Switzerland:
Example of Cultural Coexistance (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 1964); R. Reich, "Notes on the Local and
Cantonal Influence in the Swiss Federal Consultation Process,"
Publius 5:2 (Spring 1975).
29. Jacob Landau and Emanuel Gutmann, "The Political Elite and
National Leadership in Israel," in George Lenczowski, ed.,
Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966), pp.
163-199; Daniel J. Elazar, "Israel's Compound Polity," in Howard
R. Penniman, ed., Israel at the Polls, 1977 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1979), pp. 1-39.
30. On post-1967 Jerusalem, see Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem: The
Torn City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976); U.
Benziman, Jerusalem: A City Without Walls (Jerusalem and Tel
Aviv: Schocken, 1973) (Hebrew).
31. Donald L. Rowat, The Government of Federal Capitals (Toronto:
Toronto University Press, 1973).
