The Generational Rhythm of American Politics
The American Mosaic, Chapter 2
Daniel J. Elazar
It should be clear that the spatial divisions of the United
States combine a certain continuity over time along with a
certain amount of change brought about by "changing times."
Location in time is no less important a factor in shaping
politics than location in space. Hence, we need to understand how
time is organized so that location within its seemingly
undifferentiated vastness can be more or less pinpointed.
This chapter will suggest a way in which political time
actually is structured in the United States. It rests on a theory
of generational rhythms which the author has successfully applied
to the course of American politics since the mid-1950s to
forecast developments with great success. At the same time he has
applied that model to the American polity from the beginning, in a way
that very usefully charts the flows of American political
affairs.
Early Studies of Generational Rhythms
Students of society have noted the succession of generations
since ancient times.1 Indeed, the Bible explicitly bases its
chronology on generational measures.
The Bible was the first great work to concern itself with
linear time and human movement through history and is the
classic beginning of human understanding of the generational
pattern in human affairs. It was also the first work explaining
why the pattern transcends the individual lives that call it into
existence. As such, it is the starting point for our
understanding of the generational phenomenon and it offers
classic paradigmatic examples of the phenomenon operating in
history.2
Time in the Bible is almost invariably measured on a
generational basis, beginning with the "generations of man" - the
first recounting of human history in Genesis and continuing
through the system of Divine rewards and punishments (the latter
unto the third and fourth generation and the former unto the
thousandth by the Biblical account).3 A human being is allotted
two average generations (70 years) as his normal life span and
three full generations (120) for exceptional virtue.4 Indeed,
Biblical scholars have clearly demonstrated that the Biblical
expression, "forty years" is an idiomatic phrase that means a
"generation".5
Generations in the Biblical sense also are collective
affairs. The "generation of the wilderness" is the best example
of a collectivity of people linked primarily by their existence
as adults during a common time span.6 The concept is applied even
more frequently to a time period or, perhaps more accurately, a
period that embraces time-plus-people. Thus the Book of Judges
describes the rise of new judges in each generation to meet the
challenges of that generation and to restore peace for the
remainder of its allotted span.7
Moreover, the Bible recognizes that all civil societies have
beginnings whose echoes are never lost. The character of the
founders persists among their heirs. Israel, the people of
central interest in the Biblical narrative, is at every point
reminded of its beginnings and its ancestry.
Nineteenth-century philosophers, sociologists, and historians
were the first to articulate systematic theories of generational
progression and its influence on human development. Auguste Comte
viewed the duration of human life, and most particularly the
thirty-year term of full activity in adulthood, as decisive in
shaping the velocity of human evolution, suggesting that "the
unanimous adherence to certain fundamental notions" transforms
the aggregate of individuals alive at a particular time into a
social cohort.8 John Stuart Mill, influenced by Comte and
convinced that "History does, when Judiciously examined, afford
Empirical Laws of Society," added the idea that in every
generation, the "principle phenomena" of society are different,
suggesting that the differences appeared at generational
intervals as each "now set" of individuals comes to dominate
society.9
These general theories led to efforts at statistical and
empirical verification and elaboration, especially during the
last forty years of the nineteenth century, when historians were
trying to develop the scientific study of history. Antoine
Augustin Cournot developed the principle that generations are
articulated through historical events and suggested how
continuity among generations is maintained. Giuseppe Ferrari
emphasized the thirty-year interval and suggested a fourfold
classification of generations as preparatory, revolutionary,
reactionary, and conciliatory in repeating cycle.10 Wilhelm
Dilthey applied the concept to cultural development.11 Leopold von
Ranke and his student Ottokar Lorenz emphasized that generational
periodization was one of the keys to the scientific study of
history, utilizing as tools the study of genealogy and
heredity.12 Lorenz introduced the concept of the three-generation
century.13
After World War I, Jose Ortega y Gasset (1933, 1962) made the
succession of generations the basis for his philosophical theory
of social life, adding, among other concepts, the distinction
between contemporaries (those alive at the same time) and coevals
(those who are part of the same generation).14 His work was
continued by his student, Julian Marias. Sociologist Karl
Mannheim (1952) also worked on this problem, as did such scholars
as Francois Mentre (1920) and Engelbert Drerup (1933).15 The
thesis was applied to art by Wilhelm Pinder (1928) and literature
by Julius Peterson (1930) and Henri Peyre (1948).16
More recent efforts by political and social scientists have
focused on problems of intergenerational differences and the
political socialization of new generations primarily in
totalitarian regimes or in reference to parties of the extreme
left or right. Sigmund Neumann (1965) was the first to apply this
perspective in his study of the rise of Nazism.17 Bauer et al.
(1956) included it in their study of the Soviet system.18 Marvin
Rintala (1958, 1962, 1963) focused on right and left in Finland
while Maurice Zeitlin (1966) studies Cuba.19 S.N. Eisenstadt
(1956) and Joseph Gusfield (1957) utilized the generational
concept in entirely different settings, in Israel and the United
States, respectively.20
All these studies have provided basic data for the
development of a comprehensive theory of the generational rhythm
of politics. Most of their authors have not attempted to
formulate such a theory and those few who have not attempted to
apply their theories, leaving many questions remaining to be
clarified. Thus, for example, the studies have shown that
generations can be conceptualized in two parallel ways: as
discrete series of interrelated events and as the people who
actively inhabit a particular period of time. In fact, both
phenomena represent reality, just as physicists have determined
that light consists, simultaneously, of waves and particles. The
linkage of the two phenomena is a prerequisite to any
comprehensive theory.
None of these authors is concerned with the inner composition
of a generation. Rather, they look at it as something resembling
a black box that can be added with others to form even larger
time periods. Some of them indeed put more emphasis on the
century, consisting of three generations.
Many authors use the term in a common sensical way without
defining way they exactly mean by the term generation. This makes
an empirical verification of their use impossible. The only one
who is somewhat more precise in this regard is Gustav Ruemelin.
Consistent with the field of interest of these scholars
(literature, art, music), they are interested in generations as a
sequence of eminent men rather than putting their scheme on a
more popular basis.
Some authors (notably Mannheim) try to solve the problem of how
to embrace peoples of different cultural and geographic settings
under the heading of "a generation".
Efforts to Delineate Political Cycles in American History
A number of theories of political cycles in American history
have been advanced since Arthur M. Schlesinger wrote The Tides
of American Politics in 1939 that are related to the
generational thesis presented here.21 Schlesinger saw American
history as a series of alternating periods of conservatism and
liberalism based on "the dominate national mood as expressed in
effective governmental action (or inaction)". Conservative
periods reflect "concern for the rights of the few", emphasis on
the welfare of property" and "inaction". Liberal periods reflect
"concern for the wrongs of the many", "emphasis on human
welfare", and "rapid movement". Aside from Schlesinger, the
authors of such theories include V.O. Key, Jr., Charles Sellers,
Gerald Pomper and Walter Dean Burnham.22 V.O. Key's theory is
based on his historical theories of party loyalty and critical
elections. He traced the "more or less durable" shifts in
"traditional party attachments" using the latter as "bench marks"
in studying the electoral process. Key was primarily interested
in the "secular realignment" of the interest coalitions that make
up the party vote in the United States. Since Key made no attempt
to deal explicitly with historical periodization, his efforts are
insightful but incomplete.23
Charles Sellers and Gerald Pomper look at political cycles in
the manner established by Key with the intention of refining
Key's work. Sellers looks at the party distribution of electoral
votes in presidential elections and seats won in off-year
elections to the House of Representatives to discover "the
oscillations in actual party voting strength" as the basis for
the cyclical pattern in American politics which he, like
Schlesinger bases on the notion of an equilibrium cycle. On this
basis, Sellers divides American history into six periods, each of
approximately a generation in length but with minimum consistency
in their results. He concludes that the equilibrium cycle is of
little value as a predictive device since the oscillations move
in irregular and unpredictable directions.
Pomper avoids some of the problems created by Sellers in his
emphasis on geographic rather than personal realignment but, by
using the states as his primary units does not cope with shifts
of voting behavior that do not affect his correlations of the
state vote as such. Beginning with the election of 1828, he
delineates five periods; the Populist (1890s-1928), the New Deal
(1928-1960s) and the present.
Walter Dean Burnham links his theory of political cycles to
the level of public discontent. On that basis, he identifies five
periods since 1789, each of which has gone through a cycle of
stability, crystallization and discontent. "The intrusion of
approximate tension-producing event" acts as a catalyst causing
already growing discontent to be focused on the capture of an
established political party or the creation of a new one. This,
in turn, leads to voter realignment. Burnham sees a generational
basis to this pattern and, in effect, suggests that such a
realignment occurs in every generation.
While only one of the five (Schlesinger) attempts to deal
with American history prior to the adoption of the Constitution
(he begins with the generational buildup to the Revolution), all
three of those who begin in the eighteenth century see something
decisive happening between 1787 and 1790, viewing those years as a
beginning point. If we accept 1787 as a starting point, we find
that Schlesinger gives implicit recognition to the existence of a
generational cycle based on conservative-liberal-conservative
shifts as follows:
1787-1801-1816
1816-1829-1841
1841-1861-1869
1869-1901-1918
1918-1931-?
The political scientists all use critical elections to mark
the beginning or ending of particular political periods, viewing
them primarily as causitive factors in the generation of
political cycles rather than primarily as responses to other
factors as they have been viewed here. Hence, even when they
reveal generational patterns, the patterns are somewhat confused.
Sellers shows the following pattern:
1790-1796/1800
1800-1824/1828
1828-1824/1860
1860-1888/1896
1896-1932
His assessment of which are the critical elections comes
close to that presented here though there is serious disagreement
as to their significance in the periodization process.
Burnham's scheme diverges most from that presented here
although even his outline of the generational pattern is at least
visible if it is schematized as follows:
1789-1820
1828
1856-1860
1893/1894
1932
Key simply offers certain bench mark dates which can be
schematized as follows:
1896-1912
1912-1920-1932-1952
1952
Pomper also offers election dates and no more:
1836
1864-1876
1876-1892/1896
1928/1932-1952
1952-1964
None of these are complete theories and all must be
considered within a larger context which their proponents leave
implicit.
Beyond these efforts at systemization, there are rough
approximations of the generations or segments of generation in
the commonly accepted descriptions of historical periods in the
United States. In some cases whole generations have identities;
e.g., The revolutionary period, the Populist era. In others, the
periods of generational response have recognized names: e.g.,
Jackson Democracy, The New Deal, The Great Society. In still
others, periods of political dominance flowing from critical
elections are named: e.g., The Jefferson era, The Jacksonian era.
In the first few years of the 1960s a number of political
observers developed cogent and well-elaborated theories to
explain why the federal government, particularly Congress, was
paralyzed and could not respond to the needs of the time.24 A few
years later, however, the American people were treated to a
display of federal activity -- and particularly Congressional
legislation -- paralleled only by FDR's "100 days" after March,
1933. Why did these theories miss the mark so badly? What brought
about the shift from the apparent truth of this thesis in the
1950s to the veritable revolution of the mid-1960s? The answer
to these questions lie in a proper understanding of the temporal
rhythm of political life in the United States. (Rhythm in the
sense used here refers to the structured flow of time and
events.)
The American political system, like all others, has a rhythm
of its own, which, in turn, is linked with the overall rhythm of
human time. By tracing those links, we can begin to lay out a
discernible pattern in the progression of political events in the
United States over the years and get some sense of why things
happen (or do not happen) when they do.25 The historical pattern
of political events in the United States follows a generational
rhythm which flows in cycles ranging from 25 to 40 years each,
approximately the biological time-span of the mature or active
portion of a human life. The sequence and impact of discrete
political events is substantially shaped by the rhythm of the
generations, even though the events themselves may seem random.
Thomas Jefferson noted this phenomenon and built a
constitutional theory around it:26
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to
bind another...is a question of such consequences as not only
to merit decision, but place also among the fundamental
principles of every government...let us suppose a whole
generation of men to be born on the same day, to attain
mature age on the same day, and to die on the same day,
leaving a succeeding generation in the moment of attaining
their mature age, all together. Let the ripe age be supposed
of 21 years, and their period of life, 34 years more, that
being the average term given by the bills of mortality to
persons who have already attained 21 years of age. Each
successive generation would, in this way, come on and go off
the stage at a fixed moment, as individuals do now....
What is true of a generation all arriving to self-government
on the same day, and dying all on the same day, is true of
those on a constant course of decay and renewal, with this
only difference. A generation coming in and going out entire,
as in the first case, would have a right in the first year of
their self dominion to contract a debt for 33. years, in the
10th. for 24. in the 20th. for 14. in the 30th. for 4. whereas
generation changing daily, by daily deaths and births, have
one constant term beginning at the date of their contract,
and ending when a majority of those of full age at that date
shall be dead. The length of that term may be estimated from
the tables of mortality, corrected by the circumstances of
climate, occupation &c. peculiar to the country of the
contractors. Take, for instance, the table of M. de Buffon
wherein he states that 23,994 deaths, and the ages at which
they happened. Suppose a society in which 23,994 persons are
born every year and live to the ages stated in this table.
The conditions of that society will be as follows. 1st. it
will consist constantly of 617,703 persons of all ages.
2dly. of those living at any one instant of time, one
half will be dead in 24. years 8. months. 3dly. 10,675 will
arrive every year at the age of 21. years complete. 4thly.
it will constantly have 348,417 persons of all ages above 21.
years. 5ly. and the half of those of 21. years and upward
living at any one instant of time will be dead in 18. years
8. months, or say 19. years as the nearest integral number.
Then 19. years is the term beyond which neither the
representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself
assembled, can validly extend a debt.
On similar ground, it may be proved, that no society can make
a perceptual constitution, or even a perpetual law...Every
constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the
end of 34. years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of
force, and not of right.
The elaborate scheme that Jefferson, in his search for a
system that would provide the maximum degree of individual
liberty, proposed to his friend and colleague, James Madison, at
the outset of the French Revolution, represented a transient
thought on his part. Once the sage of Monticello experienced the
problems of constitution-making on a large scale, he did not
actively try to begin anew every nineteen years. Yet in proposing
his rather radical scheme, Jefferson did come to grips with an
important social phenomenon, one which perceptive statesmen of
every age have reckoned with in one way or another, namely, the
succession of generations as the measure of location in time.
Human Social Rhythms
As Jefferson noted, the human biological heritage provides a
natural measure of time. We often use the concept of the
generation in a common-sense way for just that purpose, as when
we talk about the "lost generation" or the "generation gap." In
fact, social time does appear to move in sufficiently precise
generational units to account for the rhythm of social and
political action. If we look closely and carefully, we can map
the internal structure of each generation in any particular
civil society and chart the relations among generations so as to
formulate a coherent picture of the historical patterns of its
politics.
During a period of no less than 25 and no more than 40 years,
averaging 30 to 35, (Jefferson gives 34 as the average) most
people will pass through the productive phase of their life
cycles and then pass into retirement, turning their places over
to others. Every individual begins life with childhood, a period
of dependency in which one's role as an independent actor is
extremely limited. Depending upon the average life expectancy in
a society, he or she begins to assume an active role as a member
of society sometime between the ages of fifteen and thirty
(Jefferson's average: 21) at which point he or she has between 25
and 40 years of "active life" ahead during which one is
responsible for such economic, social, and political roles as are
given to mature men and women in society. Sometimes between the
ages of 55 and 70, if one is still alive, a person is relieved of
those responsibilities and is by convention, if not physically,
considered ready for retirement.
Political life reflects this generational pattern on both an
individual and collective basis. Politically speaking, for the
first fifteen to twenty years of life an individual is
essentially powerless from a political point of view, having no
right to vote, and dependent upon one's elders for political
opinions. After attaining the suffrage, individuals must still
pass through a period of political apprenticeships before the
right to vote can be translated into the chance for political
leadership. Even among those who choose to be active in politics,
most reach their 30s before assuming positions of responsibility
of any significance on the larger political scene.27 It is only
then that they become serious contenders for political power and,
with good fortune, are able to replace the incumbent
power-holders who depart from the scene as a result of physical
or political death (which may be defined as the ending of one's
serious political career without suffering actual physical
death). By and large the years from one's 30s into one's 60s
represent the period in which the potential influence is at its
maximum. A few people begin to exercise influence earlier and
some very exceptional people remain political leaders longer, but
rare indeed is a political career that exceeds forty years of
meaningful influence past one's apprenticeship.
The voting behavior of the average citizen reflects a similar
cycle of participation. A very high percentage of newly
enfranchised young people do no bother to vote. The percentage of
eligible voters actually exercising this right, increases
significantly for people in their 30s, remains much the same
until retirement age and then declines again. It seems that
voters as well as leaders tend to "retire" after a generation's
worth of activity.28
In addition to the generational pattern that is reflected in
each individual, as Jefferson noted indirectly, a nation or civil
society is, in effect, a sequential combination of generations
sharing a common history and heritage. The generational pattern
for any particular society, nation or group is set at the
beginning of its history by its founders. Take the United States.
The historical record shows that the "founders" of the colonies,
the Republic, and the western states and settlements, were
generally "young" men, at the beginning of the productive phase
of their life cycles.29 In the process of founding new settlement
or institutions, they formed leadership groups which in the
normal course of events remained in power throughout the years of
their maturity. They retired when age and an entirely new
generation forced them to do so and, as a result, were replaced
according to the cycle which they, willy-nilly established.
Thus, in the first third of the 17th century, groups of young
adults settled virgin territory at key points along the Atlantic
coast and in that way initiated what was to become in time the
generational progression of the United States with what was, for
all intents and purposes, a free hand. Since the first generation
of Americans began more or less "even", its people (particularly
its leaders) passed from the scene at approximately the same
time, thereby opening the door for a new generation of leaders to
enter the picture and to begin the process all over again. Thus
it was that at every stage of the advancing frontier, new people
would pioneer, establish their patterns and pass from the scene
at roughly the same time, thereby allowing a new generation to
assume the reins.
Because such beginnings occur in history from time to time,
they establish a much greater regularity of generational
progressions in social and political life than that found in the
simple processes of human biology which, theoretically should, if
other things were equal, maintain a constant "changing of the
guard." In this way the biological basis for the progression of
generations is modified by locational factors. Given sufficient
data, we could probably trace the generational cycles and
patterns back to the very foundations of organized society. In
the United States, a society whose foundings are recorded in
history, we can do just that.
Such changes as occur in any society are intimately tied to
the progression of generations. Each new generation to assume the
reins of power is necessarily a product of different influences
and is shaped to respond to different problems. This reality
heightens the impact of the change and encourages new political
action to assimilate the changes into the lives of the members of
the new generation. At the same time, the biological fact that
three or at the most four generations are alive at any given time
creates certain linkages between generations (for example, the
influence of grandparents on grandchildren) that insure a measure
of inter-generational contacts and social continuity. Those
contact help shape every generation's perception of its past and
future. In this respect, Jefferson's effort to separate
generations sharply is socially inaccurate just as it is
biologically impossible and politically unmanageable.
Generations, Centuries and Events
Since the founding of the first European settlements along
the Atlantic seaboard three and a half centuries ago, eleven
generations of Americans have led the United States through a
continuing series of challenges and responses and we are now near
the middle of the twelfth. In due course, the centuries (which
are essentially three generation units) as well as the
generations have acquired a certain distinctiveness of their own.
Again, there is a common sense recognition of this in the
treatment of American history. The 17th century stands out
clearly as the century of the founding of American settlement.
The 18th century stands out as the century in which an
independent American nation was forged; the 19th century stands
out as the century of continental expansion; and the 20th century
is the century of the United States as a world power.
Historical centuries do not cover precisely the same time
periods as chronological centuries. In American history, as in
modern European history, historical centuries have come to an end
and new ones have begun some seven to fifteen years after the
chronological dividing point, thus:
-
16th century ended with the death of Queen Elizabeth I
(1522-1603) and the 17th century began with the opening of
the American frontier at Jamestown (1607) and the
emergence of conflict between the Stuarts and the Puritans
as the decisive political factor of the times.
The 17th century ended and the 18th century began with the
Treaty of Utrecht and the conclusion of Queen Anne's War
(1713) which eliminated the Netherlands as a world power
and turned the Anglo-French conflict in the New World into
a primary consideration for both countries.
The 18th century ended with the fall of Napoleon and the
end of the War of 1812 (1815) and the nineteenth century
began with the "era of good feeling" and the American turn
west (1816ff).
The 19th century ended and the 20th century began with the
inauguration of Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom" (1913), the
outbreak of World War I (1914), and the final closing of
America's last land frontier.
Perhaps even more salient, the fundamental issues and
alignments that form the hidden dimension in shaping political
behavior show every sign of persisting over three generation
periods and then dissipating in the fourth. Two examples from
American history are immediately relevant. The issues and
alignments revolving around the nature of the federal union and
the slavery issue that emerged during the sixth generation of
American life -- the first generation under the Constitution --
persisted through the eighth generation (a century later) when
they were resolved in the Civil War. In turn, the war created a
new set of fundamental issues and alignments having to do with
economic reform and the location of a pluralistic society. These
took form in the ninth generation and dominated American politics
for a century. Those issues and alignments disintegrated in the
eleventh generation and Americans are presently in the process of
defining the issues and shaping the alignments that will replace
them.
The issues of the past century are being replaced in the
twelfth generation by new issues that have surfaced in American
life in the past decade. Indeed, the crisis of the 1960s, which
commentators have described as the most divisive since the Civil
War, came just when it would have been predicted to come in the
flow of generations,that is, when one century's set of "just"
issues was ceasing to hold the American people and a new set of
issues of equal intensity was moving to center stage. This is
why the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s was so
intense, the sense of alienation from the American past so deep
among the members of the generation then coming to maturity, and
the changes in American life so vast. Since then, great healing
has taken place. While it began after Gerald Ford entered the
White House, its peak was presided over and encouraged by Ronald
Reagan in a decade which witnessed the renewal of American
patriotism and self-confidence.
The progression of
centuries and generations since 1607 may be delineated graphically. In the course of this book,
the progression will be related to major forces and factors
shaping American history: (1) the stages of the continuing
American frontier; (2) the principal challenges facing the
American people in each generation and the central responses to
those challenges; (3) the changing forms and patterns of American
federalism (4) the sequence of critical elections; (5) the
dominant modes of economic organization in the country; and (6)
the changing relationships between racial, ethnic and religious
groups.
One note of caution: the dates must be viewed as approximate. Historical eras
can be delineated but they do no begin and end with such
sharpness. Convenience demands that we be more precise for
analytical purposes than life ever is.
The first three generations together comprised the 17th
century, the period of initial colonization. By 1713, immigrants
from the Old World, mostly from the British Isles, the
Netherlands and Germany, but already including Africans and small
numbers from from virtually every corner of Europe, had founded
all but one of the original thirteen colonies, giving birth to
the first generation of native Americans of European and African
descent in the English colonies, and starting those colonies on
the road toward becoming a separate nation with its own
civilization.
The fourth through sixth generations encompassed the 18th
century, which, from the first American recognition of common
continental interests in 1713 to the conclusion of the "Second
War for Independence" in 1815, was devoted to forging an
independent American nation. They created the idea of American
nationalism, successfully fought for the independence of the
united colonies and established the United States as a democratic
federal republic. The idea bequeathed by those three generations
form the core of the political heritage of all subsequent
generations of Americans.
The 19th century covered the seventh, eight and ninth
generations, beginning at the point where America turned its back
on European entanglements after 1815 and ending at the point where
it reembraced them in World War I. They transformed the young
republic into an industrialized continental nation with a strong
national government; abolished slavery, settled the west and
created an embryonic world power ready for overseas involvements.
The tenth generation -- the first of the twentieth century --
reformed the nation's industrial system and led the country into
the arena or world politics. The eleventh generation was charged
with the task of shaping America's role as a world power and of
presiding over massive efforts to adjust socially and politically
to the results of a technological transformation at least the
equal of the industrial revolution.
As the twelfth generation began forming, it seemed to be
faced with the task of adjusting to a world role of reduced
dominance for the United States, one in which American industrial
might is diminished relative to Japan and Western Europe. It is
also the first generation of the transformation of society as a
result of the application of cybernetics, faced with adjustment
to this new frontier. The generational climax, however, came
with the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, leaving the
U.S.A. politically dominant although economically weakened. The
results of these phenomenon will constitute the basis for working
out the remainder of the generation.
Generations and Frontier Stages
The challenges to which each generation has had to respond
are products of the country's continuing frontier experience. In
American history, the continuing frontier has been the crucial,
if not the decisive factor, in the progression of generation and
centuries. The chart delineates the course of several American
frontiers, their interrelationship and their relationships to
other historical and political phenomena.
Since the first settlement on these shores, American society
has been a frontier society, geared to the progressive extension
of human control over the natural environment and the utilization
of the social and economic benefits gained from widening that
control, i.e., pushing the frontier line back. The very dynamism
of American society is a product of this commitment which is
virtually self-generating since, like a chain reaction, the
conquest of one frontier has led to the opening of another. It is
this frontier situation that has created the major social and
economic changes which have, in turn, forced periodic adjustments
in the nation's political institutions.
America's continuing frontier has manifested itself in four
stages to date: the rural-land frontier, the urban-industrial
frontier, the metropolitan-technological frontier, and now, the
rurban-cybernetic frontier. Each stage has involved its own form
of settlement coupled with a dominant form of economic activity
that together have been decisively influential in shaping
virtually all aspects of American life within that stage.
The rural-land frontier was the classic "frontier" described
by the historians that set the tone for American development. It
lasted from the beginning of settlement in the seventeenth
century to the end of the nineteenth century on the eve of
World War I. Based on the conquest of the land - the American
share of the North American continent, it was oriented toward the
direct exploitation of the products of the land even in its
cities. It was characterized by the westward movement on a
basically rural population interested in settling and exploiting
the land and by the development of a socio-economic system based
on agricultural and extractive pursuits in both its urban and
rural components. The rural-land frontier was dominant through
the middle of the ninth generation, remained an active and potent
force for the remainder of that generation and still exists as a
factor on the fringes of the country, primarily in Alaska.
Early in the nineteenth century, the rural-land frontier gave
birth the the urban-industrial frontier, which began in the
Northeast and spread westward, in the course of which it
transformed the nation into an industrial society settled in
cities and dedicated to the spread of new technology as the
primary source of the nation's economic and social forms. The
urban-industrial frontier represented the unique impact of the
industrial revolution on the United States, where it went hand in
hand with the first settlement of the greater part of the
country. An outgrowth of the rural-land frontier when it first
emerged as a recognizable frontier in its own right at the
beginning of the seventh generation, it remained tied to the
demands of that classic frontier through the next two
generations, finally superseding it as the dominant frontier in
the middle of the ninth generation. It remained the dominant
frontier nationally until the end of the tenth generation and
continues to be important in various localities, particularly in
the South and West. The dominant characteristics of this frontier
was the transformation of cities from service centers or
workshops for the rural areas into independent centers of
opportunity, producers of new wealth, and social innovators
possessing internally generated reasons for their existence and
growth.
By the mid-twentieth century, the urban-industrial had given
birth, in turn, to the metropolitan-technological frontier which
is characterized by the radical reordering of an industrial
society through rapidly changing technologies and settlement
patterns that encourages the diffusion of an urbanized population
within large metropolitan regions. These radically new
technologies, ranging from atomic energy and automation to
synthetics and cybernetics and the accompanying suburbanization
of the population influenced further changes in the nation's
social and economic forms in accord with their new demands. At
the same time, metropolitan expansion offered a new kind of land
base for a transformed industrial society. Like the first two
frontier stages, the metropolitan-technological frontier has also
moved from east to west since the 1920s, taking on a clear
identity of its own at the outset of the tenth generation. After
World War II, in the eleventh generation, it became clearly and
exclusively the dominant frontier, setting the framework for and
pace of development across the country.
The metropolitan frontier reached its peak in the mid-1960s
and by the mid-1970s, most of its impetus had been spent. It
continues to be a force in selected areas of current
metropolitanization. The late 1960s and 1970s were notable for
the dominance of the backlash from that frontier -- in the form
of political radicalism challenging the frontier assumptions and
policies of the 1950s, ecological challenges to
frontier-generated environmental pollution, and a new school of
no-growth economics that attacked the growth premises of a
frontier society -- all stimulated by new problems of resource
management brought on by the energy crisis. Pundits were saying
that, after centuries, the frontier was over.
By 1980, however, there were signs that a new frontier stage
was emerging, based on the cybernetic technologies developed on
the metropolitan frontier. These technologies -- minicomputers,
satellite-transmitted communications, cable television, and new
data-processing devices -- fostered a settlement pattern of large
belts of relatively small cities, towns, and rural areas
populated by urbanites engaged in traditionally urban (that is to
say, not connected with rural) pursuits, but living lives that
mixed city and small town or rural elements. These rurban belts
have no single metropolitan center, only a number of specialized
ones for different purposes. While this phenomenon started along
the northeastern coast, as did earlier frontiers, its major
expression is to be found in the sun belt. This
rurban-cybernetic frontier is still in its early stages, but it
is already bringing its own challenges, initially manifested in
the 1980s in the Reagan presidency and its renewed commitment to
the market economy which let loose a bevy of financial
entrepreneurs who changed the face of the American economy.
Globally, the end of the decade witnessed the collapse of
Communism, the end of the Cold War, and the triumph of the West.
Each successive frontier stage has opened new vistas and new
avenues of opportunity for the American people. At the same time,
each new frontier has brought changes in economic activities, new
settlement patterns, different human requirements, political
changes, and its own social problems that grow out of the
collision of old patterns and new demands as much as they are
generated by the new demands themselves. Most important for our
purposes, the coincidence between the points of generational
division and the shifts in the various frontier stages is as
exact as possible, as will be shown in greater detail in the
following chapters. Such shifts invariably came as part of the
initiating events of a new generation and, indeed, are closely
related to the opening of new centuries.
Generations and Economic Periods
One major consequence of the continuing frontier has been a
continuing demand for public-generally governmental - activity to
meet frontier-generated problems, particularly economic ones. As
a result, the governments of the United States have always
maintained a more or less active relationship to the American
economy even in the so-called "era of laissez-faire". What has
changed from era to era is the nature of the relationship and the
character of the governmental response. These changes have also
developed on a generational basis, with some shift in every
generation since the founding of the Republic. Inheriting a
mercantilistic economic policy, in the first generation under the
Constitution (the sixth generation of American history) the
American government continued a semi-mercantilist policy. The
next generation - the first of the nineteenth century - brought a
transition from intensive government involvement in the economy
to free enterprise capitalism, during which the forms remained
mixed. It was succeeded by a generation in which free enterprise
flourished as never before or since, the outcome of which was the
emergence of the more successful competitors as monopoly-oriented
corporations leading to a generation of concentrated enterprise
capitalism, still essentially unregulated by government.
Demands for government regulation that built up during the
last generation of the nineteenth century led to the
reintroduction of intensive government involvement of a different
kind in the first generation of the twentieth, another transition
generation. In the eleventh generation, the question was resolved
in favor of active government involvement leading to a regulated
enterprise system. Then, at the beginning of the twelfth, there
was a sharp turn around toward reinvigorating the market economy,
free enterprise, and less government intervention.
Centuries, Generations and Federalism
The use of federal principles and the whole problem of union
can also be traced on a generational and century basis. The very
first generation of American history brought the introduction of
federal principles through the contracts and covenants that
established the colonies and the local settlements within them as
well as through Puritan theology. In the remaining two
generations of the seventeenth century, experiments with
federation were made on a local and regional basis. During the
eighteenth century, the idea of national federation was developed
and introduced, as an idea whose strength spread through the
first generation, in increasingly, concrete ways in the second,
and in firmly institutionalized form in the third. The nineteenth
century was a period of testing and crystallizing the character
of the federal union building up to and then beyond the Civil
War, the synthesizing event of the century. The thrust of the
twentieth century from Wilson through Reagan has been to
accommodate federalism and a modern technological society.
Each generation has not only had its own particular need to
deal with questions of federalism but in most, if not all, new
techniques have also been devised to handle intergovernmental
relations. These new techniques and the systemic adaptations
which they have entailed have been major elements in the concrete
response to the generation's challenges.
Generations and Ethno-Religious Interrelationship
The relationship between racial, ethnic and religious groups
(and their various combinations) stand with the frontier and the
challenge-response relationship as central factors in the shaping
of American history and politics. The changes in those
relationships also coincide closely with the flow of generations
and centuries. British America's first generation saw an attempt
to allow religious pluralism on a strictly territorial basis;
that is to say, through giving particular religious groups
exclusive control over particular territories. At the same time,
Africans were introduced as indentured servants to initiate a
racial division in the country. In the second and third
generations, heterodox elements were recognized in most of the
colonies as ethnic diversity and sectarian differentiation spread
while the Africans were reduced to slavery. Thus by the end of
the first century, a modified religious pluralism was the norm
with locally favored churches and tolerated ones existing side by
side. At the same time a racially-based caste system was in the
making.
During the three generations of the second century, ethnic
and sectarian pluralism increased radically, rendering most of
the original territorial arrangements obsolete and resulting in
the virtual elimination of established churches in the new
nation. Slavery, after increasing moderately in the South, was
given a new lease on life by technological change while at the
same time it was abolished in the North.
The first generation of the nineteenth century saw the
unofficial establishment of a generalized Protestant
republicanism which was almost immediately challenged by the rise
of non-Protestant immigration. The second generation was one of
transition to a new post-Protestant pluralism which remained an
antagonistic one through the third generation when the
non-Protestant non-British migration reached its height. Slavery
boomed, was abolished and allowed to reappear in the course of
the century as the caste system was reaffirmed through the
institution of segregation.
From the first, the twentieth century has been the century
of open pluralism-religious, ethnic and racial - in American
life. The barriers of full participation by non-White Anglo-Saxon
Protestants began to fall in the tenth generation and the
elimination of those barriers has been the priority problem of
the eleventh. Indeed, by the late 1960s, pluralism in morals and
life styles began to shape up as the great issue of the coming
generation. By the middle of the twelfth generation, not only
were there no more excluded groups, but those once excluded were
calling for the further redefinition of American society as one
based on "multiculturalism," that is to say, to giving equal
weight to all groups in the expression of American culture.
While the generation thesis suggested here has not heretofore
been presented in detail, there are rough approximations of the
generation or segment of generations in the commonly accepted
descriptions of historical periods in the United States. In some
cases whole generations have identities; e.g., the revolutionary
period, the Populist era. In other, the periods of generational
responses have recognized names: e.g., Jacksonian Democracy, The
New Deal, The Great Society. In still others, periods of
political dominance flowing from critical elections are named:
e.g., the Jeffersonian era, the Jacksonian era.
The Internal Structure of the Generation: Challenges and
Responses
Each generation has
had to face and respond to its own particular challenge. With
perhaps one exception, each has also developed its own very clear
and widely recognized response.30 The challenges and the
responses provide the skeletal structure of each generation. In
some cases, particularly after independence when the nation could
act decisively, the responses have been very clear-cut indeed. In
others, particularly in the colonial period, they were more
diffuse.
The character of the challenges changes from century to
century. During the seventeenth century, they were essentially
related to the tasks of founding a new society as manifested in
the various colonies. In the eighteenth century, they were
essentially related to the tasks of consolidating the supremacy,
unity and independence of British America. In the nineteenth
century, they were essentially related to expanding the scope,
wealth, and purposes of the American national enterprise. In the
twentieth century, they have been essentially related to the
metropolitanization of American society and the assumption of an
American role in world affairs.
The emergence of the challenge is a phenomena associated with
the initial stages of each generation during which the challenges
which, objectively speaking, may have originated earlier, is
progressively recognized as a challenge by the body politic. It
is this growing recognition of the challenge that, in conjunction
with other factors such as the replacement of populations and the
consequent shifts in voting behavior, brings the intensive
response associated with mid-generation national activity. In
fact, the response itself builds up in a diffused way in various
public quarters, particularly in the states and localities, while
the challenge is coming to public attention and only after it has
been tested in many quarters does it emerge as a concentrated
national effort.
Aside from the fact that each generation acquires a certain
discreet existence of its own, within each there is a more or
less regular progression of political events revolving around the
development of a particular set of challenges confronting that
generation and its response to them. It is this recurring pattern
of challenges and responses that gives each generation its
particular character. While the shape of the challenges is
primarily determined by external -- or environmental -- forces,
the mode of handling those challenges is primarily determined
internally, by the members of the generation themselves.
In American history, the pattern of challenges and responses
has taken two generalized forms, one in the colonial period when
each colony had its own internal politics essentially independent
of its sisters, and the other science independence when a common
national constitution created a common national politics. In some
cases, particularly after independence when the nation could act
decisively, the responses have been very clear-cut indeed. In
other, particularly in the colonial period, they were more
diffuse.
The character of the political challenges that have dominated the American scene has changed from century to
century. During the 17th century, they were essentially related
to the tasks of founding a new society as manifested in the
various colonies. In the 18th century, they were essentially
related to the tasks of consolidating the supremacy, unity and
independence of British America. In the 19th century, they were
essentially related to expanding the scope, wealth, and purposes
of the American national enterprise. In the 20th century, they
have essentially related to the metropolitanization of American
society and the assumption of an American role in world affairs.
In a generalized map of the pattern of challenge and response
within each generation since independence, the "border" between the old and new
generations is marked by several decisive political actions,
often involving constitutional change, whose characteristic
feature is the simultaneous completion of the major responses of
the old generation and the opening of new directions, challenges
and opportunities for the new. The first half of the new
generation is a time for recognizing the new challenge
confronting it and the issues they raise, and developing and
testing proposals for political action to meet them. At the same
time, it is a period of population change as old voters and
leaders pass from the scene of political activity and new ones
come onto it. During that period there occur the generation's
expressions of public will that point it in the direction which
the response will take, generally by raising leaders to office
who have indicated that they are ready to respond to the
generation's developing challenges. In fact, the response itself
builds up in a diffused way in various public quarters,
particularly in the states and localities. Only after it has been
tested in many quarters does it emerge as a concentrated national
effort.
The second half of the generation begins with a great spurt
of governmental innovation on the national place designed to
respond to the now-recognized challenge. That effort lasts for
three to five years. The remainder of the generation is then
occupied with digesting the results of that spurt, modifying the
new programs so that they will achieve greater success and at the
same time integrating them into the country's overall political
fabric. The end of the generation is marked by political acts
that both ratify and codify its accomplishments while also
serving to open up the issues of the next generation. By that
time, voices calling for political responses to new challenges
are already beginning to be recognized.
The Bench Marks of American Political History:
Critical Elections and New Deals
In the course of mapping the topographic characteristics of a
particular landscape, geologists mark off crucial points through
a system of bench marks. Crucial points in the passage of time
can also be seen to be marked off in some way. In American
political history, the crucial points of demarcation are very
much in tune with the generational rhythm of events. They are of
two kinds; first, the critical elections that determine who shall
govern in a particular generation and, second, the "new deals,"
or periods of intensive federal legislative innovation, through
which government initiates a systematic response to the
challenges of each generation.
The Generational Recurrence of Critical Elections
A major element in the movement from challenge to response
is the sequence of critical elections that has preceded every
major period of national response since the adoption of the
Constitution. The generational thesis takes on particular clarity
in light of this pattern of critical elections. A critical
election is one which brings about major alterations in the party
loyalties of major blocs of voters, shifting them from one
political party to another. Professor V. O. Key, who first
suggested the term, defined a "critical election" as one in which
"the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in
which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations
of power within in the community, and in which new and durable
electoral groups are formed."31 These shifts and readjustments
which occur as a result of the critical elections lead to the
formation of new nationwide electoral coalitions and either to a
change in political ascendency from one party to the other or,
within the major party, from one major element to another.
Students of American electoral behavior have clearly shown
that there is a tendency for one of the major parties to command
the allegiance of a majority of the national electorate for a
relatively long period of time.32 Thus, for example, according to
public opinion polls and the election returns, between the 1930s
and the 1970s a majority of the nation's voters who identify
themselves with a political party have considered themselves to
be Democrats. In consequence, in every national election since
1932 the Democrats have started with the advantage of having a
plurality of the voters identified with them while the Republican
Party, as the minority party, has had to overcome a "normal"
Democratic majority in order to elect presidents or even a
sufficient number of senators and representatives to win control
of Congress.
The results of this situation are well-known. Between 1932
and 1968, only one Republican had won the Presidency and the GOP
controlled the Congress for only two years (1952-1954). Dwight
D. Eisenhower, a military hero with non-partisan appeal, was able
to overcome the "normal" Democratic majority to capture the White
House for his party twice because of his personal appeal coupled,
at least in 1952, with a general feeling that it was "time for a
change" after twenty years of Democratic incumbency. All of this
was upset by the Vietnam War. Republican Richard M. Nixon
squeaked into the Presidency in 1968 in the wake of the
Democrats' Vietnam problems, won a second term at the expense of
an extremely unpopular Democratic alternative, but could not in
either case carry a Republican majority into either house of
Congress. Nevertheless, his victory hastened the weakening of
the majority Democratic coalition and broke the Democratic lock
on the presidency. It ushered in a period of split ticket voting
that has kept Republicans in the White House for all but four
years (1977-1981) since 1969, but left the Democrats in full
control of Congress except for 1980-1984 when the GOP controlled
the Senate.
A party becomes the majority party when it is able to put
together a nation-wide coalition comprising a majority of the
various permanent and transient electoral groups. These electoral
groups are based on a variety of economic and geographic
interests, differing historical loyalties, racial or ethnic
backgrounds, religious affiliations, personal or family ties, and
responses to the specific problems of the age. These coalitions
are not national so much as they are nation-wide. They are
inspired and held together by national leaders (or leadership)
but are actually activated through the separate state parties
which form the two national confederations known as the
Democratic and Republican parties. Just as the national parties
are confederations of the state parties, so is the national
coalition of electoral groups a confederation of state and
sectional coalitions.
Once one of the parties is able to put together such a
coalition and thereby capture the majority of the votes, the
tendency of the electorate to remain stable in its allegiances
will enable it to remain the majority party until positive
reasons develop that lead to the dissolution of the winning
combination. This dissolution, too, is virtually inevitable.
Times and moods change, new problems attract voter attention, the
opposition party exploits the dissatisfactions that develop and
sooner or later make the necessary inroads in the various
electoral groups.
Even during its period of dominance, the majority party faces
opposition and loses elections as a result of temporary shifts in
public opinion. Since its coalition is never of equal strength in
the fifty states, some states remain in the control of the party
that is in the minority nationally. Of course it is by no means
certain that the majority party will even win all the national
elections during its ascendency. Indeed it is both possible and
usual for a party to suffer losses on the national plane for a
limited time without forfeiting its majority status as long as
its losses are aberrations that do not dissolve the coalition. The
states which remain in the hands of the minority party serve as
bases that enable it to maintain its effective existence and mend
its political fences until it is able to develop the new majority
coalition when the time is ripe, by providing candidates for
national office and sources of patronage and other political
rewards for the party faithful during the years of national
"famine."
As the majority coalition begins to weaken, its constituent
electoral groups will become alienated from each other. Their
changing needs may even bring former confederates into conflict
with each other. The members of these electoral groups may begin
to find the other party more receptive to their new demands. As
issues pass and problems change, whole electoral groups may
decline radically in importance and new, still uncommitted,
groups may emerge to be wooed and won by the opposition. When the
time is ripe for a change, the realignment takes place. This is
not the oft-discussed realignment of the liberal and conservative
wings of the two parties, but a reshuffling of the parties'
constituent elements, the myriad electoral groups.33
While the beginnings of every realignment can be found in the
state and congressional elections, the shift becomes a national
phenomenon only through the medium of the quadrennial
presidential election. Once every four years, sufficient voter
interest is aroused to make embryonic realignment actual ones.
Once the realignment become fixed, they are further reflected in
the state and congressional elections that follow. The series of
presidential and congressional election in which the realignment
takes place are the "critical elections."34
The first pair of critical elections actually antedated the
development of the institution of the popularly elected
president. Despite the difference in modes of election the same
factors of electoral bloc representation that later came to
symbolize presidential politics when the votes of the people were
solicited apparently were present in the contests in the
electoral college and the House of Representatives.
Key's thesis regarding the shift of political allegiance on
the part of individual voters has been challenged as unprovable
through the use of aggregate voting data. Moreover, some doubt
has been cast on the notion that many voters do indeed shift
allegiances. The generational thesis offers the key to the
solution of this problem. It may very well be that the
"realignment" that takes place does not so much involve changes
in the allegiance of specific voters but a disruption of the
common pattern whereby children tend to vote as did (or do) their
parents - along lines determined by issues current during their
grandparents' prime. A "realignment" thus becomes the end result
of an event or compact series of events so crucial that they
disrupt this "normal" progression and lead a significant
percentage of children to reassess their family voting patterns
and alter them in light of a situation which has made the old
issues lose their primary importance. As the parents die (or
cease to vote as is often the case with oldsters), the votes of
their children came to represent first the balance in the
electorate and then the majority. The shift is first felt in the
period of generational buildup which is precisely the period when
this "challenging of the guard" is taking place among political
actives and "rank and file" alike. That is why the critical
elections occur during that part of each generation and serve to
bring it to an end. By the time the ratifying election, the new
generation of "children" has moved from balance to majority.
"New Deals" -- Bursts of Federal Government Activity
The culmination of each series of critical elections is a
bursts of innovative federal activity, legislative activity of
the kind usually referred to in connection with the New Deal of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. These periods become fixed in the
public mind as the historical watersheds they are.
In the six and a half generations since the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution, there have been five such concentrations of
reform activity. Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson are
well-known for their reforms. We still speak of Jeffersonian and
Jacksonian Democracy. It is less well-known that Abraham Lincoln
presided over a period of domestic reform legislation of major
proportions that enabled the country to adjust to the industrial
revolution the way the New Deal provided the basis for overcoming
the social problems of industrialization. The Civil War upstaged
that dimension of his Presidency but the period, as such, stands
out in the public mind because of that struggle. Only in the
ninth generation was the moment of reform aborted. It began at
the appropriate point but was cut short by a series of decisions
of an extremely unsympathetic U.S. Supreme Court. The reforms,
perforce, were delayed until nearly the end of the generation
when Theodore Roosevelt was able to use the Presidency to
overcome some of the resistance to them. Next came Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's New Deal which has become the model for all
such periods of federal action. In the 1960s, Lyndon B.
Johnson's "Great Society" carried on the pattern, "on schedule,"
as it were. The next such concentration should come in the
1990s.
The burst of legislative activity in the Great Society lasted
approximately three years. While the acceleration of the curve
of governmental involvement continued within the executive branch
of the federal government and in the intergovernmental system for
another two or three years, in effect, the election of Richard
Nixon to the presidency ushered in the appropriate period of
generational consolidation.
The first postwar generation came to an end in the three
years between 1973 and 1976, during which time the American
effort in Vietnam collapsed and the United States became
"gun-shy" of extensive overseas involvements as the world's
policeman. President Nixon became involved in the Watergate
scandal and was forced to resign his presidency, putting an end
to the growth of the "imperial presidency" and bringing about a
Congressional reassertion of its power. The energy crisis and
some of the more critical domestic problems that arose in the
last days of the Nixon administration led the governors of the
American states to reassert themselves to fill the vacuum left by
Washington, thereby considerably weakening the hierarchical
understanding of American federalism whereby the states and
localities had come to await marching orders from Washington
before undertaking any activities.
The election of Jimmy Carter to the presidency in 1976 as an
"outsider" whose task it was to clean up the Washington community
marked the beginning of the second postwar generation, the
twelfth in American history. The Carter administration, although
scarred by many difficulties, began to define the issues of the
new generation, usually in a way that was unrecognized by the
public at the time. President Carter was faced with the task of
restructuring America's international role in the wake of the
post-Vietnam mood. He tried to shift federal government concern
from social welfare to a new set of infrastructure issues
revolving around energy. He tried to bring the Washington
bureaucracy under control in the name of the states and
localities. These were all to become principal issues during the
period of generational build-up.
The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980
brought to the White House a figure whose ability to communicate
issues to the American people in a simple and direct manner
intensified the tendencies introduced in the Carter years. In the
eight years that followed, all those issues required more
intensified expression. By the end of the Reagan administration
voices were being raised on behalf of a new wave of government
activity to respond to what were referred to as the issues of the
1980s but were actually the issues of the new generation.
Politically speaking, the new programs of each generation
have been invariably preceded by critical elections through which
the reconstituted electorate -- which changes from generation to
generation as new people reach voting age and old ones die --
determines the basic pattern of party voting for the new era,
either by reaffirming the majority party's hold on the public by
granting them an extended mandate or by rejecting the majority
party as unable to meet those demands and elevating the minority
party to majority status. These critical elections, which attain
their visibility in presidential contests, allow voters, blocs,
and interests to realign themselves according to the new problems
which face them.
Three times in American history critical elections have
elevated the party previously in the minority to majority status.
In the series of elections beginning in 1796 and culminating in
1800, the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans replaced the
Federalists. In the 1856 and 1860 series, the Republicans
replaced the Democrats who had become the heirs of the
Jeffersonians and in 1928-1932, the Democrats in turn replaced
the Republicans.
Between each shift, the critical elections served to
reinforce the majority party which was successful in adapting
itself to new times and new conditions. Thus, in 1824-1828, the
Jacksonian Democrats picked up the reins from their Jeffersonian
predecessors; in 1892-1896, the Republicans were able to
reconstitute their party coalition to maintain their majority
position and even strengthen it. In 1956-1960 the Democrats were
able to do the same thing. The old coalition put together by FDR
and the New Deal, which underwent severe strains in the late
1940s and early 1950s, was reconstituted and reshaped by John
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to give the Democrats an even
stronger majority than before. This made the programs of the
1960s possible, but in turn led to a new testing period for the
Democratic coalition.
To suggest that a generational rhythm is clearly apparent in
American politics is not to suggest that events move in any
lock-step, that the rhythm of every generation is exactly the
same as that of every other, or that there are no exceptions to
the "normal" rules. Obviously history does not work in that way.
Hence we must not the exceptions as well as the rule and account
for them for the theory to be an accurate one. It is the fact
that this too can be done that gives the theory its power.
Summary
Chapter 2 has focused in detail on the generational rhythm of
American politics. Ultimately derived from the biblical
understanding of time, the generational theory has been of more
interest to European social philosophers than American social
scientists until recently. Most systematic American attention to
the question has been concerned with the cycles of American
politics, often confined to electoral ones and, hence, limited in
their theory. A more systematic biostatistical basis for the
generation rhythm was provided by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson
points the way to understanding that the rhythm of generations is
based upon human social rhythms generally.
Political events follow the rhythm of the generations, both in
their internal rhythm and on an intergenerational basis.
Centuries represent three generations and also have a certain
pattern to them.
The chapter examines the internal structure of the generation,
constructed around the generation's challenges and the responses
to them. The chapter concludes with the presentation of critical
elections and new deals as the benchmarks of American political
history recurring on a generational basis.
Notes
1. Julian Marias, Generations: A Historical Method, translated
by Harold C. Raley (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1970); Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Silence: Essays on
Generational Themes (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).
2. George E. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation: The Origins of
the Biblical Tradition (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1973).
3. E.A. Spieser, The Anchor Bible: Exodus chapter 20, verse 5
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1987).
4. E.A. Spieser, The Anchor Bible: Genesis (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1987).
5. For citation in the Bible of the idiomatic expression for a
generation, see The Anchor Bible: Book of Judges, chapter 3,
verse 11; chapter 5, verse 31; chapter 8, verse 28.
6. See The Anchor Bible: Joshua, chapter 5, verse 6; and
Numbers, chapter 32, verse 13.
7. See The Anchor Bible: Book of Judges, chapter 3, verse 11;
chapter 5, verse 31; chapter 8, verse 28.
8. Harriet Nartineau, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte
(London: G. Bell, 1896).
9. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and
Inductive (London, 1862).
10. Giuseppe Ferrari, Coros Su Gli Scrittori Politici Italiani
(Milano: Monanni, 1929).
11. Wilhelm Dilthey, Das Leben Schleiermachers (1870) or
Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat, in Gesammelte
Schriften, Band 4. (1875), pp. 36-41.
12. Leopold von Ranke and Ottokar Lorenz. For more information
on Leopold von Ranke, see George G. Iggers and James M. Powell,
eds., Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical
Discipline (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989); Peter
Gary, Style in History (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Theodore
Hermann Van Lane, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (New York:
Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970); Felix Gilbert, History, Politics or
Culture? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
13. Marias, Generations: A Historical Method.
14. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme (New York: Norton,
1933).
15. Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul
Kecsdemeti, ed., Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972); Francois Mentre, Less
Generations Sociales (Paris: Bossard, 1920); Engelbert Drerup,
Das Generations Problem in der Griechischen und
Griechisch-Roemischen Kultur (Paderborn: F. Schoeningh, 1933).
16. Wilheim Pinder, Das Problem der Generation in der
Kunstgeschichte Europas (Berlin: Frankfurter Verlags-Anstalt,
1926); Julius Peterson, Die Literarischen Generationen (Berlin:
Junker and Duennhaupt, 1930) and Die Wesenbestimmung der Romantik
(Leipzig, 1925), Ch.6; Henri Peyre, Les Generations Litteraires
(Paris: Boivin, 1948).
17. Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the
Age of International Civil War, 2nd ed. (New York: F.A. Praeger,
1965), and "The Conflict of Generations," Partisan Review 39, No.
4 (1972): 564-78.
18. Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the
Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
19. Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Silence; Maurice Zeitlin,
American Society (Chicago: Markham, 1970).
20. S.N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups
and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); Joseph
Gusfield, Protest, Reform, and Revolt (New York: J. Wiley, 1970).
21. Arthur Schlesinger, "The Tides of American Politics." (1939).
22. Charles G. Sellers, A Synopsis of American History (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1969); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and
the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970);
V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New
York: Knopf, 1961); Gerald M. Pomper, Elections in America (New
York: Dodd, Mead, 1968); Aletta Biersack, et al., The New
Cultural History: Essays (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1989).
23. V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of
Politics 17 (1955): 3-18, and "Secular Realignment and the
Party System," Journal of Politics, 21 (1959): 198-210.
24. See, for example, James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of
Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). Over the
years various theories have been propounded to explain the cycles
of American politics. Perhaps the best known is that of Arthur
Schlesinger, Sr., Paths to the Present (New York: Macmillan Co.
1949), which proposes a cycle of swings from liberalism to
conservatism approximately 50 years in duration. Unfortunately
the article itself is extremely time-bound, first of all in using
liberalism and conservatism, constructs particularly relevant in
the generation between World Wars I and II when the article was
written as the fundamental basis of American political ideas,
something which is simply not the case. Moreover the cycles
themselves best reflect the swings from more activist to less
activist government from the Civil War to the New Deal.
25. The discussion to be advanced in the following pages was
first presented in Daniel J. Elazar, "Generational Rhythm of
American Politics," American Political Quarterly (January 1978)
vol. 6, no. 1, and in "Generational Breaks," Nissan Oren, ed.,
When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Politics
(1984). See also Daniel J. Elazar, Building Toward Civil War
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America and Center for the
Study of Federalism, 1992).
26. Letter to James Madison, September 6, 1789.
27. Note that the U.S. Constitution requires a person to be 25
years old to serve in the House of Representatives, 30 years old
to serve in the Senate, and 35 years old to be President.
28. See Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and
Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960);
Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and Jae-on Kim, "Political
Participation and the Life Cycle," Comparative Politics, 6 (April
1974): 319-340; Mary M. Conway, Political Participation in the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,
1985); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik, The
Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1976); Alex Inkeles, "The American Character," The Center
Magazine (Santa Barbara, Calif: Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, Nov/Dec 1983); Morris Janowitz, The Last
Half-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978); Lester W. Milbrath, Political
Participation: How and Why do People Get Involved in Politics
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Roger W. Cobb and Charles D.
Elder, Participation in American Politics: Agenda Building
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); James David Barber, Politics By
Humans: Collected Research on American Leadership (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1988); Clifton McCleskey, Political Power
and American Democracy (Pacific Grove, Cal.: Brooks/Cole, 1989).
29. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick discuss this phenomenon
with special reference to the revolutionary and constitutional
years in The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution (New
York: Macmillan, 1961).
30. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (New York: Dell,
1965): Jhurgen Habermas, The New Conservatism; Cultural Criticism
and the Historians Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).
31. V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," in Journal
of Politics 17 (1955): 3-18.
32. Campbell, et al., The American Voter; Gerald Pomper,
Elections in America; Phillip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan
Stability," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (July 1969):
139-171.
33. On realignment, see, V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible
Electorate (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1966); James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System:
Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United
States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1973); Walter D.
Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics (New York: Norton, 1970), and "American Politics in the
1970s: Beyond Party?" in William Nisbet Chambers and Burnham,
eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political
Development, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975),
pp. 316-317; Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise
of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1981), pp. 122-129; Anthony King, ed., Both
Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and
Congress in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, 1983).
34. Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics, and The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982); Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party
System; Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony;
David R. Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization,
Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); James
Clotfelter, Political Choices: A Study of Elections and Voters
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980); Bruce A. Campbell,
The American Electorate: Attitudes and Action (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1979); Peter B. Natchez, Images of Voting:
Visions of Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
