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Federalism


Constitutionalizing Globalization:
The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements

Introduction

Daniel J. Elazar


In 1982, early in the second chronological generation of the postmodern epoch, Ivo Duchacek, who may have been the first political scientist to combine the study of international relations as a field and the study of federalism, wrote:

Never before have so many nations and their leaders so frequently and so openly admitted their growing interdependence; never before have they created so many cooperative frameworks and elaborate mechanisms for managing their complex interdependence and its consequences. Simultaneously, however, national leaders and their supporters continue to insist on the sovereign independence of their states with the expectation that the intricate web of regional or global cooperative links will serve their separate interests.1

Duchacek continued his discussion by enumerating the hundreds of organizations and associations then already in existence on a globalized basis.

  • Over 300 intergovernmental cooperative associations as opposed to only 37 before World War I.
  • An increase of 150 percent in the number of what he referred to as "intersovereign associations" between 1951 and the time he wrote the article.
  • Over 2,400 transnational nongovernmental organizations including corporations, trade unions, and religious bodies by 1978.2

Since then, all of those numbers have continued to rise exponentially. Thus the 1995-1996 Yearbook of International Organizations lists 12,520 international organizations. While the Yearbook categorizes those organizations in a manner different than Duchacek, the trend is clearly upward in all of Duchacek's classifications. This includes:

  • 266 "conventional international bodies" (federations of international organizations; universal membership organizations; intercontinental membership organizations; and regionally defined membership organizations);
  • 1,497 "other international bodies" (organizations emanating from places, persons, or other bodies; organizations having a special form, including foundations and funds; and internationally-oriented national organizations); and
  • 3,049 "special types" (inactive or dissolved international organizations; recently reported or proposed international organizations; subsidiary and international bodies; religious orders, fraternities, and secular institutes; autonomous conference series; and multilateral treaties and agreements).

Globalization and Its Implications

The world today is abuzz with discussions of globalization, especially in the three spheres deemed to count most for human progress: economics, human rights, and communications. "Progressive" voices of various shades of opinion are discussing ways in which this globalization can be advanced so as to increase the opportunities for human happiness, while "conservative" voices are bewailing globalization as robbing the world's states of their political sovereignty and the world's peoples of their cultural heritage for what is perceived as no more than a mess of pottage, and one likely to turn sour at that.

Globalization is indeed upon us. While its extent and effects may be exaggerated from time to time, it is no myth. The benefits of globalization are touted widely and prominently -- open markets, free trade, greater prosperity for more people, the development of a common world culture, greater respect for peoples no longer seen as distant and unfamiliar, greater respect for the human rights of individuals and groups along Western models. Yet at the same time, the "downside" of globalization has also become evident -- the weakening if not destruction of local cultures and local and national liberties by great international bodies, particularly private corporate commercial bodies, in the name of those benefits. In many respects globalization has crept up upon us and the mechanisms developed to promote it such as GATT or the European Union and their regional counterparts have acquired substantial power with minimal constraints, in practice if not in theory.

Not surprisingly, given the democratic aspirations of our times, closely following on the heels of globalization have come efforts to anchor it in appropriate constitutional frameworks. The need for new constitutional arrangements becomes more apparent to lovers of democracy and liberty as globalization advances. Hence, the effort is acquiring a greater level of consciousness on the part of those engaged in it. However, it is still only at the beginning of being noticed by those not so intimately involved. This constitutionalization is being assisted by the renewed desire for strengthening the local and interpersonal dimensions that have come along with it.3

Much if not most of what is happening to bring about this constitutionalization is what classically has been known as federalism; that is to say, the combination of constitutional choice, design, and institution-building to accommodate both existing states and trans-state linkages in a federalist manner by combining self-rule and shared rule in such a way as to insure that shared rule will be confined only to those functions where it is absolutely necessary or clearly more useful to the polities and peoples involved.

Not only do these efforts rest upon the principles of federalism, whether acknowledged or not, but in their specific applications they represent a certain species of that genus -- the confederal species. For many, this may be a surprising development -- for much of the modern epoch (mid-seventeenth to mid-twentieth centuries), confederal arrangements were in eclipse as the worldwide thrust toward statism made such "loose" constitutional arrangements look flimsy as compared to federation, a species of federalism considerably more compatible with the then regnant "nation-state." Now in the postmodern epoch with globalization and its companion, regionalization, upon us and moving forward at a fast pace, confederal arrangements have reemerged -- indeed, it may be said, are coming into their own. This book is a preliminary exploration of how those arrangements have taken shape in the postmodern epoch, how the decline of statism and the rise of globalization have made federalism in its confederal manifestations the vital constitutional-institutional component that can provide a political framework within which world economic, communications, security, and other trends can and are being accommodated.

The new confederalism rests on three pillars: security, economic integration, and protection of human rights. Each of those pillars serves one of the major sets of actors on the world scene. The security issue serves the states involved in the confederal arrangement. The economic basis serves the commercial and industrial interests of the major economic actors and the human rights pillar serves the individual citizens within the arrangement and also the primordial groups to which they belong. In this way, the new confederalism offers something for everyone in connection with their primary interests. Obviously the three pillars are not as separate as here portrayed and each of the three constituent groups has interests in the pillars other than the pillar of its major interest. That only serves to reinforce the attractiveness of the new arrangements and also offers a mitigating effect against their own side for each set of actors.

One of the major characteristics of the new confederalism is that it is not a matter of the enlargement of states as in the old confederalism, whereby small polities felt the need to link with one another to establish larger ones to be better able to survive and/or compete in the world around them, but the transformation of states from the effort and ideal of being totally sovereign and self-sufficient to becoming autonomous jurisdictions within a larger system, with sufficient standing in international law and vis-a-vis other states to be able to protect their autonomy except where they, themselves, have conceded it to some collective of which they are also a part, in which they in the decision-making but cannot act unilaterally. In short, it is a confederalism of state transformation rather than state enlargement. That is what defines the postmodern character of the phenomenon. In 1980, in "Consociations of Fatherlands," the first piece in which he addressed the issue directly from a federalist perspective, Duchacek suggested that the newly globalizing postmodern world could learn from the American confederal experience of the Revolutionary Era two hundred years earlier.4 On that he quotes Clinton Rossiter, that confederation seems "to have been just about as viable a form of government as could have been offered to the American people" at that time.5 He then proceeded to apply the same analogy to what was then still the European Community (now Union) and other contemporary examples of transnational organization limiting state sovereignty.

In his thinking, Duchacek, a federalist, saw confederation as an inferior form of political organization when compared to federation. In this book, we will examine confederation and confederal arrangements not as a way station moving toward federation or as an inferior form of political organization, but as a legitimate form of federal democracy in its own right with its own virtues and vices, strengths and weaknesses, in the premise that what is developing in the postmodern world may indeed restore confederal arrangements to "active duty," as it were, among the forms of regime that offer viable options in today's world.

Duchacek based his view on the fact that the Americans in the 1770s and 1780s were "ready to be Americans," in Rossiter's terms, while the Europeans are not.6 Our argument here is that the Europeans and others who are considering or embracing federal solutions may want to be Europeans or something else without ceasing to be Frenchmen, Germans, British, or whatever they are, and hence may prefer less fully binding forms of federal organization.

This is not an easy process. Proponents of globalization are unhappy with its slowness and weaknesses, while opponents are fearful of its successes, making them equally unhappy with the phenomenon. But the process goes on, happily or unhappily, and needs to be better understood for what it is so that it can be shaped to better become what we would like it to be.

This writer believes that globalization is upon us "for good." "For good," in this sense, means in a lasting manner, but it is also upon us "for better or for worse" and we have the opportunity to influence it either for the better or for the worse. Federalism and federal arrangements -- in this case confederal and limited in character -- offer, in this writer's opinion, the best chance to influence it for the better, to curb its excesses in the concentration of economic power in the hands of those who have only economic interests and to provide for the introduction of an appropriate political dimension that will support federal democracy and human rights, individual and group, but they must be consciously developed and carefully thought through.

In the words of The Federalist, the book of political philosophy that first explicated the United States constitution and thus laid the foundations for a modern federal theory, regimes are established either by force or accident or by reflection and choice. Regimes using federal principles and arrangements more than any others are products of reflection and choice. This is particularly important in the postmodern world. That world was born in part through a series of conflicts on the part of partisans of liberty and democracy struggling to defeat those who would establish other world orders by force, whether Fascist, Nazi, or Communist. As a result of that struggle, we entered into a period of globalization by accident; that is to say, through relatively small and restricted acts to solve immediate problems which led to the development of globalization in the economic and communications spheres. Now, having discovered what has happened, we have a brief window of opportunity to constitutionalize it through reflection and choice. It behooves us to do so or our children will pay the price.

Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements and its companion volumes, American Confederal Experiences, Past and Present;7 Community and Union: The Rebirth of Confederal Arrangements in Europe;8 and The World Engaged: Confederal Arrangements in the Caribbean, Eurasia, Southeast Asia, and the World,9 are the first products of a larger project on the revival of confederal arrangements in the postmodern epoch, particularly confederal solutions to ethnic conflict.

These confederal solutions, ranging from full-fledged confederations to little more than very limited-purpose associations of states can be understood as regional and functional cooperatives. These cooperatives vary in importance and scope, both in membership, in achievements, and in some cases also in duration. Most important, they vary in the degree to which they constitutionally or empirically bind their members. In fact, they are all of limited purpose and collectively consist of myriad overlapping relationships. Even more critical is that the strongest of them have become what we may call "constitutionally binding"; that is to say, while established voluntarily, they rest upon or have developed elements that formally require a commitment that can only be referred to as constitutional and which from a practical point of view must be maintained if the member is to survive and prosper. That is to say, accepting constitutional limits in order to gain their practical possibilities has become unavoidable for their members, but the fact that these are differentially overlapping cooperatives both makes them more universal and mitigates their comprehensiveness.

The nomenclature of these cooperatives is varied. Duchacek brings sixteen different examples:

  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
  • Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN)
  • International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank)
  • Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
  • Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Empire)
  • European Economic Community (EEC)
  • Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
  • International Finance Corporation (IFC)
  • Council for the Cooperation of the States of Gulf (CCG or Common Market of the six Arab states on the Persian Gulf)
  • United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF)
  • United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
  • East African Common Market (potential)
  • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
  • Warsaw Pact (sometimes referred to as Socialist Commonwealth)
  • International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The seeming modesty or comprehensiveness of the name used in any case is rarely correlated with the scope and depth of the body in question.10 Not only that, but the names themselves are different in different states. For example, the United States refers to the universal intergovernmental organization established in 1945 as the United Nations. In other languages, for grammatical or defining purposes, the equivalent term used is "United Nations Organization," an effectively limiting name and actually considerably more realistic as well.


The Several Species of Federalism

The several species of federalism include federal and confederal arrangements, symmetrical and asymmetrical. They are shown in Figure 1. The figure is necessarily more analytic than a reflection of reality. In many cases, the various forms cannot be separated one from the other in an absolute sense but, rather, particular polities have combined elements of more than one species in practice if not in theory. Thus several federations began as confederations and have retained confederal features, and vice versa. This is the most frequent blurring, but since these are the two most widespread species, they also have the most significance.


Figure 1

FORMS OF FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS
(Political, Economic, and Religious Parallels)

Political Economic Religious Principal Characteristics
1. Union Multi-Division Corporation Episcopal Church Polity Clearly bounded territorial constituent units retain "municipal" powers only while sharing power concentrated in the common government.
2. Consociation Guild Systems Ethnic Congregation (in centralized or hierarchical church) Non-territorial constituent units share power concentrated in common overarching government.
3. Federation 1. Economic Community
2. Conglomerate, if the constituent units are represented in the overall management structure.		 Presbyterian Church Polity Strong self-government constituent units linked within strong but limited overarching government.
4. Federacy Customs Union Autocephalic Church (linked Polity of Larger Hierarchical Church)Asymmetrical permanent linkage between two self-government units with the lager having specific powers within the small in exchange for specific privileges.
5. Condominium Joint Stock Company   Joint rule or control by two units over a third or over some common territory or enterprise.
6. Confederation Common market Congregational Union or Federation Strong self-governing constituent units permanently linked by loose, limited purpose common government.
7. League Free Trade Area Congregational Convention Loose but permanent linkage for limited purposes without common government but with some joint body or secretariat.
8. Inter-Jurisdictional Functional Authorities Joint Enterprises Board of Missions Joint or common entities organized by the constituting units to undertake special tasks.


Alain-G. Gagnon has offered the following definition of federalism:

Federalism may be conceived as a political device for establishing viable institutions and flexible relationships capable of facilitating inter-state relations (e.g., division of powers between orders of government), intrastate linkages (e.g., states or lander representation at the central level) and inter-community cooperation. Their emphasis on process, institutions can be seen as a rising out of politics, the genesis of institutions resulting essentially from the conflicts and power struggles of economic, societal and political actors. However, the question of territory is also central to any study of federalism and it allows for the expression of both diversity and unity.11

While for analytic purposes we can identify a variety of species of federalism, in reality, not only are the lines of separation between them not fixed, but neither is the official terminology used to describe them uniform. Thus, regarding the latter, Switzerland and Canada, both federations, retain their original names, the Helvetic Confederation and the Confederation of Canada. Spain and South Africa are federations in almost every respect, but neither refers to itself as such. Federations themselves range from Nigeria, perennially under centralized military government, to rather centralized India, to the increasingly centralized United States, to moderately diffused Germany, to very noncentralized Canada.

With regard to the differences between federations and confederations, reviewing all the variations, we may conclude that not only are the divisions flexible but that federations serve what are agreed to be single nations in which the federal government has direct contact with the people. Confederations, on the other hand, not only unite several states but different national states or the equivalent thereof and that the federal government must reach the people only or predominantly through those national states. Stated differently, federations are "tighter" -- partly national and partly federal, in the words of The Federalist, and confederations "looser" -- partly federal and partly leagues. Moreover, a successful federation will be based on a common liberal democratic civil society for the whole, while a successful confederation will be based on a union of often distinctive democratic commonwealths.

Another way to think of the distinction is that federations are concerned with nation-building for the comprehensive unit while confederations are most ambiguous on that subject, even if the union is designed to be a perpetual one as in the case of the Articles of Confederation. This is reflected in the lack of all-union citizenship in confederations or making that citizenship entirely derivative on citizenship in constituent units, unlike federations at which citizenship in the federation stands at least semi-independently from citizenship in the constituent units. Ultimately there is the ability of the federal government to reach out directly to the national citizens even within the constituent units that offers different possibilities which may or may not be used, while such possibilities are distinctly more limited in confederations and confederal arrangements.

There is also more leeway in the forms of regime of the constituent units in confederations than in federations. All the regimes in a federation must be similar in form. Indeed, some would argue, as do Duchacek and Ostrom, that they must be democratic for a true federation to exist.12 Confederations can have a greater range of regime forms among their constituent units and still survive and thrive.

Here Duchacek goes beyond what this writer would see as possible because he includes bodies that are only slightly more than associations of states linked by treaty as confederal arrangements, beyond what we will consider here, even though we will recognize them as extensions of the same continuum. In this book, the United Nations and similar treaty bodies will be seen as beyond the limits of the confederal definition.

Finally, inter-entity decision-making in confederal arrangements more closely resembles diplomatic negotiation and decision-making among sovereigns than within nation-states. While this should not be regarded as absent from federations, for example, local governments within metropolitan regions conduct much of their business in a manner reminiscent of international relations.13

In some respects, a more precise measure of confederalism is the degree of independent access that constituent states in a particular federal arrangement have to the international arena. Thus, federation and confederation in confederal arrangements, while separable for analytic purposes, in fact exist along a continuum.

We should not regard so many of these arrangements simply as an extension by treaty of accepted international relations among states. Even where the arrangement in question has acquired all the properties of a confederation, it is rarely called that formally. On the other hand, even intentionally far weaker linkages do more than standard treaties. Perhaps the difference is best described in the Treaty of Berne establishing the Universal Postal Union, one of the oldest of the intergovernmental associations. "The countries between which the present Convention has been concluded form, under the designation Universal Postal Union, a single territory for the reciprocal exchange of correspondence."14

When the whole world or a segment of it is considered governmentally to be a single territory even for a limited functional purpose, that already brings the arrangements for governing that territory, at least for that function, under the rubric of federalism.

This does not obviate the question of why turn to old terminology to describe new phenomena? It would be possible to invent new terms, but in political language as in so many other things there are great virtues in continuity, even if that continuity embraces certain changes. Certainly the term "democracy" as we use it today is not what the Greeks meant by democracy when they invented the term 2,500 years ago; so, too, with the term "state," whose meaning differs today from what it was in premodern times.

The important thing is that there are fundamental connections between these differing definitions that justify the use of the same term to describe them. That is much more so in the case of the terminology of federalism than in many other cases. In the study of federalism, new terms have been invented where needed. Federation, for example, invented after 1787, and the invention of the first federation through the United States Constitution. But at the same time it is not only useful but advisable to maintain continuities where they exist, as they do in the realm of confederal arrangements.

Not only that, but by use of a term already loaded with meaning we are helped to avoid implying more meaning to particular phenomena than they legitimately can bear. There is a virtue to approaching reality by holding that if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is highly likely to be a duck. By the same token, if we see something that does not but which we would like to refer to as a duck, having a prior definition to measure it against helps us to avoid jumping to erroneous conclusions.

In the 1990s this new phenomenon began to be recognized on both sides. Students of federalism, less bound by conventional statist thinking, began recognizing the phenomenon a decade earlier, but still only the best students and only in limited ways. In the late 1980s the first students of international relations began to make the discovery from the direction of their discipline. By 1994 the number of articles to appear from both perspectives took a quantum leap forward. So, too, the other, even more public, forums.

For example, in late 1994 the renowned Salzburg Seminar announced its 1995 core program. Of its eleven workshops, three -- The European Union After 1996, Transnational Law: Intellectual Property Rights, and Building and Sustaining Democracies: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations -- dealt directly with the new confederalization, while four more -- The Globalization of American Popular Culture, Involuntary Migration, The Impact of the Media on Politics, Public Policy and World Events, and Preserving the National Heritage: The Realities, the Politics, the Rewards -- dealt with the environment in which it was taking place.

One of the signs of the times is an upsurge in journal articles submitted on the subjects treated in this book. As co-editor of Publius: The Journal of Federalism, I have noticed this increase in the past few years, either through articles actually submitted or authors contacting Publius' editors with regard to possible submissions. This new interest is most welcome, expressed through Publius and elsewhere.


From Statism to Multilateralism to Confederalism

What we see before us is the development of a set of international regimes of varying scope and constitutional intensity, almost entirely in the post-World War II period, that are in the process of replacing the pre-World War II international system with a new global order. We can describe that change as the movement from statism to multilateralism to confederalism.

The international system prior to World War II was based upon the Westphalian state system and emphasized the sovereignty of individual states, what we may refer to as statism. Beginning in the middle of World War II, the United States took the lead in an effort to modify statism through multilateralism, which can be defined as the linking of sovereign states to collectively establish multilateral arrangements. In this case, multilateralism began with the states allied against the Axis in World War II. Later it was expanded to include the reconstituted Axis states and the newly constituted Third World states. Multilateralism was fostered to allow the development of new international trade, monetary, and security regimes embodied in the Bretton Woods Agreement and the United Nations Charter and supplemented by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

None of this would have gotten started or moved forward had the United States not had the economic and military hegemony that it had. The U.S. had assumed the free trade mantle that its former mother country, Great Britain, had worn in the nineteenth century and when its hegemonic position had allowed it to do so, it pressed its point of view on other states, no matter how reluctant.

Even the United States had problems at the beginning. The Executive branch of the American federal government wanted to go further than the Legislative branch would allow. Hence, the original Executive branch proposal for an International Trade Organization was rejected by the U.S. Senate and abandoned, to be replaced by the looser arrangements of Bretton Woods. Similarly, while the U.S. Senate reversed its post-World War I position and ratified American membership in the United Nations, it very carefully restricted American acceptance of United Nations decisions and associated agreements such as the treaty outlawing genocide.

Indeed, for a decade both the economic and political agreements accepted on paper languished in practice and it was only in the 1950s as a result of changing circumstances and newly perceived needs that there were practical steps under both. GATT began to become more effective, despite all the exceptions which it allowed, and the United Nations, paralyzed by U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War, took on a certain additional strength when the Korean War broke out, as a result of the Soviet boycott of the Security Council at the time. Hence, in the 1950s there began a slow movement to strengthen multilateralism, a movement which took another step forward in the 1970s, especially after 1971. By that time the United States had lost the hegemonic position that it had in 1944 and the agreements were renegotiated, thereby making the voices of the other industrialized member states better able to make themselves heard.

No doubt, the diminution of American hegemony actually allowed the next steps to take place since the smaller states of the world which, by that time, were no longer insignificant economic powers and which were able to influence policy more directly. This was particularly true in the case of Western Europe which had the additional strength of the European Economic Community which already had become the European Community. While the EC was not yet capable of truly rivaling the United States, it did make the industrial states of Western Europe a great deal stronger in negotiating with the Americans. At the other end of the world, Japan actually began to rival the U.S. in critical manufacturing fields such as automobiles and electronics. The old hegemonic-based order moved on to become an oligopolistic one instead, which also allowed smaller and weaker countries more room in which to maneuver.

This had become possible because the EC had moved from multilateralism in Europe and was beginning to become a confederal arrangement. After its crisis of the 1970s, in the 1980s that confederal arrangement became even more real and by the end of the decade the Community was on its way to becoming a confederation, which it did once the Treaty of Maastricht was ratified and went into effect. Meanwhile, the world as a whole was moving beyond multilateralism and into confederal arrangements marked by the transformation of GATT into the World Trade Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the integration of the ex-Communist Bloc into the worldwide system.

This was not a simple movement but had its ups and downs, fits and starts. For example, the United Nations under its new crypto-federalist Secretary General Bhutros Ghali, attempted to increase its power through multiplying peacekeeping missions. These did not succeed and Ghali was forced to retreat from that exposed position. Moreover, the civil wars in Yugoslavia, which had been provoked by the problematic moves by members of the European Community, should have offered the EC an opportunity to become the peacekeepers of Europe, but they could not rise to the challenge and merely provided a holding action from then until the United States was willing to enter the arena and use NATO as its device to allow a joint North American-European peacekeeping effort. Still, by the mid-1990s the world had not only abandoned the old statism but was reaching well beyond multilateralism which was essentially a matter of international relations among states well into the development of confederalism as a new norm.15


Notes

1. Ivo Duchecek, "Consociations of Fatherlands: The Revival of Confederal Principles and Practices," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 12 (Fall 1982):129.

2. Ibid., p. 129.

3. Guy LaForest and Douglas Brown describe this janus-like phenomenon in their book Integration and Fragmentation and, along with their colleagues, provide us with a good overview of what is happening in both directions. Douglas Brown and Guy LaForest, eds., Integration and Fragmentation (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1995).

4. Duchacek, "Consociations of Fatherlands."

5. Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 47-48.

6. Ibid., p. 38.

7. Daniel J. Elazar, ed., American Confederal Experiences, Past and Present (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming).

8. Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Community and Union: The Rebirth of Confederal Arrangements in Europe (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming).

9. Daniel J. Elazar, ed., The World Engaged: Confederal Arrangements in the Caribbean, Eurasia, Southeast Asia, and the World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming).

10. Duchacek, "Consociations of Fatherlands," p. 136.

11. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), Ch. 2, Alain-G. Gagnon, "The Political Uses of Federalism," p. 15.

12. Vincent Ostrom, "A Computational-Conceptual Logic for Federal Systems of Governance," in Daniel J. Elazar ed., Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing in the Post-Modern Epoch (Lanham, MD: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and University Press of America, 1991), pp. 3-22; and Ivo D. Duchacek "Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research," in Daniel J. Elazar ed., Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing in the Post-Modern Epoch, pp. 23-40.

13. Vincent Ostrom, ed., "The Study of Federalism at Work," Publius special issue, vol. 25, no. 4 (Fall 1995).

14. Treaty of Berne, 9 October 1874, Article 3:1.

15. Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195-232.


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